contain the major objectives for which the conference was called, which is the establishment of relationships between the countries based on a limitation agreement which provides every country with a definite knowledge of the plans of the others and that sense of security which comes from such knowledge. I should like to make that point clear. A fixed agreed relationship between navies is what produces security and consequent good will. At just what level that relationship is established is not so important, so far as security is concerned.

Eight years ago, when the Washington treaty was signed, although it covered only two out of five kinds of warships, it tremendously increased the good understanding between the principal naval powers and it stopped by treaty the competitive building in battleships and aircraft carriers. It went much further than that, it fixed in the minds of the world the conception that navies could be limited by international agreement; and that competitive naval building, with its attendant international irritation, could be stopped. Although that treaty did not limit cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, it did so firmly establish the idea of limitation that there has been no serious body of opinion in any country in the world that has expressed itself against the theory, and there has been a constant effort to achieve in practice the conception which the Washington treaty fixed in public opinion. Those of us who have sat through the work of the preparatory commission and the three-power naval conference at Geneva must realize that putting into practice this great conception, like that of any other which affects so many diverse interests and runs counter to long-established custom, is fraught with great difficulties; but the experience gained in those meetings makes this achievement here all the more impressive, because for the three largest navies in the world the work that was left uncompleted at Washington in 1922 is now complete. Having been almost exclusively occupied during the past six years with various phases of the disarmament problem, I think I understand as well as anybody the difficulties of reaching such negotiated agreements and I do not hesitate therefore to volunteer an opinion as to the value of the agreement already assured. I can perhaps put it most briefly by saying that if in the threepower naval conference held at Geneva in 1927 we had been able to conclude a three-power treaty on similar terms, I should have been very proud of it as an effective, fair, and advantageous bargain for all three parties. This is equally true to-day, and I feel that we can well be proud of having found such a solution for our longstanding difficulties.

The greatest value of such agreements lies not so much in their immediate effect as in the benefits that come with time. The Washington agreement in regard to battleships was considered a splendid

achievement which it was, but battleships were then the center of so much contentious opinion that it was necessary to provide for extensive replacements in order to maintain a high level of efficiency for the battleship class. The mere fact that we reached treaty agreement in regard to capital ships in 1922 has removed them from the area of suspicion and competition and it has, therefore, been possible at this conference, with very little difficulty, to reach agreement to forego the replacement of these ships during the life of our treaty, in a manner that would have been considered unbelievable eight years ago.

The process that we are engaged in is a continuing process. There is no solution of the relationships between navies in the sense that you can have the solution of a mathematical problem. We must understand that all international problems are not susceptible of the same treatment. There are some that can be dealt with once and for all by some sweeping solution. This is sometimes true of the liquidation of a financial problem involving several countries. It is far from being true of the very intricate and delicate question of disarmament involving, as it does, the fundamental duty of defense which each government owes to its people. We must, therefore, recognize that we can not hope for any miraculous, instant solution of the problem of limiting navies; that we must approach it with infinite patience and good will as a continuing process; and that we must find ample reward in the periodic achievement of what may appear modest results.

We must also remember that, however convinced we may be of the soundness of our own ideas on limitation or reduction, we can not and must not try to impose them on others. The whole hope of the future of the disarmament movement lies in the willing acceptance by the powers concerned of agreements reached by negotiation, not imposed by force. If the parties to a conference reach willing agreement and feel, while the treaty remains in force, that not only have they been fairly treated but that the treaty has worked to the general advantage, they will come back to the next period conference with greater confidence, that they are warranted in accepting further measures of reduction. If on the other hand, through the exercise of undue pressure, governments are brought to accept measures of limitation which they accept grudgingly and which during the life of the treaty they feel to be oppressive to them, they will refuse to come back to the next conference or, if they come, it will be in a spirit which does not promote further progress. In this connection we must remember that just as we should resent any attempt to coerce us into accepting distasteful measures of disarmament, so we must be scrupulously careful to avoid seeking to impose our views on other people.

This delegation receives from home a considerable volume of correspondence from people who believe that certain measures are desirable, but from that tenable ground they go on to insist that we impose their views on other countries and oblige them to accept what we think is good for them. Aside from the fact that nobody has yet explained to us how we are to force other nations to do as we tell them, without resort to war, they must remember that no country can be coerced in this way, because its representatives remain always at entire liberty to pack up and go home; and, even if such coercion were possible, we must remember that the net result would be that this would be the last conference on limitation, for, having had one taste of these strong-arm methods of negotiation, other powers would have no desire to repeat the experiment.

