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than Warrenton Junction; whre Gen. Framtonian, with oue - CANAI discover diheta in foree on the 1415 and returned without attacki them. The main body of our are bad commenced its return to the D he 11th; on which day t at Issued' War Order No. 1. Gen. McClellan from th Gegg detachments, whether at al 1 Wscheder or below the Occoquin, Hos ftebet wriors who touch this point, Banel officers who served with or visited debel winy during the ensuing campaign, emmalmeus in tonking their total effectiv turing that Wisfer less than 50,002,. Jan. 30.

reliev

"Pollard says:

For the space of three weeks before the armiy 10 as intrenchments at Manacvas, properations were being mado for falling back to the line of the Rappahannock, by the quiet and gradual re said: "T moval of the vast acemaniations of snup stores; diebands Lood, with such consuminete address was tids euniged, that our own troops had no idea of Our front what was intended wall the torch was takea The first intimation U enemy bad of the ion of Marissas was the smoke of the hits that had been fired by our ariny."

in

ADVANCE BY THE PENINSULA DECIDED ON.

113

command of all military departments | ington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; and

but that of the Potomac; extending Gen. Halleck's department in the West so as to include all the Mississippi Valley northward of the Gulf States and west of a north and south line drawn through Knoxville, Tenn.; and creating a new 'Mountain Department,' consisting of the country between McClellan's and Halleck's, to be commanded by Gen. Fremont. Undoubtedly, this order indicated a diminution, if not absolute failure, of the President's confidence in his senior General; and, while it is very obvious that the commander of a great army operating from the Peninsula against Richmond could not properly and safely direct the movements of other armies, scattered all over the country, and with which his telegraphic communications would probably be often interrrupted, it is

certain that all our movements should have been directed by a common head, responsible for the proper distribution and concentration of our forces.

"3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on York river. Washington shall be such as to give an en

"4th. That the forces to be left to cover

tire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.)

"If the foregoing can not be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the for reconstructing bridges, repairing railearliest possible moment; and the means roads and stocking them with material sufficient for supplying the army, should at

once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Acquia and Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.)

"N. B. That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)"

This decision, being communicated to the War Department, was promptly responded to as follows:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, March 13, 1862. "To Maj.-Gen. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN :

"The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes

A Secretary of War, how-no objection to the same, but gives the fol

ever able and fit, is perplexed by duties and anxieties too multifarious and distracting to permit of his serving to advantage as Generalissimo.

lowing directions as to its execution:

"1st. Leave such force at Manassas

Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

"2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. "3d. Move the remainder of the force

down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit

"EDWIN M. STANTON,

Two days later, at a council of corps commanders at Fairfax Court House, it was decided-for reasons not given and not apparent-to de- of the enemy by some route. bark our army at Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers, instead of Urbana or Mob Jack Bay -a most unfortunate decision, though materially qualified by the following provisos :

Secretary of War."

Gen. McClellan hereupon ordered Gen. Banks, with his corps, to move both his divisions down from the Shenandoah Valley to Manassas;

"1st. That the enemy's vessel Merrimac there to intrench and rebuild the railcan be neutralized.

"2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the

roads and bridges, "occupy by grand guards Warrenton Junction, or War

force to its new base, can be ready at Wash-renton itself, and also some little