eve of marriage, his death fell like a | life, a nobler spirit, a grander, more pall on many loving hearts. benignant destiny! Lee at first reported his losses at "about 1,800 killed and wounded" -one of those preposterous misrepresentations to which commanders on either side were too prone. His actual loss, as embodied in the detailed reports of Longstreet and Jackson, was over 5,000," and may probably be fairly estimated at 6,000, including 500 unwounded prisoners. He claims to have taken 900 prisoners and 9,000 small arms, but no guns. Thus closed what the exulting correspondent at Lee's headquarters of The Times (London) calls "a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic." Not so, O owl-eyed scribe! but rather one of those days of bloody baptism from whose regenerating flood that Republic was divinely appointed to rise to a purer 15 Longstreet reports his losses thus: killed, 251; wounded, 1,516; missing, 127: total, 1,894. Jackson gives his as-killed, 344; wounded, 2,545; missing, 526: total, 3,415: grand total, 5,309. Among their killed, beside those already mentioned, was Brig.-Gen. T. R. R. Cobb, of Ga., brother of Howell Cobb. Among their wounded, were Brig.-Gens. J. R. Cooke and W. D. Pender. 10 He says, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "The two attacks were made, and we were repulsed; still holding a portion of the ground we had fought upon, but not our extreme ad vance. "That night, I went all over the field on our right; in fact, I was with the officers and men until nearly daylight. I found the feeling to be rather against an attack the next morning; in fact, it was decidedly against it. 16 It would be incredible on any testimony less conclusive than his own that Gen. Burnside, on the very heel of this prodigal, horrible carnage, resolved to attack again next day, and on the very point where the enemy's lines had been proved impregnable at a cost of 10,000 men. Another butchery as fruitless and still more demoralizing would doubtless have been incurred, but for the timely and forcible remonstrance of stern old Sumner who never kept out of a fight when there was a shadow of excuse for going in-and who protested, backed by nearly every General in the army, against such suicidal madness. Burnside finally gave way, and thus probably saved the 9th corps (of old, his own) from useless, inexcusable sacrifice. the enemy into their next line, and, by going in with them, they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent. I left Gen. Sumner with order. The order was given, and the column of that understanding, and directed him to give the attack was formed. "The next morning, just before the column was to have started, Gen. Sumner came to me and said: 'General, I hope you will desist from this attack; I do not know of any general officer who approves of it; and I think it will prove disastrous to the army.' Advice of that kind from Gen. Sumner, who has always been in favor of an advance whenever it was possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders, and consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the other officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same impression prevailed among them. I then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was on the left, and he "I returned to my headquarters, and, after was of exactly the same opinion. This caused conversation with Gen. Sumner, told him that I me to decide that I ought not to make the attack wanted him to order the 9th army corps-which I had contemplated. And besides, inasmuch as was the corps I originally commanded-to form the President of the United States had told me the next morning a column of attack by regi- not to be in haste in making this attack; that ments. It consisted of some 18 old regiments, he would give me all the support that he could, and some new ones; and I desired the column to but he did not want the Army of the Potomac make a direct attack upon the enemy's works. destroyed, I felt that I could not take the responI thought that these regiments, by coming quick-sibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding ly up after each other, would be able to carry my own belief at the time that the works of the the stone wall and the batteries in front, forcing enemy could be carried." LEE AND BURNSIDE ON FREDERICKSBURG. 349 The two armies stood facing each | body of his army. But how could other throughout the 14th and 15th: he know at once how severely we Lee strengthening his defenses and had suffered? And, even if he did awaiting a renewal of the attack; know, would it have been wise to Burnside at length deciding to with- rush his men upon our batteries, as draw all but Hooker's corps across ours had been rushed upon his? the river, and continue to hold Fred- Jackson had decided against this, ericksburg; but this he finally gave when in the flush of his success; and up, on Hooker's representation that he decided wisely. To push forward he should be unable to hold the town; their men till under the fire of our and decided to rëcross his entire army heavy guns, commandingly posted on during the night of the 15th; which our side of the Rappahannock, would was quietly effected without serious have been to imitate Burnside's blunloss. A few of our desperately wound- der; and they had not 15,000 men ed, a few pickets, and considerable to spare." ammunition, were left by us in Fredericksburg; but Franklin did not lose a man; and not one gun was abandoned as a trophy of this ill-starred advance on Richmond. Our pontoons were all taken up and brought off; the Rebels