I have talked to you only about those things which are now completed. The work which lies ahead of the conference at the moment involves both technical and political questions directly affecting Great Britain, France, and Italy. If there existed in the world no other powers than those present at this conference, these problems would be much simpler and easier of solution. We must not forget, however, that in this ancient and complex European system such problems are far from simple and that political considerations affecting these three powers also involve a broad range of other countries which remain outside the scope of our treaty and which are in no way bound by agreements reached here. It, therefore, behooves these three powers to scrutinize these problems very carefully not only in the light of their relations to each other but also in the light of their relations and commitments to other powers, with a view to determining what is the maximum contribution they can make to our general agreement, without prejudice to those other relationships which continue regardless of the agreement we are now seeking. And just as we bespoke general patience in order that we might have time to work out our problems, so it is now only a matter of fair play for us in our turn to show equal patience while other people make an effort to work out their problems.

We have good reason to hope that a five-power agreement may be signed before we leave here. Whether this is to be, we ought to know within a few days. If this is to be, it will mark the most notable testimony to the existence of a more secure confidence and peaceful world than any five powers have given since the war. If the full measure of that agreement cannot be had at this session, the three-power agreement can be made, and made on a basis which will welcome in the other two powers when their difficulties have been solved. We feel sure of ultimate solution, for the work that has been done here and the spirit in which it has been done are such as to spell either immediate or ultimate success.

17

Radio Address by the Chairman of the American Delegation, Henry L. Stimson, London, April 13, 1930

Almost three months ago the American Delegation landed in England to take part in the London Naval Conference. In order to understand its purpose and to appraise the results which have been accomplished it is necessary to view the background and history of which it is a part. Naval limitation has formed a part of the organized efforts of the world to limit international suspicions and promote good relations. It is a new effort and has grown gradually. At the First Hague Conference in 1899 the subject of limitation of arms was one of the purposes for which the conference was called, but all that resulted was a resolution favoring restriction as a desirable end. At the Second Hague Conference in 1907 it was considered too dangerous to put on the program. Naval competition was going on unchecked in those days, as it had been in one shape or another for centuries. This particular naval race ended in the Great War in 1914, and when that war was over another competitive naval building race had begun. This later one included the United States. For the first time in our history we found ourselves facing the irritations and ill will arising from naval competition. Neither the experiences of the war nor the exhaustion which it caused prevented the world from resuming naval competition, and we found ourselves entangled in it.

Under these circumstances President Harding called the Washington Conference and Mr. Hughes made his historic proposals. They were historic because they changed the moral standards of the world. Before those proposals were made human experience seemed to indicate that naval competition was inevitable. Since that day the conscience of the world has insisted that naval limitation by mutual agreement shall take the place of competition. The Washington Conference achieved enough to prove that what the conscience of the world demanded was a practical possibility. From the date of ratification of the Washington treaty not a battleship has been laid down by any nation in the world.

But though the success of that conference was great it was not complete. Only two kinds of warships were limited; cruisers, destroyers and submarines were not; and after the conference adjourned, competitive building began in those types competition

which bade fair to become dangerous. The Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations tried again and again to agree upon methods of limitation, but failed. In 1927 President Coolidge called the three-power conference at Geneva, but that conference failed to reach an agreement. Yet the work of these meetings was not entirely lost, for each one gave tangible evidence that the world believed in the principle of limitation and agreement. But each failure showed the extraordinary difficulty of reaching an international agreement upon that most vital concern of every sovereign State-national defense. And the aftermath of each failure made it more and more evident that an agreement was necessary to the good relations and stability of the naval world. International suspicion, irritation, and ill will-the ugly children of naval competition-began to show their heads again. At the very time when the world needed all its resources to recover financially and economically from the exhaustion of the Great War, the navies of the world were beginning to build up an expensive and dangerous rivalry. It was time to try again to halt this process. The other naval powers suggested that Great Britain and the United States should see if they could get close enough together in their figures to give assurance that the failure of Geneva would not be repeated. Long negotiations took place last summer culminating in the visit of Prime Minister MacDonald to the United States. Then followed this Naval Conference.

The problem which faced the American Delegation here was difficult and complicated. Since the Washington treaty the United States has laid down no battleships, no aircraft carriers, and no destroyers, and only three submarines. Impelled by the cruiser construction of the other nations our Congress had instituted a cruiser program, but only two ships of that program were in the water. Our Navy was ill balanced. The end of the battleship holiday instituted by the Washington treaty was approaching and most of our other ships were becoming old and approaching their normal time for replacement. The question was, should the United States replace the bulk of its Navy on a competitive basis or upon a basis of limitation reached by mutual agreement with the other naval nations of the world? Would those other countries whose navies were in better condition than ours agree to such limitation without taking advantage of their better bargaining position? It is to the credit of the faith in the principle of limitation held by Great Britain and Japan that they made no such effort.

Our principal objective when we came here was to extend the principle of limitation by agreement so that it should cover all the elements of the fleet and thus complete what had been left undone at Washington, at the League, and at Geneva. So far as the fleets of