from the same, which had been executed by her Majesty alone, or by her jointly with the Prince; and that the Prince ought to have distinguished those drawings and etchings which were his own from those which were done by the Queen. Strange did not attempt to dissolve the injunction, so far as it related to the exhibition; but in December a motion was made on his behalf, before his Honor the ViceChancellor Knight Bruce, to dissolve the injunction, so far as it related to publishing the Catalogue. That motion was refused with costs, on the 16th of January, and was now renewed, by way of appeal, before the Lord Chancellor. 1849. PRINCE ALBERT v. STRANGE. Statement. Mr. Russell, Mr. Rolt, Mr. Warren, and Mr. Sidney Smith, in support of the motion. The former part of the injunction, which was to restrain the exhibition of the etchings or impressions, is not now in dispute. Strange states, that he never had any of the etchings, or more than one of the impressions, in his possession, and therefore it is not in his power either to exhibit or to make copies of them. The only question is, his right to publish the Catalogue. Some of the etchings in question were done, not by Prince Albert, but by the Queen; and the Prince has no interest in them, which will entitle him to sustain this injunction, so far as relates to those etchings. It was provided, by the statute 3 & 4 Vict. c. 3, s. 2, that the Prince should not, by virtue of his marriage, acquire any interest in any property of her Majesty. [The LORD CHANCELLOR.-A Defendant cannot put a Argument. 1849. PRINCE v. STRANGE. Argument. Plaintiff in that position by publishing that which partly belongs to one and partly belongs to another, and then say, that neither the one nor the other shall move for an injunction, because the Catalogue contains matter relating to both.] Strange has, by his answer, distinctly denied all the allegations in the bill which impute to him any fraud in obtaining the impressions, or any knowledge of any such fraud committed by others. The question, therefore, is, whether a party, who has become aware of the fact that certain etchings are in existence, is at liberty, without the consent of the owner, to publish a catalogue of them, together with the ideas which they have produced in the mind of the party who compiled the Catalogue. A person inspects, with care and attention, certain engravings; the examination of them leaves certain ideas in his mind; and the ideas which he received by those means he has materialised and embodied in a catalogue, and he now proposes to publish them to the world. Now, the engravings had been left in the apartments of Windsor Castle, and several had been given away. That was equivalent to such a publication, as, if it had been a mechanical discovery, would have precluded the possibility of obtaining a patent afterward. [The LORD CHANCELLOR.-If a man communicates to a friend the particulars of a discovery or invention, could he not afterward obtain a patent ?] In this case there has been a general publication, by exhibiting and by giving away; and no precedent can be found in which this Court has granted an injunction in such a case. The questions in which the Court has interfered, with regard to the publication of letters and of lectures, are to some extent analogous. In Gee v. Pritchard (a), the Lord Chancellor repudiated the argument, that the publication of letters would be restrained, because their publication would be painful to the feelings of the Plaintiff; and said, "The question will be, whether the bill has stated facts of which the Court can take notice, as a case of civil property, which it is bound to protect." In Abernethy v. Hutchinson (b), an application was made to restrain the Defendants from publishing, in "The Lancet," Mr. Abernethy's Lectures, which had been delivered extemporally. Lord Eldon, at first, refused the application; but afterward granted an injunction, on the ground that there was an implied contract between him and the parties who attended his Lectures, that they should not publish them. The order of the Vice-Chancellor carries the interference of the Court further than it can be supported on the principle adopted in either of those cases, namely, either on the ground of property, or on the ground that there was some implied contract that the knowledge communicated should not be made public. To support his Honor's decision, the right of property in a chattel must, independently of any contract, give an exclusive right to the use of any knowledge connected with that chattel. That is, at all events, a very doubtful question of law; and the Court will therefore refuse its interference, until the Plaintiff has established his right at law: Spottiswoode v. Clarke (c); Rigby v. The Great Western Railway Company (d). Can a right in property, to which certain knowledge relates, give an exclusive right to the use of that knowledge, independently of any contract? A confusion seems to be created by mixing up the several distinct matters which compose the whole. 1849. PRINCE ALBERT V. STRANGE. Argument. 1849. PRINCE v. STRANGE. Argument. First, there is a right of property in the canvass of a painting; and, secondly, there is a right of property in the form of the idea which adorns the canvass, and that cannot be copied. And, further, if a party is bound by any contract, he may be restrained from using the knowledge he has obtained respecting the painting, unless with the consent of the owner of the chattel. But the possessor, independently of contract, has no right or property in the idea which is acquired by another party from a knowledge of that particular chattel. If the owner of property desires it to be kept secret, and orders that strangers be not admitted to view it, yet if a servant, notwithstanding such directions, should admit an amateur to see it, could that amateur, in such a case, be prevented from describing the property in poetry or sculpture, or from illustrating it by paintings? Suppose, again, the case of a work of art being stolen from the lawful owner, and a party obtaining an inspection of it, knowing the owner's wish to keep the work secret: would the Court restrain such party from using the knowledge he had obtained by means of an examination of the work? He might describe it in poetry, or realise it in marble. A fair use of works, which form the property of another party, either by quotation, or in making an abridgment, or for the purpose of criticism, is permitted by the Court: Wilkins v. Aikin (a), Saunders v. Smith (b), Gyles v. Wilcox (c), Carr v. Hood (d). If a party published a drawing of a house or tree belonging to another person, could the owner restrain him by an injunction, because his privacy was invaded? It is the same principle of a contract, expressed or implied, not to divulge, which induces this Court to interfere (a) 17 Ves. 422. (b) 3 M. & Cr. 711. (c) 2 Atk. 141. in cases of medical recipes: Youatt v. Winyard (a), Green v. Folgham (b). The cases of unprinted manuscripts, and of dramatic performances, and lectures not printed but delivered orally, all proceed on the notion of property existing, although not in a published form. If lectures be reduced into writing, there is a copyright in them. In Macklin v. Richardson (c), which related to the farce of "Love à la Mode," a short-hand writer took down the words from the mouths of the actors on the stage, and the Defendant afterward published them, and an injunction was granted to restrain him, on the ground that the author had not, by the public representation of the farce, parted with his exclusive right of publication. The converse of that case was Murray v. Elliston (d), in which a party, who was representing Lord Byron's tragedy of " Marino Faliero, Doge of Venice," on the stage, with some alterations from the printed tragedy, was held not liable to an action. One of the latest cases was Tipping v. Clarke (e), before Vice-Chancellor Wigram. There the Defendant had bribed the Plaintiff's agent to make extracts of false entries from the books of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff did not move for an injunction on the Defendant's answer; but, on the cause coming on for hearing, it appeared that Clarke had filed another bill in the Rolls Court, and had obtained in that suit an inspection of those books; and therefore the bill was dismissed. But the principle that an agent could not be allowed to communicate the contents of his employer's books to another person, and that that person could not publish the information so improperly obtained, was directly admitted by the Vice-Chancellor. A person guilty of bribery takes the knowledge he obtains with no better right to use it than the party communicating it; but here there is neither bribery nor fraud. (a) 1 J. & W. 394. (b) 1 S. & S. 398. (c) Amb. 694. (d) 5 B. & Ald. 657. (e) The facts of this case are stated in 2 Hare, 383. 1849. PRINCE v. STRANGE. Argument. |