next day reoccupying Fredericksburg and their side of the river; and thenceforth pickets and sharp-shooters fired across the stream, whenever any temptation to a shot was afforded, with as businesslike an air as though the Rappahannock had always been the boundary of two hostile empires, over which no armed force had ever ventured. Lee has been blamed for not following up his advantage; and it is just possible that he might have made something by a tremendous bombardment of the town while still crowded with our decimated, disheartened troops-possibly by a sudden, determined assault upon it, or upon Franklin's wing, with the great "Lee's 'General Order No. 38,' dated Dec. 21, congratulating his army on their success in this encounter, says: "The immense army of the enemy completed its preparations for the attack without interruption, and gave battle in its own time, and on ground of its own selection. "It was encountered by less than twenty thou General Burnside's errors in this movement were errors of judgment only; and these were nobly redeemed by his subsequent conduct and bearing. Though he had accepted the chief command with unfeigned reluctance and self-distrust, and keenly felt that he had not been fairly treated in the matter of the pontoons, and that Franklin had not done his best in the hour of trial, he excused others and took all the blame on himself. In his report to Gen. Halleck," he says: "But for the fog, and the unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy 24 hours to concentrate his forces in his strong position, we should almost certainly have succeeded; in which case, the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near success. Failing in accomplishing the main object, we remained in order of battle two days-long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his stronghold to fight me with his infantry-after which, we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested, without the loss of men or property. sand of this brave army; and its columns, This is so unfair as to be essentially false, and quite unworthy of a great soldier. 18 Dec. 19. "As the day broke, our long lines of | While the Rebel chiefs were controops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade-not the least demoralization or disorganization ex isted. "To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing in the face of the enemy, I owe every thing. For the failure in the attack, I am responsible; as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them were never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible. "To the families and friends of the dead, I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies; but for the wounded, I can offer my earnest prayer for their comfort and final recovery. "The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you have left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more respon sible." But General Burnside's usefulness as commander of the Army of the Potomac was at an end. Officers and soldiers alike felt that he had sadly misjudged in ordering an assault on the bristling heights south of Fredericksburg-still more,in seeking to repeat that assault after the bloody, calamitous experience of the 13th-and the popularity of McClellan was immensely strengthened and widened by that disastrous repulse. Whatever his faults, 'Little Mac' had ever been careful of the lives of his men; and this fact was now remembered to his credit. Had the army been polled for the choice of a commander at any time during the month following our withdrawal from Fredericksburg, it is probable that McClellan would have had a decisive majority, and morally certain that Burnside's supporters would have proved a still more indubitable minority. The latter, however, had no idea of sitting down under his defeat. 19 Dec. 26. gratulating each other that the Army of the Potomac had been paralyzed, at least for the Winter, he was planning a fresh and determined advance on Richmond. Within a fortnight after his bloody repulse, he ordered " rations cooked, wagons packed, and every thing made ready for a general movement; intending to make a feint above Fredericksburg, but to cross at the Sedden House, six or seven miles below; while 2,500 cavalry, with 4 guns, crossing at Kelly's ford, were to raid across the Virginia Central, the Lynchburg and the Weldon Railroads, blowing up the locks on the James River Canal; crossing the Nottoway, and reporting to Gen. Peck, in command at Suffolk; while several other flying expeditions were to distract the enemy's attention and deceive him as to the significance of the general movement. He had just given " the initial impulse to this combined movement, when a telegram from the President arrested it; and, repairing at once to Washington, Gen. B. learned that representations had been made at headquarters by certain of his subordinates, prompted and sustained by others, that, if he were permitted to proceed, in the existing temper of the army, he would inevitably incur disasters so grave as to signally belittle, if not wholly efface, those of the recent failure. In deference to these representations, the President had telegraphed as he did; and the Secretary of War and the General-in-chief, though now for the first time apprised of the clandestine communications of army officers to Mr. Lincoln, failed even to attempt a removal of the impression 20 Dec. 30. BURNSIDE'S 'MUD MARCH-HE IS RELIEVED. 