EARLY MENACES WASHINGTON-IS REPULSED.

605

For the

19th corps (Emory's), ordered from New Orleans by sea, had reached Fortress Monroe a few days previous, and had been sent by Grant to Wash

from before Petersburg, with directions that Gen. Wright should assume command. Had Early waited, his force, now reduced to 15,000, would have been confronted and crushed by one of at least 40,000.

some hours, to welcome a 'liberating' | horses, and 5,000 cattle. army. But Early, after a brief halt on the battle-field, was now marching on Washington; and Baltimore, though weakly held, was not to be taken on a gallop. Brig.-Gens. Lock-ington; as had the 6th (Wright's) wood and Morris were there; and they soon rallied thousands of loyal citizens, by whom every approach was guarded, and earthworks thrown up in the suburbs which could not be carried without difficulty and delay. Johnson declined the attempt; but a detachment of his horsemen, under Harry Gilmor, made a dash at the Philadelphia railroad near Magnolia station, next morning; burning the long trestle over the inlet known as Gunpowder, stopping there the morn-partially crossed when Early turned" ing train northward, and robbing passengers and mails.

Early's cavalry advance reached Rockville on the evening of the 10th; his infantry was next day within 6 or 7 miles of Washington; which they actually menaced on the 12th. Gen. Augur, commanding the defenses, pushed out, toward evening, a strong reconnoissance to develop their strength; and a smart skirmish ensued, wherein we had 280 killed and wounded, and the enemy at least as many. If Early had rushed upon Washington by forced marches from the Monocacy, and at once assaulted with desperate energy, he might have taken the city, and might have lost half his army: he must have lost all his army if he had carried the city and attempted to hold it,

Whatever his purpose, it was now too late to do any thing but what he did - retreat across the Potomac, with his cavalry, batteries and trains freshly horsed, 2,500 spare 19 July 19.

Wright's pursuit was not made in such force as he should have had, and was timid and feeble. Crossing the Potomac at Edwards's ferry, he moved through Leesburg and Snicker's gap to the Shenandoah; which he had

upon him suddenly and fiercely, driving back his advance with a loss of fully 500. Wright rëcrossed after the enemy had moved off, but soon returned to Leesburg, and, turning over the command to Crook, repaired to Washington.

Averill, moving from Martinsburg on Winchester, was fought" near that city, for three hours, by a Rebel force, which he finally worsted; taking 200 prisoners and 4 guns; with a loss of 150 or 200 killed and wounded on either side. The approach of Early from Snicker's gap now compelled him to draw off.

Grant, deceived by advices that Early was returning to Lynchburg and Richmond, ordered the 6th and 19th corps by water to Petersburg, intending to strike a blow with his thus augmented forces before Early could arrive. Hunter was still on his weary way from his miscarriage at Lynchburg-dry rivers, broken railroads, &c., impeding his progress. July 20.

20

Crook, left in command of the depleted force on the Potomac, now moved up to Harper's Ferry, and thence pushed out once more to Winchester, supposing that there was nothing there that could stop his progress.

He was grievously mistaken. Early had not gone south, but was close at hand; and soon our advance was annoyed" by smart skirmishing, which pushed back our cavalry on our infantry, and next day routed them, driving Crook's entire command pell-mell to Martinsburg with a loss of 1,200, including Gen. Mulligan" killed. Early's loss was trifling. There was an artillery duel next day at Martinsburg; but Crook, having gained time to save his trains, crossed over into Maryland, leaving Early undisturbed master of the south side of the Potomac from Shepherdstown to Williamsport.

The excuse alleged for this act of Vandalism was the burning of exGov. Letcher's house at Lexington by Hunter, six weeks before. That was held to be justified-and, at all events, was solely incited-by finding in a Lexington printing-office the type and proof of a handbill issued and signed by Letcher, calling on the people of that region to 'bushwhack' Hunter's men-that is, fire at them from every covert, while not embodied as a military force and seeming to be peaceful farmers or artisans. If this burning violated the laws of war, it had already been twice avenged by burning Gov. Bradford's country residence near Baltimore, and ex-P. M. General Blair's, near Washington. It was not in accordance with Lee's orders nor his practice in either of his invasions; for, though he burned Thaddeus Stevens's iron-works near Gettysburg (as we burned manufactories of warlike material, clothing, &c., throughout the South), he sternly forbad wanton devastation; and he was obeyed..

He made an unwise use of his advantage. Maryland and southern Pennsylvania being in utter panicmany running off their stock to places of safety, while thousands openly exulted at the brightened prospects of Averill, with 2,600 cavalry, perthe Rebellion-he sent B. T. John- plexed by the enemy's bewildering son, McCausland, and others, with demonstrations, had fallen back from perhaps 3,000 cavalry, on a sweep- Hagerstown to Greencastle, and was ing raid northward. McCausland but 9 miles from Chambersburg while took a considerable circuit, threaten- Johnson and McCausland, with but ing some points in order to distract part of the Rebel cavalry north of attention from others; dispersing a the Potomac, sacked and burned that small body of recruits at Carlisle town. He arrived that day, but they barracks, and finally striking Cham- had left; moving westward to Mcbersburg," then totally defenseless and Connellstown, whither he followed; in good part deserted, and demand-arriving in time to save it from a ing $100,000 in gold or $500,000 in similar fate. He promptly charged; currency, under penalty of conflagra- but there was not much of a fight; tion. The money not being instantly the enemy hurrying southward to produced, the place was fired, and Hancock, and thence across the Poabout two-thirds of it destroyed.

21 July 23.

tomac.

22 The Col. Mulligan who defended Lexington, Mo., in 1861.

23

July 30.

SHERIDAN APPOINTED TO COMMAND.

