a general rule, have been better supplied, than our armies operating in the West. The latter have operated at much greater distances from the sources of supply, and have had far less facilities for transportation. In fine, I believe that no armies in the world while en campagne, have been more promptly or better supplied than ours. 3. Soon after the battle of Antietam, General McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements, in order that, if he moved between the enemy and Washington reenforcements could be sent from this place. On the first of October, finding that he purposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantages of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On the sixth of October he was peremptorily ordered: "To cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good." It will be observed that three weeks have elapsed since this order was given.

4. In my opinion, there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with orders to advance against the enemy. Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac, he could have received his supplies at most as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side.

5. On the seventh of October, in a telegram in regard to his intended movements, General McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the First, Fifth, and Sixth Corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as sheltertents. No complaint was made that any requisitions had not been filled, and it was inferred from his language that he was only waiting for the distribution of his supplies. On the eleventh, he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies sent by rail had been delayed.

On

As already stated, agents were immediately sent from here to investigate this complaint, and they reported that every thing had gone forward. On the same date, the eleventh, he spoke of many of his horses being broken down by fatigue. the twelfth, he complained that the rate of supply was only one hundred and fifty horses per week for the entire army there and in front of Washington. I immediately directed the Quartermaster-General to inquire into this matter, and to report why a larger supply was not furnished. Gen. Meigs reported on the fourteenth, that the average issue of horses to Gen. McClellan's army in the field and in front of Washington for the previous six weeks had been one thousand four hundred and fifty per week, or eight thousand seven hundred and fifty-four in all; in addition, that large numbers of mules had been supplied, and that the number of animals with General McClellan's army on the Upper Potomac was over thirty thousand. He also reported that he was then sending to that army all the horses he could procure.

On the eighteenth, Gen. McClellan stated: "In regard to Gen. Meigs's report that he had filled every requisition for shoes and clothing, General Meigs may have ordered these articles to be forwarded, but they have not reached our depots, and unless greater effort to insure prompt transmission is made by the department of which Gen. Meigs is the head, they might as well remain in New-York or Philadelphia, so far as this army is concerned." I immediately called Gen. Meigs's attention to this apparent neglect of his department. On the twenty-fifth, he reported as the result of his investigation, that forty-eight thousand pairs of boots and shoes had been received by the Quartermaster of Gen. McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and Hagerstown; that twenty thousand pairs were at Harper's Ferry depot on the twenty-first; that ten thousand more were on their way, and fifteen thousand more ordered.

Col. Ingals, Aid-de-Camp and Chief Quartermaster to Gen. McClellan, telegraphed on the twenty-fifth: "The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated, I think, and certainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions of regimental and brigade commanders." On the twentyfourth, he telegraphed to the QuartermasterGeneral that: "The clothing was not detained in cars at the depots. Such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing arrives and is issued, but more is still wanted, I have ordered more than would seem necessary from any data furnished me, and I beg to remind you that you have always very promptly met all my requisitions. As far as clothing is concerned, our department is not at fault. It provides as soon as due notice is given. I foresee no time when an army of over one hundred thousand men will not call for clothing and other articles."

In regard to Gen. McClellan's means of promptly communicating the wants of his army to me, or to the proper bureaus of the War Department, I report that, in addition to the ordinary mails, he has been in hourly communication with Washington by telegraph. It is due to Gen. Meigs that I should submit herewith a copy of a telegram received by him from Gen. McClellan. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief

OFFICIAL COPY.-J. C. KELTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General. UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.

Received October 22, 1862, 9.40 P.M., from McClellan's Headquarters: To Brigadier-General Meigs:

Your despatch of this date is received. I have never intended in any letter or despatch to make any accusation against yourself or your department, for not furnishing or forwarding clothing as rapidly as it was possible for you to do. I do believe that every thing has been done that could be done in this respect, both by yourself and department. The idea that I have tried to convey was, that certain portions of the command were

NEAR WINCHESTER, VA., Dec. 4, 1862. Brig.-Gen. Geary, Com'g Federal Forces:

GENERAL: The city of Winchester will be evacuated in an hour's time, by the military forces under my command, which time I would request for you to be pleased to observe, to give non-combatants, desirous of leaving the town, an opportunity to do so.

