The 3d section of the act of 1812, making provision for the corps of engineers, provided that the cadets theretofore appointed in the service of the United States, as well as those who might in future be appointed, should, at the pleasure of the President, be attached to the Military Academy at West Point, made subject to the regulations thereof, and to be thereby consolidated with the original corps of engineers.

Being consolidated with the original corps, they could not, therefore, be properly distinguished from them afterwards, but were subject to be called into actual service whensoever and wheresoever it might please the President, and made amenable to the rules and articles of war. So that it follows, as a legal consequence, that the cadets attached to the Military Academy at West Point are entitled to the benefits of the provision made for wounds and disabilities received in the line of their duty by the 14th section of the act of 1802.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

April 8, 1820. SIR: I avail myself of the earliest hour at which prior engagements would permit it, to give you my opinion on the question "whether cadets who are wounded in the line of their duty are entitled to pensions?"

By the 1st section of the act of the 3d of March, 1815, "fixing the military peace establishment of the United States," the corps of engineers was expressly authorized to be retained; and, by the 7th section of the same act, it was provided that the several corps authorized should be entitled to the same provision for wounds and disabilities, &c., as was authorized by the act of the 16th of March, 1802, entitled "An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States."

By the letter on which your question is endorsed it appears that the inquiry relates to the cadets at West Point. If these cadets, then, constitute a part of the corps of engineers retained on the peace establishment by the act just cited, they are, by its express enactment, entitled to the same provision for wounds and disabilities as was authorized by the act of the 15th of March, 1802. Do those cadets constitute a part of that corps?

By the 26th section of the act of the 16th of March, 1802, just referred to, a separate and distinct corps of engineers was, for the first time, authorized to be raised; and it was to consist, among others, of ten cadets.

By the next section of the same act it was provided that the corps of engineers, thus organized, should constitute the Military Academy at West Point. Thus, in its origin, these ten cadets did constitute a part of the corps of engineers. By the 3d section of the act of the 29th of April, 1812, making provision for the corps of engineers," it was enacted that the cadets theretofore appointed in the service of the United States, as well as those who might in future be appointed, as thereinafter directed, might, at the pleasure of the President, be attached to the Military Academy at West Point, and be subject to the established regulations thereof. By the same section it was provided that, in order to qualify them to be thus attached, they should, among other things, have engaged to serve for five years, unless sooner discharged; and that they should be entitled to the pay and emoluments allowed by law to cadets in the corps of engi

neers.

I have had the honor, on a former occasion, to express to you the opinion that the legal effect of this section of the act of 1812 was to consolidate with the original corps of engineers the cadets thus authorized to be added, so that they could no longer be distinguished, in any respect, from that corps; that, like them, they were subject to be called into actual service whensoever and wheresoever it pleased the President to call them;

and that, like them, they were at all times subject to the rules and articles of war. Nor have I seen any reason to change this opinion; more espe cially since I understand it has been approved both by the President and yourself. The cadets, thus composing a part of the corps of engineers, are embraced, by every provision affecting that corps, in general terms; and, consequently, are embraced by the provision of the 7th section of the act of the 3d of March, 1815, before cited. That section, as we have seen, is, that the several corps authorized by that act (of which the corps of engineers was one) should be entitled to the same provision for wounds and disabilities, &c., as was authorized by the act of the 16th of March, 1802. The only remaining question is, whether the act thus referred to authorizes pensions for wounds and disabilities?

It is proper to observe, that the reference thus made to the act of the 16th of March, 1802, is not made for the purpose of ascertaining who was entitled to the provision made for wounds and disabilities; for that was already ascertained, as we have seen, by the act of 3d of March, 1815, itself. But the reference to the former law is made solely for the purpose of ascertaining what the provision was which was thereby made for wounds and disabilities; and, on turning to the 14th section of the former law, we find it enacted "that if any officer, non-commissioned officer, musician, or private, in the corps composing the peace establishment, shall be disabled, by wounds or otherwise, while in the line of his duty in public service, he shall be placed on the list of invalids of the United States, at such rate of pay," &c.

