224 U.S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. does not exist, there is no due process. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 111; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 46; Bell v. Bell 181 U. S. 175, 178; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14. The judgment of the court below did not accord the equal protection of the law, because when rendered it was for both ouster and fine. Gulf &c. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 154; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 559; Southern Ry. Co. v. Green, 216 U. S. 400. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Fed. Rep. 177; S. C., 221 U. S. 1, involved the question of whether there had been a violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act by the Standard Oil form of organization and method of conducting business. The Sherman Act does not, in substance, differ from the statutes of Missouri as construed below, further than that one applies to interstate and the other to state transactions. The same facts which adjudged guilt below were here held to establish guilt under the Sherman Act. To prove the Government's case, all the evidence offered below in the Missouri case was, in fact, offered therein; the same reasons for a decree and judgment were given by both state and Federal courts. In the case under the Sherman Act the defendants were given a fixed time in which to reorganize so as to avoid the consequences which now confront them. When the reorganization takes effect, the trust will be dissolved and the existing evils destroyed. As the organization in both cases made guilt, the reorganization will make clean. Hence if that reorganization takes place, as this court has heretofore decided would be proper, no objection can be made of a further violation of the State law by reason of the original reorganization. The large investments in Missouri are of great importance and entitled to serious consideration. The Standard Oil Company of Indiana was wholly owned by the Stand Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. 224 U. S. ard Oil Company of New Jersey. Upon reorganization its stock will be distributed to the individual stockholders of that company. Not so with the Waters-Pierce Company. In case of absolute ouster, the consequences are fearful. If there be a literal construction and enforcement of § 8972, Rev. Stat., Missouri, 1899, and §§ 8969 and 8975, Laws of Missouri, 1907, pp. 379, 380, the property becomes practically confiscated, and any person dealing therewith a felon. The judgment of ouster and a fine was clearly wrong as to the Republic Oil Company which voluntarily withdrew from the State. The action should, as to it, therefore, be simply abated at its costs. The Republic Oil Company having withdrawn from the State, thereby gave to informant, in substance, the entire relief sought, which was solely exclusion from the State. To thereafter retain the case and, without any claim for such relief, or intimation before judgment that it could be granted, adjudge against that company a fine of $50,000, was clearly the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in an original civil proceeding. Neither the common law, statute nor constitution so authorized. The effect of the judgment of ouster is confiscation. Under § 8972 (Rev. Stats. of Missouri, 1899) and §§ 8969, 8975 (Laws of Missouri, 1907, pp. 379, 380), the obligation of a contract is impaired and the equal protection of the law denied. It needs no argument to demonstrate that these sections do not accord the equal protection of the law. Neither an offending corporation nor its successor or assign, to whom it may sell its plant, under the literal reading of the statute may in the State deal in a commodity made by it. No person may, in the State, deal in any commodity made by such corporation, its successor or assign. Individuals and partnerships engaged in the 224 U. S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. same business and alike guilty of the same act and of a violation of the same statute, cannot be so punished. Their property receives no such blight. According to previous decisions, the illegality of such discrimination is too clear to admit of discussion. Gulf &c. Railway Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 154; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 559; Southern Ry. Co. v. Green, 216 U. S. 400. Section 8972 denies freedom in making contracts. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 390; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 53; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 172, 173. The statute is not one of exclusion; it applies alike to all corporations, domestic and foreign, and therefore cannot be upheld upon the ground of being a condition to a foreign corporation entering the State or remaining therein. Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401, 409. So the Constitution of the United States is a protection against the act of the State regardless of the form which it takes or method it is to pursue. It may be by judgment of a court or come into existence for the first time by the effect to be given to such judgment. Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Indiana, 194 U. S. 579, 589; Attorney General v. Lowry, 199 U. S. 233, 239; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 580; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Illinois, 201 U. S. 506, 519, 520. Here the court below enforced its own penalty of ouster for an abuse of a corporate privilege. The judgment of ouster as entered and especially as it is to be enforced under § 8972, Rev. Stat. of Missouri, 1899, and § 8975, Laws of Missouri, 1907, 380, unwarrantably interferes with the right to do interstate business and hence it violates § 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91. The language of the judgment not only revokes the license, but also recites that the respondents are "hereby ousted of any and all rights accorded to them under the laws of this State from doing business in this State." The judgment of ouster as written should not stand. If not absolutely reversed, it should at least be modified. The statute, for the violation of which there was an ouster, was, prior to the trial, repealed, and it was not due process of law to enforce it. State v. Centerville Bridge Co., 18 Alabama, 678, 681; In re Franklin Telegraph Co., 119 Massachusetts, 449. Mr. Elliott W. Major, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, and Mr. Charles G. Revelle, for defendants in error. MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The Standard Oil Company and the Republic Oil Company by this writ of error seek to reverse a judgment of ouster and fine of $50,000, entered against each of them in original quo warranto proceedings by the Supreme Court of Missouri, contending that they are thereby deprived of property without due process of law and denied the equal protection of the law. The briefs and arguments for the defendants were addressed mainly to the proposition that the fine of $50,000 was a criminal sentence in a civil suit and void because beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and, for the further reason, that the pleadings and prayer gave no notice which would support such a sentence. 1. It is, of course, essential to the validity of any judgment that the court rendering it should have had jurisdiction, not only of the parties, but of the subject matter. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 234, 247. But it is equally well settled that it is for the Supreme Court of a State finally to determine its own jurisdiction and that of other local tribunals, since the decision involves a construction of the laws of the State by which the court was organized. In this case the constitution of Missouri declared that "the Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, quo warranto, certiorari and other remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same." Its decision and judg ment necessarily imply that under that clause of the constitution it had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and authority to enter judgment of ouster and fine in civil quo warranto proceedings. That ruling is conclusive upon us regardless whether the judgment is civil or criminal or both combined. Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U. S. 413, 420. 2. The Federal question is whether, in that court, with such jurisdiction, the defendants were denied due process of law. Under the Fourteenth Amendment they were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. That necessarily required that the notice and the hearing should correspond, and that the relief granted should be appropriate to that which had been heard and determined on such notice. For even if a court has original general jurisdiction, criminal and civil, at law and in equity, it cannot enter a judgment which is beyond the claim asserted, or which, in its essential character, is not responsive to the cause of action on which the proceeding was based. "Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the subject-matter, and of the parties, it is still limited in its modes of procedure, and in the extent and character of its judgments. It must act judicially in all things, and cannot then transcend the power conferred by the law. If, for instance, the action be upon a money demand, |