thus hope to silence any batteries the rebels might bring to bar our passage. If, then, we should succeed in laying the pontoons, it would simply be a matter of a rush up the heights under cover of the fire of our artillery, and a key position would be gained. It should further be added that the rebels had fortified far more below than they had above; and these considerations determined the choice of some of the fords of the Upper Rappahannock as the point of traverse. United States Ford, ten miles above Fredericksburgh, was selected as the point. Happily a far greater degree of secrecy than we had hitherto succeeded in preserving as to our projected movements was this time obtained. The pontoons, of which a large additional supply had been obtained in Washington, were sent up by a back-road and under cover of night-at the same time others were sent down the river to other points. Roads were cut to the various fords above; spots were cleared of their timber for positions for batteriesbut precisely similar work was carried on at a half dozen other points. The weather ever since the battle of Fredericksburgh, with one or two brief exceptions, had been magnificent, and the roads were in excellent condition for military operations. All felt, however, that this season of grace, inviting to action, could not last; that a single night's rain would render the roads impracticable for the whole winter, and we could not help praying that the golden moments might be utilized. Would to Heaven they had! Although an encouraging degree of secrecy had been observed as to the projected movement, the active preliminary preparations going on of which the rebels were made aware by their numerous spies on this side of the river-admonished them to be on the look-out here. The advance was determined for Tuesday, the twentieth. On the Thursday previous the rebel pickets were sending up signal rockets all night, and the observations of our own signal corps showed that a division of rebel infantry had been moved up to the vicinity of the ford. Presently mounds of the red clay of the region, which began to become apparent through the glass, showed that the watchful enemy was at work throwing up riflepits. the pontoons would be laid under the direction of the corps of engineers, protected by our sharpshooters. It was presumed that a couple of hours would suffice to see this done, and four hours was considered enough for the crossing of the whole infantry force. The crossing of a river, though in itself an operation belonging rather to tactics than to strategy, may yet be a cardinal point in a whole system of strategic movements. Our hope was that we should surprise the enemy at Banks's Ford. Hooker's and Franklin's grand divisions would then be thrown across the river, while at the same time one of Sumner's corps (the Second) would make a feint with pontoons, etc., some miles below Fredericksburgh. The key of the whole situation is the hills in the rear of Taylor's house, a mile back from the ford, and a mile and a half below it. If we should succeed in making the heights, and taking possession of this position, the game would be entirely in our own hands. The strong rebel position in the rear of Fredericksburgh would thus be turned, and just as soon as this was effected, Gen. Sumner was to cross at the old place, directly opposite Fredericksburgh, and attack the works in front. The reserve grand division of Gen. Sigel was assisting in guarding the line of the river and our lines of communication. On Tuesday every preparation had been made. That day Gen. Burnside issued a general order, announcing that the army of the Potomac was "about to meet the enemy once more," and that "the auspicious moment had arrived to strike a great and mortal blow to the rebellion, and to gain that decisive victory which is due to the country." This order was read to the men that evening, and night found the infantry encamped in the woods within easy speaking distance. The positions for the batteries had all been selected. The batteries were at hand. The pontoons were within reach, a short distance back of the river. We were sitting, the editor-in-chief of the Times and the present writer, in our tent at headquarters that evening, looking forward to a start on horseback for the scene of operations before daylight the following morning. About nine o'clock a light, ominous pattering was heard On Monday, at one o'clock, the troops were on the canvas roof. "It is rain!" was the exset in motion, Hooker's command moving in col-clamation, and, looking out from the tent, the umn up by one road, Franklin's by another. It heavens showed all the signs of a terrible storm. was a march of but ten or a dozen miles, and From that moment we felt that the winter camnight saw them encamped in the woods, within paign had ended. convenient distance of the fords. The crossing It was a wild Walpurgis night, such as Goethe was to have been attempted on Tuesday morn- paints in the "Faust" while the demons held ing. Information brought by our spies and revel in the forest of the Brocken. All hopes scouts from the other side of the river deter- that it would be а mere shower" were presentmined a day's delay, and, at the last moment, ly blasted. It was evident we were in for a the plan was changed. Instead of attempting regular north-easter, and among the roughest of the crossing at United States Ford, Gen. Burn- that rough type. Yet was there hard work done side resolved to make it at Banks's Ford-four that fearful night. One hundred and fifty pieces miles below and the movement was put off for of artillery were to be planted in the position seanother day. On Wednesday morning the cross-lected