I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant, SAMUEL B. MYERS, Major Seventh Virginia Cavalry. This the General refused, sending back Doctor Ball to inform Major Myers that our column would move forward without delay into the town, and that the citizens would not be allowed to leave and would not be disturbed, unless our troops were fired upon by them; but the Major had made good his time and made himself scarce, and was nowhere to be found. The Doctor went on and demanded the surrender from the Mayor of the town, which was given, as follows:

Up to the return of the flag of truce, General Geary expected a battle. Upon the receipt of the Mayor's reply, the General advanced the column up to the forts and halted. The Doctor also ascertained that the small-pox was prevalent in the town, and to avoid this contagious disease, the troops were advanced no further. The Gen. eral and staff alone going into the forts and town, and taking formal possession. As the General and staff went into the fort, the army below gave three cheers for the General. Upon a hill beyond the town, the enemy's cavalry were looking on; they also threw up their hats and cheered, but the General soon put a stop to their sport, by sending a few well-directed shells among them, and they made themselves scarce.

Dr. Bell, and Lieut. Davis, A.D.C. on General Geary's staff, paroled one hundred and twentyfive rebel sick, in the various hospitals in town.

About three P.M. the General ordered a countermarch, and the column moved homeward down the Martinsburgh pike, halting at sunset about six miles from Winchester, and bivouacking for the night. At daylight next morning (Friday) the column resumed the march, passing through Bunker Hill at nine A.M., and reaching Smithfield at twelve м. At this point a severe snow-storm arose, and the wind blew cold and biting. The column pressed on and halted about three miles south of Charlestown, and bivouacked for the night. Notwithstanding the severe snow-storm and cold night, the boys rested very comfortably, and not seriously inconvenienced, and on the next morning (Saturday) were as joyous and light-hearted as though the winter blast had no

power to blight their energies. The prospect of soon reaching camp brightened the faces of all. We marched through Charlestown with colors flying, trudging through the snow, while ever and anon a fierce blast of wind would sweep into our faces from over the plains on either side, reminding us that we had other foes to encounter beside the rebel soldiery. At last, twelve м., we arrived at Bolivar, the boys marching in proudly, each regiment to its own encampment, with as light hearts as though they had just started out, instead of just coming back from a five days' expedition. We did not lose a single man, killed or wounded, but some five or six stragglers were captured.

The results of the reconnoissance were such as to satisfy us positively that there are no considerable bodies of rebels in this vicinity, beyond the guerrillas and bushwhackers, who will linger here as long as the war exists.

On this expedition, the want of the requisite number of cavalry, so essential to reconnoissances, was severely felt; the command had to grope, as it were, almost entirely in the dark, as the number of cavalry with us did not exceed sixty men.

after it became known that the Mayor had surDr. Ball informs me, that while in town, and rendered the town to the Federals, the citizens became jubilant, the ladies waving American flags and pocket-handkerchiefs, and very anxious that our forces should come in and take possession, showing their satisfaction generally in their Mayor's doings. This shows quite a different state of feeling of the citizens to what it was last spring.

-Cincinnati Commercial.

Doc. 60.

GENERAL HINDMAN'S ADDRESS. GENERAL HINDMAN issued the following address to his soldiers before making his attack upon the national forces in Arkansas:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, TRANS-MISSISSIPPI ARMY, IN THE FIELD, Dec. 4, 1862. SOLDIERS: From the commencement to the end of the battle, bear constantly in mind what I now tell you:

First. Never fire because your comrades do, nor because the enemy does, nor because you happen to see the enemy, nor for the sake of firing rapidly. Always wait till you are certainly within range of your gun, then single out your man, take deliberate aim, as low down as the knee, and fire.

Second. When occasion offers, be certain to pick off the enemy's officers, especially the mounted ones, and to kill his artillery horses.

Third. Don't shout except when you charge the enemy-as a general thing keep silent, that orders may be heard. Obey the orders of your officers, but pay no attention to idle rumors or the words of unauthorized persons.

Fourth. Don't stop with your wounded com

four o'clock P.M. that they succeeded in getting them down. By half-past four P.M. I had the bridge completed, and by six o'clock P.M. I had my entire force of cavalry on the eastern bank of the river. My design then was to march my force as rapidly as possible to the rear of the rebel army, and destroy his telegraphic and railway communications. To do the latter the most effectively, I thought it best to march directly on Grenada, knowing that there were two important railroad bridges across the Yallabusha River, the one on the Mississippi Central, and the other on the Mississippi and Tennessee Railroad.