351 they had made on the President's attempts to assail our stalled and mind. Returning to the army, Gen. Burnside soon ascertained that certain details of the proposed cavalry movement had transpired—in fact, he was assured by Gen. Pleasanton that they were known among Secessionists in Washington two or three days after his first interview with the President -so he abandoned that movement; intending to make one somewhat different, in the course of a few days. This new movement contemplated a crossing in force at Banks's and at the United States fords, above Fredericksburg; the crossing below being also made, or at least menaced, as originally proposed: and again his preparations were perfected and his army now put " in motion; when, at 10 P. M., there burst over it one of the severest and most trying storms ever experienced in that region. Snow, driving sleet, pouring rain, a general breaking up of the roads, hitherto hard and dry, and a chaos of the elements which rendered locomotion impossible and life under the drenching sky scarcely endurable, arrested that advance at its outset, and fixed our army in the mire wherein it for hours wretchedly, sullenly, hopelessly floundered. Daylight exposed to the enemy across the stream movements which were intended to be consummated under the cover of night: they were not foolish enough, had they been able, to squander their men and animals in struggling forces; but they guarded the fords so strongly that Burnside was glad to order his men back to their old camps-some of which they had burned on quitting, in the confident expectation that they should nevermore need them. Gen. Burnside, having discovered, as he believed, the officers who had paralyzed his efforts by fomenting discontent in his army, and by disheartening communications to Washington, now prepared a general order (No. 8'), dismissing" them from the service; but, on the advice of a trusted friend, decided to submit it to the President before giving it publicity or effect. He did so; and the President, after consultation with his official advisers, decided, instead of approving the order, to relieve Gen. Burnside from command; which was accordingly done: the order stating that Gen. B. was so relieved at his own request—against which, Gen. B. remonstrated as most unjust, pressing his demand that his resignation should be accepted instead; but he was finally persuaded to withdraw it, and agree to serve wherever his aid might be required, allowing any order to be published that might be deemed essential to the public weal. Thus ended" his command of the Army of the Potomac. by J. E. B. Stuart across the Rappahannock to Dumfries, where 25 wagons and some 200 prisoners were taken, and thence toward Alexandria and around Fairfax Court House, burning the railroad bridge across the Accotink, and returning in triumph with their spoils; another," by a party of Imboden's troopers, farther west, from the Valley to Romney, where the guards of a supply train were surprised and routed: 72 men, 106 horses, and 27 wagons taken and carried off; a third," by Fitz Hugh Lee, across the Rappahannock, near Falmouth, surprising a camp, and taking 150 prisoners, with a loss of 14 men; a fourth," by Gen. W. E. Jones, in the Valley, routing two regiments of Milroy's cavalry, and taking 200 prisoners, with a loss of 4 men only; while a more daring raid was made by Maj. White, of Jones's command, across the Potomac at Poolesville, taking 77 prisoners. Lee further reports that Capt. Randolph, of the Black Horse cavalry, by various raids into Fauquier county, captured over 200 prisoners and several hundred stand of arms; and that Lt. Moseby (whose name now makes its first appearance in a bulletin) "has done much to harass the enemy; attacking him boldly on several occasions, and capturing many prisoners. One or two minor cavalry exploits, recited by Lee in 'General Order No. 29,' read too much like romance to be embodied in sober history; yet such was the depression on our side in Virginia, such the elation and confidence on the other, such the very great advantage enjoyed by Rebel raiders in the readiness of the White inhabitants to give them information, and even to scout in quest of it, throughout that dreary Winter, that nothing that might be asserted of Rebel audacity or Federal imbecility is absolutely incredible. The somber cloud is lighted by a single flash, not of victory, but of humor. In a Rebel raid far within our lines, Gen. Stoughton, a young Vermont Brigadier, was taken in his bed, near Fairfax Court House, and, with his guards and five horses, hurried off across the Rappahannock. Some one spoke of the loss to Mr. Lincoln next morning: "Yes," said the President; "that of the horses is bad; but I can make another General in 5 minutes." When General Hooker assumed 20 command of the Army of the Potomac, its spirit and efficiency were at a very low ebb. Desertions were at the rate of 200 per day; soldiers clandestinely receiving citizens' clothing by express from relatives and others to facilitate their efforts to escape from a service wherein they had lost all heart. The number shown by the rolls to be absent from their regiments was no less than 2,922 officers and 81,964 non-commissioned" officers and soldiers-many of them in hospitals, on leave, or detached on duty; but a majority, probably, had deserted. The frequency, audacity, and success, of the Rebel cavalry raids that Winter forcibly indicate the elation and confidence felt on one side, the apathy, born of despondency, on the other. Superior as its enormous total probably includes all who had deserted from the regiments composing that army since they were severally organized, as well as the sick and wounded in hospitals. |