for them by Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery ing would take place. With the first gray dawn a man of rare energy and of a high order of professional skill. The pontoons, also, were been a desperate experience and yet not by any drawn nearer toward the river, but it was dread-means as bad as might be supposed. The men ful work; the roads, under the influence of the rain, were becoming shocking; and by daylight, when the boats should all have been on the banks, ready to slide down into the water, but fifteen had been gotten up—not enough for one bridge, and five were wanted! The night operations had not escaped the attention of the rebels. Early in the morning a signal gun was fired opposite the ford, reminding one of that other signal gun fired by them on the morning of Thursday, the eleventh December, when we began laying the pontoon opposite Fredericksburgh, and which was the token for the concentration of the whole force at that point. It was indispensable that we should secure all the advantages of a surprise; and though our intention was thus blown to their ears early on Wednesday morning, we were, nevertheless, forty-eight hours ahead of them, and with favorable conditions should have been able to carry our position before they could possibly concentrate. Accordingly a desperate effort was made by the Commanding General to get ready the bridges. It was obvious, however, that, even if completed, it would be impossible for us, in the then condition of the ground, to get a single piece of artillery up the opposite declivity. It would be necessary to rely wholly upon the infantry-indeed, wholly on the bayonet. Happily, if the rebels should prove to be in strong force, the country is too thickly wooded to admit of much generalship, and it was hoped that our superior weight of metal would carry the day. Early in the forenoon I rode up to the headquarters of Gens. Hooker and Franklin, about two miles from Banks's Ford. The night's rain had made deplorable havoc with the roads. The nature of the upper geologic deposits of this region affords unequalled elements for bad roads. The sand makes the soil pliable, the clay makes it sticky, and the two together form a road out of which, when it rains, the bottom drops, but which is at the same time so tenacious that extrication from its clutch is all but impossible. The utmost effort was put forth to get pontoons enough into position to construct a bridge or two. Double and triple teams of horses and mules were harnessed to each pontoon-boat. It was in vain. Long powerful ropes were then attached to the teams, and one hundred and fifty men were put to the task on each boat. The effort was but little more successful. They would founder through the mire for a few feet- - the gang of Lilliputians with their huge-ribbed Gulliver and then give up breathless. Night arrived, but the pontoons could not be got up. The rebels had discovered what was up, and the pickets on the opposite bank called over to ours that they "would come over to-morrow and help us build the bridge." That night the troops again bivouacked in the same position in the woods they had held the night before. You can imagine it must have were in the woods, which afforded them some shelter from the wind and rain, and gave them a comparatively dry bottom to sleep on. Many had brought their shelter-tents; and making a flooring of spruce, hemlock, or cedar boughs, and lighting huge camp-fires, they enjoyed themselves as well as the circumstance would permit. the following morning a whisky ration, provided by the judicious forethought of Gen. Burnside, was on hand for them. On Thursday morning saw the light struggling through an opaque envelope of mist, and dawned upon another day of storm and rain. It was a curious sight presented by the army as we rode over the ground, miles in extent, occupied by it. One might fancy some new geologic cataclysm had overtaken the world; and that he saw around him the elemental wrecks left by another Deluge. An indescribable chaos of pontoons, wagons, and artillery encumbered the road down to the river - supply wagons upset by the roadsideartillery "stalled" in the mud. ammunition trains mired by the way. Horses and mules dropped down dead, exhausted with the effort to move their loads through the hideous medium. One hundred and fifty dead animals, many of them buried in the liquid muck, were counted in the course of a morning's ride. And the muddle was still further increased by the bad arrangements, or rather the failure to execute the arrangements that had been made. It was designed that Franklin's column should advance by one road and Hooker's by another. But, by mistake, a portion of the troops of the left grand division debouched into the road assigned to the centre, and cutting in between two divisions of one of Hooker's corps, threw every thing into confusion. In consequence, the woods and roads have for the past two days been filled with stragglers, though very many of them were involuntary stragglers, and were evidently honestly seeking to rejoin their regiments. That It was now no longer a question of how to go on; if it was a question how to get back. night (Thursday) the three days' cooked rations which the men had taken in their haversacks when starting, would give out, and the other six days' provisions were in the supply trains, which stuck fast in the mud miles behind. Indeed, the rations had already, in many cases, given out, and boxes of hard crackers were brought up on mules or carried on men's shoulders. An order from General Burnside to withdraw the forces to their old position was momentarily expected. It did not come, but instead, another order