The distance to make to reach Grenada was fif ty-six miles, but by pushing hard I deemed it possible to reach there by daylight next morning. After proceeding nearly east, along the Yockna Creek about eleven miles, the road forks, one road going to Panola, the other to Charleston and Grenada. A few yards from the forks of the road, on the Panola road, is a ferry across the Yockna, and the head of my column turned down the Panola road to the ferry to water their horses. They were at once fired upon by a heavy rebel picket. Major Hawkins, of the Sixth Missouri, immediately brought his small howitzers to bear, and we soon silenced the enemy and drove him away. We afterward learned that they were the pickets of a cavalry force of three hundred, who were encamp ed six miles up the Panola road, who, on hearing our guns, supposed we were bound for Panola, and they returned to that point. After leaving this point we were several times fired upon by the pickets of the enemy, which compelled us to feel our way during the night. At daylight I found myself at Preston, a little town sixteen miles from Grenada. When I arrived here I found that it would be impossible for me to reach Hardy Station, the first station on the Mississippi and Tennessee Railroads, in time to intercept the up-train, which I ascertained usually left at eight A.M. I detached Captain A. M. Sherman, Second Wisconsin cavalry, with two hundred men of the Second Wisconsin and Fifth Illinois cavalry, to cross over to the Mississippi and Tennessee Railroad at Garner Station, which was only four miles distant, and destroy the telegraph and such bridges as he could find, and if possible to capture the train. He burnt one bridge over one hundred feet long, and cut the telegraph. He was also instructed on leaving Garner Station to cross through the woods to the Mississippi Central, distance of nine miles in an air-line, and hunt for and destroy bridges and cut the telegraph. This last, from the character of the country to be passed over, he found would be impracticable. The train from Grenada did not come up with the remainder of the column; I passed on down to Grenada. About nine o'clock A.M., my horses being thoroughly jaded, I found it necessary to stop and feed and rest them, which I did for about two hours; I then pressed on to Hardy Station; about half a mile below the station I found a bridge about one hundred feet in length, which I burned, and destroyed several hundred yards of telegraph-wire, and burned one passenger, one box, and ten plat

form cars. We here learned that information of our coming had preceded us by several hours, and that the evening previous one thousand one hundred infantry had come down the road from Panola to Grenada. At Hardy Station the road we travelled crossed the railroad and passed down between the Mississippi and Tennessee and Mississippi Central Railroad. Passing down the road toward Grenada for about two miles, we heard from the negroes that trains of cars were running all night down the Central Railroad toward Gre nada loaded with soldiers. Being in a perfect trap between the two railroads, in a low and densely wooded bottom, with no knowledge in regard to roads, and knowing that they had had time to send ample forces from Abbeville, I deemed it too hazardous to proceed further in that direction. I here detailed Major Birge, of the Ninth Illinois cavalry, with one hundred men, armed with carbines, crowbars and axes, and directed him to cross the country through the woods and canebrakes until they should strike the Central Mis sissippi Railroad, and then destroy the telegraph and all the bridges they could find. They successfully performed the service, destroying the telegraph, tearing up the rail-track, and burning one small bridge, being the only one they could find, they having an uninterrupted view of the track for a long distance each way. While thus employed, a train of cars loaded with soldiers came slowly up the track from toward Grenada, apparently feeling their way, to find out where we were. They fell back on discovering Major Birge and party. Major Birge having done all the damage to the railroad he could, fell back to the main column. By this time it was nearly night; my horses and men were too thoroughly tired out, and my knowledge of the country was too limited to justify me in perilling my whole force by venturing further, and I accordingly fell back for about fifteen miles and encamped for the night. Before doing so I hesitated as to the route I should take on my return. I was at the point where the main road from Abbeville and Coffeeville intersected the road I passed down upon, about five miles from Grenada. I felt the importance of striking Coffeeville, and destroying some bridges that I heard of there, and from there fall back viá Oakland, on the Mississippi and Tennessee Road. Coffeeville was thirteen miles off, and Oakland thirty; but, on reflection, I determined not to do so. Had I taken the other road, the result might have proved disastrous. Sunday night a force of five thousand rebel cavalry came into Oakland in pursuit of me, with two field-pieces. After feeding and resting for a short time, they proceeded on to Grenada and Coffeeville. Had I taken the other road, viá Coffeeville, and the only other one by which we could return, we should have encountered this force. As we should have had to go into camp from sheer exhaustion soon after leaving Coffeeville, they would, no doubt, have come upon us in camp; and, with more than double our number, and a perfect knowledge of the country, they would have had us at great disad vantage. On Monday morning 1 broke camp, four