Thus (contrary, I confess, to my impression on the first presentation of the question) I find myself brought to the conclusion that the cadets attached to the Military Academy at West Point are entitled to the benfits of this provision for wounds and disabilities received in the line of their duty. I am, &c., &c.,

To the SECRETARY of War.

WM. WIRT.

URSULINE NUNS OF ORLEANS.

The Ursuline nuns of New Orleans have possessory title to their enclosures that cannot be disturbed; the evidence, as to residence, is imperfect; suspension of sales suggested, to afford Congress an opportunity of acting upon the claim.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

April 11, 1820.

SIR: I have examined the case of the Ursuline nuns of New Orleans, which you did me the honor to refer to me on yesterday; and proceed to give you the best opinion I have been able to form on the imperfect and ex parte evidence by which their memorial is supported.

They appear to have had a continued possession of more than seventy years of all the grounds embraced by their enclosure; which, I under stand, embraces the whole of the four squares bounded by Levee, Ursu line, Royal, and Garrison streets, except so much thereof as is occupied by the hospital, barracks, quarters, &c., distinguished by a yellow colo on the plat accompanying their memorial, and marked C.

There was an attempt, in the year 1799, to disturb their possession to that portion of these grounds which lies on the back of the barracks, as appears by the document marked D; but it seems not to have been successful.

To so much of these grounds, therefore, as is embraced by their enclosure, they have, I think, a title by possession, which cannot be justly disturbed.

They allege, however, that the whole of the four squares was originally granted to their order; that Louis XV, in violation of the grant, took possession of that part of it now occupied for military purposes; that although, from a regard to the public good, and with reference to the exercise of charity to the sick in the hospital, they yielded to this invasion of their rights, yet so soon as the use of the property for the specific purpose for which it was taken from them ceased, they insist that the right reverts to them; and hence they enter their protest against the sale of the hospital and barrack grounds, and pray you to suspend the exercise of the power given to you by the act of the 20th April, 1818, until they can have an opportunity of bringing their claim before Congress.

In support of this claim, they refer to evidence which is not produced; of the effect of which, therefore, it is impossible to speak. That which they do produce is too light and inconclusive to be assumed as the basis of legal title; and as to the hospital and barrack property, the evidence of long possession is against them.

Nevertheless, as they ask a suspension of your proceedings only until they can have an opportunity of submitting the full evidence of their claim to Congress, I submit it, that unless the public service demands an immediate sale, it is a question fairly addressed to the grace of the President, whether it would not be better to afford them this opportunity.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

To the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

WM. WIRT.

BREVETS IN THE MARINE CORPS.

There is no act of Congress now in force which recognises any such office as that of brevet major of marines.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

April 22, 1820. SIR: In answer to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to state it as my opinion, that, as no such office as that of brevet major in the marine corps is recognised by any act of Congress now in force, the President cannot confer that rank under the act of 1814.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

WM. WIRT.

THE WABASH SALINE.

The general power given to the President to lease the Saline on the Wabash carries with it all the incidental powers necessary to a settlement with the lessees, to transfer the kettles to a subsequent lessee, or to a former one, for a debt growing out of a lease of the works. Taylor, Wilkins, & Morrison are not entitled to pipes found on the premises and paid for to the preceding lessees, but only for permanent and useful improvements made by them, and which were previously authorized by the President.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

April 22, 1820.

SIR: I proceed, at the earliest moment I have been able to command, to answer your questions relative to the claim of Taylor, Wilkins, & Morrison, for their improvements at the Saline on the Wabash.

The first question is: "Were the lessees entitled to compensation for pipes found on the premises by them, and paid for to the preceding lessees, if they remained in a state of repair to be used?",

The answer must of necessity be drawn from the lease; that alone is the contract of the parties. The Treasury advertisement is, no part of the contract. The only provision of the lease which can be relied on as supporting the claim presented by this question, is the following: "It is further agreed, on the part of the United States, that the said Jonathan Taylor & Co. shall be paid by the United States a fair price, at the expiration of the present term, for all improvements that shall be made by them of a permanent and useful kind, which shall have been previously authorized by the President of the United States."