stating that Gen. Burnside had "good reasons" for commanding the troops to hold their present position till to-day. But whether we should move forward or backward, the first requisite obviously was to put the roads in such a condition as would admit of movement at all. Accordingly, all the available force was at once set to work corduroying the "rotten" roads and putting them into some kind of practical condition. Early this morning the army was ordered back to its old camping ground, and about noon the infantry began to pass by these headquarters. The lads trudged along tired enough, but jolly withal, and disposed to be quite facetious over the "mud campaign," whose odd experiences will doubtless long form the theme of conversation around many a camp-fire. Thus ends an enterprise which had every human promise of success, but which has been baulked and brought to naught by causes which mortal ken could neither have foreseen nor prevented. The fatal part played by the elements needs no comment. Whether this drawback might not have been overcome by vigorous effort and hearty cooperation on the part of the military leaders, is a question much mooted here. There are those who assert, that had it not been for the apathy of some in high places of military command, we might still have carried the day. This question, however, is one more fit to be brought to another bar than that of these col umns. There is, however, another point on which I cannot forbear to say a word. One of your Washington telegrams, referring to the causes of the late failure, says: "The Quartermaster's department, as usual, when an important movement is being executed, was behind with its supplies." I have not scrupled in this correspondence to use the privileges of criticism to its fullest extent, and can say to the reader, therefore, that this is a total misapprehension. Abundant supplies were on hand, and there are at this moment more than six million rations stored here in convenient depots. Our chief lack is not in the material, but the moral order. We do not fail for want of food or clothing, or ammunition or arms. The army was never so well supplied with all these things. No! The disease is of a more subtle nature. It is in the blood and brain. We want energy, capacity, faith, devotion. "Tis life of which our veins are scant." Doc. 111. BARBARITIES OF THE REBELS. GENERAL DODGE'S REPORT. HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CORINTH, MISS., CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit a few of the outrages committed upon the citizens of Alabama by the confederate troops. While all their leaders, from the President down, are boasting of their carrying on this war in accordance with the laws which govern nature in such cases, and are charging upon our troops all kinds of depredations and outrages, I think a few simple facts might put them to blush, and make those parties, and our press and people who are seconding the efforts of Davis to cast a stigma upon us, ashamed of the work they are doing. I will state merely what I know to be true. Abe Canadi and Mr. Mitchell were hung two weeks ago for being Union men. They lived on the Hacklebon settlement, Marion County, Ala bama. Mr. Hallwork and his daughter, of the same county, were both shot for the same cause. The latter was instantly killed; the former is still alive, but will probably die. Peter Lewis, and three of his neighbors, were hunted down by one hundred bloodhounds, and captured. The houses of Messrs. Palmer, Welsby, Williams, and the three Weightmans, and of some thirty others, were burned over their heads. The women and children were turned out of doors, and the community was notified that if they al lowed them to go into other houses, or fed or harbored them in any manner, they would be served the same. Mr. Peterson, living at the head of Bull Mountain, was shot. I am now feeding some one hundred of these families, who, with their women and children, some gray-haired men, and even cripples on crutches, were driven out, and found their way here, through the woods and highways, without food or shelter. All this was done for the simple reason that they were Union men, or that they had brothers or relatives in our army. us. The statements of these people are almost be- The only compensation left us in the failure of a movement, which, if made a week ago, would in all probability have been successful, is that we did not succeed in making it at the present time. If the storm which has stopped us on the north side of the Rappahannock had embargoed us on the south side, what is to-day only a misfortune, might have been a great disaster. There has been no opportunity of testing how the men would behave on again meeting the enemy. This time they have been tried by enduring rather than acting. But I believe that, in spite of all the drawbacks, they would have behaved well. And certainly, if "they conquer who suffer," the CAPTURE OF THE PRINCESS ROYAL. behavior of the army of the Potomac, amid circumstances so discouraging, may be counted half a battle and a whole victory. -N. Y. Times. Captain R. M. SAWYER, Doc. 112. REAR-ADMIRAL DU PONT'S REPORT. FLAG-SHIP WABASH, PORT ROYAL, S. C., screw-steamer Princess Royal, while attempting to run the blockade into Charleston. The following are the circumstances connected with her capture: After standing in a mile and a half, Lieut. Commander Quackenbush observed a steamer standing along the land, in the direction of Charleston. He fired two shots toward her, when her course was altered toward the beach, and she was run ashore. Two officers, and an armed boat's crew, were immediately sent to take possession. She proved to be the