607

26

The panic throughout southern | branch of the Potomac, pursued by Pennsylvania had ere this become Averill, who struck" them near intensified. Gen. Couch, command- Moorefield, routing them, with a loss ing there, was assured that a great of but 50 on our side; Averill capRebel army of invasion was march- turing their guns, wagons, and 500 ing on Pittsburg; and that city re- prisoners. newed the defensive efforts of the year before. The guerrilla John S. Moseby, with 50 men, dashed across the Potomac at Cheat ferry, surprising and capturing at Adamstown nearly his own number of horsemen, and robbed a few stores; and, though he ran back instantly, his trifling raid was magnified into a vague and gloomy significance.

Neither the 6th nor the 19th corps had proceeded farther than Georgetown, D. C., when Crook's defeat and its consequences impelled them in quite another direction than that of Petersburg. Moving" by Rockville and Frederick, they had reached Harper's Ferry, and there met Crook, with part of Hunter's long expected infantry, on the day Chambersburg was burned; and now, with an immense train, the whole force was started on a wild-goose-chase after Early, who was supposed to be laying waste southern Pennsylvania.

Gen. Kelley, commanding at Cumberland, had undertaken to stop Johnson's raiders as they passed him on their retreat, and had a smart skirmish with them at Falck's mill, in which he claimed the advantage; but Col. Stough, with 500 men, sent to Oldtown to intercept them, had there been routed, after a short skirmish; himself and 90 men being captured. The enemy retreated up the south 24 July 26. Aug. 4. 26 Aug. 2. 27 Aug. 4. 28 Aug. 7. "There was, in 1865, a spicy newspaper controversy between these Generals touching their respective strength in their Valley campaign.

25

Gen. Grant had already sent " Sheridan to Washington, with intent to have him placed in charge of our distracted operations on the Potomac and Shenandoah; and he now came up" himself, to obtain, if possible, a better understanding of what was going on. In his conference with Hunter, that officer expressed a willingness to be relieved, if that were deemed desirable; and Grant at once telegraphed to Washington to have Sheridan sent up to Harper's Ferry; himself awaiting there that officer's arrival. An order soon appeared " appointing Maj.-Gen. Philip H. Sheridan commander of the new 'Middle Department,' composed of the late Departments of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna; and two divisions of cavalry (Torbert's and Wilson's) were soon sent him by Grant; raising his force to nearly 30,000 men; while Early's, confronting him, can hardly have exceeded 20,000."

28

It was no fault of Sheridan's that his accession to command was not immediately followed by a vigorous offensive. Doubtless, his motley forces needed to be better compacted and fitted together; but, under skillful and capable leadership, they would attain this most rapidly in the field. Yet there had been so much failure and disappointment in this quarter, while the Early made his force scarcely half so numerous as Sheridan's. Sheridan rejoined that the prisoners taken by him from Early exceeded the num ber to which that General limited his entire command.

if

consequences of a defeat, opening the | aced and kept strong and idle, North to a fresh invasion, and perhaps compelling-what Lee most desired and Grant most dreaded-a withdrawal of our army from the Jameswere so grave, that Grant hesitated to authorize a determined advance until he had made him a second visit," and become convinced that he had a lieutenant on the Potomac who thoroughly comprehended his position, his work, his strength, and that of his antagonist, and needed but liberty of action and a trust which his achievements would abundantly justify. "Isaw," says Grant, in his report, "that but two words of instruction were necessary- Go in!" So he gave them, and Sheridan went in.

possible; he striving in turn to thrust that wing through our left and seize the mouth of the ravine, so as at once to sever our army and deprive its right of any line of retreat.

Early held the west bank of OPEQUAN creek, covering Winchester, Sheridan was in his front and to his right, holding Berryville. In a skillful and spirited reconnoissance, Gen. Wilson had struck" the flank of Kershaw's division, capturing without loss Col. Hennegan and 171 of the 8th S. C. The principal value of such a stroke inheres in its effect on the spirits of an army; and Sheridan, believing his in the mood for battle, drew out, at 2 A. M.," his entire force, resolved to carry the enemy's position by assault.

It was 10 A. M. when the 6th corps emerged from the ravine, and took ground on our left; Ricketts's division pushing forward, through thick woods and over steep hills, where musketry only could be used, right against the enemy's front; for here ground must be gained and held to enable the 8th corps to debouch behind our front from the pass, turn the enemy's left, and charge him in flank and rear. When our impetuous advance had cleared the woods and heights, a broad, open valley was before them, with the Rebel army sheltered by the woods and rocks beyond; whence a terrific shelling already told upon our ranks. Yet so vehement and resolute was the charge of Grover's division of the 19th corps that Early's first line was carried-Gen. Rhodes being killed and three Rebel colonels sent to our rear as prisoners.

Early, seeing that no moment was to be lost, promptly hurled two fresh divisions upon Grover and Ricketts, pushing them back in disorder and with fearful loss; a heavy fire opening on their flank as they surged toward the pass-many regiments utterly broken, their officers fallen, and the battle seemingly lost beyond hope. The 156th N. York had barely 40 men grouped around its colors; Capt. Rigby, 24th Iowa, was seen retreating firmly, deliberately, followed by a sergeant and 12 men who, reaching the assigned rallying-point, "1 Sept. 13. "Sept. 19.

That position was naturally strong, and had been thoroughly fortified. To assail it, our army had to advance through a narrow ravine, shut in by steep, thickly wooded hills, form in an irregular, undulating valley in the enemy's front, advance through a wood, and attack desperately his center, while flanking and crushing in his left. His right, too strongly posted to be turned, was to be menSept. 16.

30

to

SO

at

Π

A

SHERIDAN'S BATTLE OF THE OPEQUAN.