The pipes, to which the question relates, were not made by them. I answer this question, therefore, in the negative.

2. The second question is: "Are houses, sheds, cisterns, and reels, permanent and useful improvements within the meaning of the lease?" This is a question of fact. Questions relative to permanent improvements under leases of lands for agricultural purposes, have been, indeed so often made and decided, that it is well settled what are such improvements under such leases. This, however, will not assist us in the decision of an analogous question in relation to a lease of salt-works. I presume that houses, sheds, cisterns, and reels, are all necessary to the process of making salt; but whether the particular houses, sheds, cisterns, and reels, which were constructed by those lessees, were permanent and useful improvements, depends on a variety of circumstances, without a knowledge of which the question cannot be safely answered. They might be all built of such materials, and these so slightly put together, as not to deserve the name of permanent improvements; and all of them that were fixed, might be so situated as not to deserve the name of useful improvements. I understand that the making of salt calls for a great consumption of fuel. The pipes, in regard to which so much anxious provision is made in these leases, may be (for aught that I know) intended to carry the salt water to cisterns near the woods; it being cheaper, perhaps, to carry the water to the immediate neighborhood of the fuel, than to bring the fuel to the water. The consumption of fuel in one quarter, in the course of three years, (for which this lease was made,) might make it necessary to change the direction of the pipes; consequently, the position of the cisterns, and (for aught I know) of the houses and sheds too; so that those built under the preceding lease might be no longer useful to the succeeding lessee. This, therefore, is not only a question of fact,

but of complicated fact. I am sure that I shall be excused from answering it. It can be safely answered only by going on the ground, seeing the articles, and having their several uses explained.

3. The third question is: "Was the exclusion from the valuation of one-third of the pipes laid by the less es according to the stipulation?"

The lessees can claim for the pipes only under the stipulation that has been quoted. If the one-third excluded were permanent and useful improvements, previously authorized by the President, they were improperly excluded.

4. The fourth question is: "Can the assent of the President of the United States be inferred from any or all the acts of the government which have been enumerated ?"

These acts were: 1. That the government had an agent on the spot, whose assent is presumed from his not objecting to the improvements; and 2. That, in the subsequent lease to John Bates, there is a stipulation on his part that he will receive and pay for all the permanent and useful improvements that had been made by the said. Taylor & Co., and produce their receipts for such payment.

The stipulation between Taylor & Co. and government has been already quoted. It is, that they shall be paid for all improvements of a permanent and useful character, "which shall have been previously authorized by the President of the United States."

The first act of the government relied on as founding an inference of this previous authority on the part of the President, (if, indeed, it can be called an act,) is the silence of the agent. Before such an inference can be justified, it must be shown that the powers of this agent extended so far as to authorize him to represent the President of the United States in this respect. There is no proof of any such power before me. But if there was, I cannot perceive how his mere silence justifies the inference in question. The lessees were at liberty to make any improvement they pleased on their own account. If they contemplated an improvement with which they meant to charge the government, their contract required that they should submit their project beforehand to the President, and receive his previous authority for making it. If they commenced an improvement without asking for such authority, the only fair inference which could be drawn under the contract, was, that they were making the improvement for their own convenience and on their own account. The mere silence of the agent in such a case would prove nothing.

The lease to Bates was inter alios acta. The meaning of his stipulation is, that he will pay Taylor & Co. for all that they were authorized to charge to the government; but it does not by any means ascertain what they were authorized to charge to the government. This depends on their own lease, which requires them to show an authority from the Presi dent previous to the creation of the improvements. This they must show, and cannot justly infer, I think, from either of the acts in question. It is stepping aside from the question, (but not uselessly, I conceive,) to suggest that the claimants were concluded by the arrangement made between the authorized agents Street and Bates. If Street acted with full power, they were bound the instant the arrangement was made, and could not be unbound themselves by the manner in which they might think proper to word their receipt for the money paid under that arrangement. Besides, they knew that Bates had assumed the responsibility of the gov