iron steam propeller Princess Royal, last from Bermuda, four days out, and laden, as far as he could learn, with rifled guns, arms, ammunition, steam-engines for the ironclads, and an assorted cargo. On taking possession, it was ascertained that the Captain, supercargo, pilot, and some of the petty officers, and a passenger, had left the ship when she struck, and escaped to the shore, which fact was substantiated by the Chief Mate, under supercargo, and Chief-Engineer, as well as by seeing the two missing boats lying on the beach deserted. By the active exertions of Acting Master E. Van Size, and Acting Ensign R. W. Cornell, of the Unadilla, assisted by a boat's crew from the United States steamers Housatonic and Augusta, and schooners Blunt and America, aided by two of the engineers of the prize, she was got off without sustaining any injury. There not being sufficient coal on board the Princess Royal to send her North, she was ordered, by the senior officer, to this port, to obtain a supply. No papers pertaining to the ship or cargo, were found on board of her at the time, except the shipping-articles and a log-book; but after her arrival here, Acting Master Van Size, of the Unadilla, the officer in charge of the prize, discovered, accidentally, in looking over the side, certain papers which had lodged in the fender, in the attempt to throw them overboard. These refer principally to the cargo, and with the papers before mentioned, (which were all that were found on board,) will be forwarded to the United States District Judge, at Philadelphia. The under supercargo, Hoxley; the Chief Mate, Shaw; the Captain's clerk, a young man named Hacksley, whose father is said to be interested in the cargo, two of the engineers, and several of the firemen, go North in the prize. The rest of the crew will be sent by the first opportunity. I desire to call the attention of the department to the fact that in this prize are two complete engines, said to be of great power, and intended for iron-clads. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, S. F. DU PONT, Rear-Admiral Com'g South-Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. Doc. 113. BATTLE OF BEAR RIVER, W. T. DESERET "NEWS" ACCOUNT. DESERET, February 10. In the last issue of the News, and the one preVOL. VI.-Doc. 26 | ceding that, we noticed, as far as we had information, "the expedition for the arrest of Indian chiefs, and the fight with the Indians." The volunteers have now returned to their quarters on the beach, east of the city, and through them we learn the facts in detail of the expedition, and of a hard-fought battle, which, though in a locality outside of our territorial limits, will not be the less felt in its results by our citizens. As we have been freely furnished with what information we have requested, we give it as freely to our readers at home and abroad. At the time we noticed the departure of the infantry under Captain Hoyt, and of the cavalry under Major McGarry. We now learn that the former had sixty-nine men of company K, Third infantry, and the latter had two hundred and twenty men of companies A, H, M, and K, Second cavalry. These, together with twelve mounted men as an escort to the baggage train, and Col. Connor, Major McGarry, Major Gallagher, and Lieut. Berry, constituted the entire fighting force that went North. Guides and others attached to the company are, of course, not counted. Five or six irregulars, among them "Dutch Joe," a gentleman with whom we have no acquaintance, went in and had a free fight, by way of wiping off all scores with the Indians; so altogether, the force exceeded a little over three hundred men. The judiciary probably regard the marching of the expedition as an aid to the U. S. Marshal, in serving writs for the apprehension of several chiefs; but it is quite as probable that the movement was but a part of the campaign upon which Colonel Connor and the volunteers have entered to clear the north and central routes to California of the marauding, thieving Indians, whose murderous hostilities we were so frequently called upon to record last summer. Two previous expeditions under Major McGarry were but the prelude to that which we have now to record, and as far as we can learn, conjecture leads to the conclusion that the end of expeditions has not yet come, and that the Colonel will either make an end of Pocotello and San Pitch, with their bands, this summer, or drive them far enough from the northern route to render it safe for the emigrants. On reaching Bear River, though it was yet early daylight, by the aid of his field-glass, the Colonel could plainly discover the position of the Indians on the north side of the river. The cavalry dismounted, loaded arms, remounted, and Major McGarry had orders to lead across the river, and, if possible, surround the Indians. Companies K and M, Lieut. Chase and Captain Price, first reached the banks on the north side, after considerable difficulty from the ice in the bottom of the river, and from the masses of ice that were carried along with the current. Companies H and A, Captain McLean and Lieutenant Quinn, followed close behind them. The first companies galloped up the base of a range of hills to the east, and formed in line of battle; but before all the men had dismounted, the Indians sent a shower of lead among them, wounding one of the volunteers. The first com- Major McGarry with a small detachment of dispanies were deployed as skirmishers, and order-mounted cavalry to cross the north end of the ed along the front of the ravine. The two other companies were up immediately after, and dismounting, were ordered forward in the same manner. The Indians had excellent winter