and, for ought we know, do believe them: but the gospel says, every one that believeth shall be saved, and all the workers of iniquity shall be destroyed: if then these characters can subsist together, the gospel contains a contradiction.

The difficulty here shown to arise from confounding together ideas which are distinct; from not distinguishing between faith, as a principle of knowlege, and as a principle of religion: this point enlarged on: the knowlege of God is like other natural knowlege, as long as it resides in the head only; to become a principle of religion it must descend into the heart, and teach us to love the Lord with all our minds, &c.; and if this be true of the knowlege of God, which is the greatest of all divine truths, it must be true in all other instances; the faith then of the gospel, to which the wicked man is a stranger, is that which makes us cleave steadfastly to the Lord with full purpose of heart.

On the second head, if we consider religion under the notion of action, this proposition has nothing strange in it; as the same is true of every principle of knowlege and action; is as true of sense as it is of faith. As faith makes us cleave to God, so sense makes us cleave to the world; but till sense has possession of the heart, it has no power, is of no use to the world: we learn from sense the reality of things temporal: yet this assent of the mind to the evidence of sense never made a man wicked or worldly-minded: but when sense stirs up the desires of the heart, then it becomes a principle of action, and a combatant for the world against the powers of faith. As is the wicked man with regard to his faith in divine truths, so is the righteous man in respect to things of sense: as the wicked man has the knowlege of faith, but nothing religious, so has the righteous man all the knowlege of sense, but nothing sensual; the difference between them is, that the one pursues objects of sense, the other objects of faith. This parallel traced farther, to gain a right conception of the nature of faith: it is shown

that, to make a man perform the actions either of religion or of common life, his desires, which are the springs of action, must be moved; and since nothing can move the desires, which is not first the object of the understanding, he must have the knowlege of the things of this life and of religion, and consider them under the notion of good or evil with respect to himself. Now to enjoy the things of this life is the business of the sensual man; those of a future life are the good man's concern. As the objects are different, so the means of obtaining the knowlege of them are different: the world has as many ways of making itself familiar to us, as we have senses: religion has only those dark glimpses of futurity, which reason, feeble as she is, can discover: the only thing then that is wanting to set religion on as high ground, and to enable it to bear up against the impressions of sense, is a certain principle of knowlege with respect to its objects: for could we as evidently possess ourselves of the reality of the things of another life, as of the things of this, there would be no more competition between sense and religion than there is comparison between the things of this life and of eternity. To supply this darkness of our knowlege in religion, is the very end and design of revelation. Now, as sense is to be distinguished into a principle of knowlege and a principle of action, so is faith likewise: this distinction in the case of sense may be seen in any instance: an honest man knows the value of riches, as well as a thief: it is not therefore the knowlege of the object, but the immoderate desire of it, that makes the difference. The same is the case in religion: faith, as a mere object of the mind, is no principle of religion; and one is no more a religious man for knowing the articles of religion, than he is a sensual man for walking with his eyes open and seeing the world: this point enlarged on.

On the whole, since religion is not a mere science and speculation, but is to be the employment of our lives, in the

love of God and man; since the knowlege of any thing, or belief of any thing, as mere acts of the mind, are no principles of action; but every action proposes to itself some end, which is the object of some desire; it follows that faith cannot be a principle of religion, till it becomes the object of our desires, i. e. till it has its effects and operations in the heart.

The great advantage which the world has over religion lies in the certainty and reality of its objects: to supply this defect in religion, revelation assures us of the reality of things future, to influence and keep steady our affections. The objects of faith then support religion, as the objects of sense encourage the love of the world.

All the articles of the gospel tend to one of these ends; either to assure us of the certainty of the revelation and redemption by Christ, or to set before us the very substance and image of the things hoped for this enlarged on to reject therefore these articles, is to reject the revelation and redemption of Christ, and to act purely on the ground of

natural religion.

Were it not in our

The third head is a plain case, in which every man's own experience is his best instructor. We find daily that we can check our passions and inclinations, to serve the purposes of this life; and if we would do as much for that which is to come, we should answer all which the text requires of us in taking heed of an evil heart of unbelief. power to suspend the influence of our passions, a man would have no more liberty than a stone, and consequently would be incapable of religion: though we cannot see things as we will, it is in our power to pursue and court them as we please: we can make our inclinations yield to our will, as men do when they sacrifice present enjoyments to distant prospects of honor or preferment; for the future things of this life are no more objects of sense than those of another life; and it is not sense,

but judgment, that refuses the present good for a distant advantage: it is but an instance of the same reason and judgment to restrain the sensual appetites, and to make room for the hopes of immortality to enter and possess the heart: and this is truly the work of religion.

DISCOURSE XIV.

HEBREWS, CHAP. III.-VERSE 12.

Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief in departing from the living God.

PART I.

THE words of the text contain an earnest exhortation, as is evident on the first view: and the subject of the exhortation is faith towards God; for faith is the principle destroyed by an ' evil heart of unbelief.' But faith, as some think, is no proper subject for exhortation: for if faith is a mere act of the mind judging on motives of credibility, it is as reasonable to exhort a man to see with his eyes, as to judge with his understanding; and the warmest admonition will not enlarge the sight, which will still depend on the goodness of the eye, and the distance and position of the object. In faith the case is much the same: if the affections are thoroughly raised, and made eager to embrace the faith, they may chance indeed to step in between the premises and conclusion, and make men profess to believe, without knowing or considering the reasons of belief; which is to destroy the foundation of faith: or, if they keep their due distance, and leave the cause to be decided by reason and understanding, their influence will be nothing, and they might as well have been left out of the case; since faith will follow the judgment the mind makes on the motives of credibility.

But then, if this be the true notion of faith, that it is merely an act of the mind assenting to a truth on motives of credibility, how comes it that in every page we find the praises of it in the gospel? What is there in this to deserve the blessings promised to the faithful? Or, whence is it that the whole of our salvation