quarters in a deep ravine, about three fourths of a mile long, running almost directly due north from Bear River into the mountains that formed their protection on their left. The banks of the ravine east and west were almost perpendicular, with only three places of difficult approach, which the Indians had made for their own convenience, and for the annoyance of any approaching enemy. Anticipating an attack, they had cut steps in the east side of the banks of the ravine, from which they could conveniently fire without exposure, and descend again for perfect security. Besides these natural advantages in the ravine, on each side there were rising benches about ten feet apart, which also gave the Indians the advantage over their exposed enemy, who had to discover suddenly that ready rifles awaited their approach. In the ravine, the wick-i-ups were planted among the willows, which partly concealed them, and the lower portions were embanked outside with rock and earth. With considerable ingenuity, they had interwoven the willows to the east of their wick-i-ups, with loop-holes through which they could fire without exposure. They had also forked sticks set in the ground to serve as rests for their rifles, and with these, no doubt considered themselves safe enough against any force likely to be brought against them. As the troops formed in line of battle, the Indians seemed to look upon the coming struggle with particularly good humor. While one of the chiefs rode up and down in front of the ravine, brandishing his spear in the face of the volunteers, the warriors in front sung out: "Fours right, fours left; come on, you California sons of -!" On such a polite invitation, the word was given to "advance," and gradually as the volunteers neared the ravine the Indians retired over the benches, awaited calmly their approach, and sent at them a murderous fire that was sensibly felt everywhere. A large number of men fell dead, several fell mortally wounded, and others threw themselves to the ground to abide their time and adopt another style of fighting. The word was passed along the line for the men not to waste their ammunition, and to protect themselves as much as possible. In the advance of company K, Lieutenant Chase was first wounded in the wrist, and in a moment or two received his mortal wound, but kept his saddle for about twenty minutes longer, urging on his men in the fight. Captain McLean, in the advance with company M, was wounded in the right hand, but kept on toward the ravine with revolver in his left hand, till he received a dangerous wound in the left thigh, which has caused him much suffering, and threatens his life. ravine, to flank the Indians on the left, and take them in the rear. The infantry hearing the firing, while yet distant from the scene of action, hastened up and attempted to cross the river; but it was too deep for footmen, and they had to fall back. Colonel Connor sent over to them the cavalry horses, with which they crossed, and wet and freezing they entered the fight. Capt. Hoyt was ordered to support Major McGarry in the flanking movement, and with his company succeeded in scrambling up the hill, skirmishing as they went, till they finally reached the west side, where, with the troops north and east, they kept up an enfilading fire on the Indians that ultimately drove them down into the central and lower portions of the ravine. The Indians, in the opening of the fight, had the best of it, and the volunteers fell like the leaves in autumn, but the tide of fortune changed, and savage ferocity was outmatched by generalship, brave men and good rifles. As the work of death progressed, and the result was now clearly seen, the lower portion of the ravine became the object of interest. Capt. Price, with a detachment of men from companies K and M, were doing fearful execution. In the space of five minutes, eight of his men had fallen in death or were mortally wounded; but others taking their places, the contest was kept up, and at the close of the struggle, forty-eight Indians were lying together in a heap, which showed how bravely they had fought for life. Lieut. Quinn, with a small detachment, had entered the ravine from the east, and did, in the language of report, "excellent execution," while Lieutenant Clark, with another detachment, commanded the mouth of the ravine, and did also "his duty," as the Indians were driven toward the river. By this time the fight had lasted nearly four hours; many of the men with feet so badly frozen that they could scarcely walk, and others with fingers so frozen that they could not tell they had a cartridge in their hands, unless they looked for it there. The Indians, bravely as they fought, could not withstand the indomitable will and bravery of the troops, and presently the detachments stationed at the mouth of the ravine detected the Indians breaking. A wild yell from the troops announced this fact to the Colonel, and in an instant he had Lieutenants Berry, Quinn, and Conrad with a detachment of mounted cavalry charging furiously down the river, and cut off the Indian retreat at that point. The Indians being thus encircled and brought to bay, an almost hand-to-hand conflict ensued, all along the riverbank. Colonel Connor and Major Gallagher then galloped down among the troops, and another severe fight took place. In a few seconds Lieut. Quinn had his horse shot from under him, and Lieutenant Berry was badly wounded in the right shoulder, and here, also, a number of the men The Colonel, seeing the advantageous position fell. A few minutes after Lieutenant Berry fell, of the Indians, resorted to strategy, and sent | Major Gallagher received a painful wound in the |