The share of a partner in a neutral house is, jure belli, subject to confiscation where his own domicil is in a hostile country.

The Antonia Johanna, ibid., 159.

A native citizen of the United States who emigrated before a declaration of war to a neutral country, and there acquired a domicil, afterward returning to the United States during the war and reacquiring his native domicil, is to be held as recovering his American citizenship, so that he could not afterward, flagrante bello, acquire a neutral domicil by again emigrating to his adopted country.

The Dos Hermanos, 2 Wheat., 76.

Mere casual return to his native country of a merchant who is domiciled in a neutral country at the time of capture does not revive his native domicil, it appearing that he left his commercial establishment in the neutral country to be conducted by his clerks in his absence, and that he visited his native country merely on mercantile business, intending to return to his adopted country.

The Friendschaft, 3 Wheat., 14.

The property of a house of trade established in the enemy's country is condemnable as prize, whatever may be the personal domicil of the partners.

Ibid., 4 Wheat., 105.

All persons, whether foreigners or not, residing within the territory occupied by the hostile party in the civil war in the United States, are liable to be treated as enemies.

The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635; The Venice, 2 Wall., 258.

"It is said, that though remaining in rebel territory, Mrs. Alexander has no personal sympathy with the rebel cause, and that her property therefore cannot be regarded as enemy property; but this court cannot inquire into the personal character and dispositions of individual inhabitants of enemy territory. We must be governed by the principle of public law, so often announced from this bench, as applicable alike to civil and international wars, that all the people of each State or district in insurrection against the United States must be regarded as enemies, until, by the action of the legislature and the executive, or otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and permanently changed."

Chase, C. J.; Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall., 419.

As to cotton as contraband, see §§ 203, 224, 2.8, 373. As to claims for spoliation of neutral, see supra, §§ 227 ff; infra, § 353.

Alien friends who remain in the country of the enemy after the declaration of war have impressed upon them so much the character of enemies that trading with them becomes illegal, and all property so acquired is liable to confiscation.

The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 377.

Domicil in such cases becomes an important consideration, because every person is to be considered in such proceedings as belonging to that country where he has his domicil, whatever may be his native or adopted country.

Ibid.

The court has never gone further in protecting the property of citi zens residing during the rebellion in the Confederate States from judicial sale than to declare that where such citizen has been driven from his home by a special military order and forbidden to return, judicial proceedings against him were void.

University v. Finch, 18 Wall., 106.

The court reaffirms the ruling in the William Bagaley (5 Wall., 377), that a resident of a section in rebellion should leave it as soon as practicable and adhere to the regular established Government; and furthermore holds that one who, abandoning his home, enters the military lines of the enemy and is in sympathy and co-operation with those who strive by armed force to overthrow the Union, is, during his stay there, an enemy of the Government, and liable to be treated as such, both as to his person and property.

Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U. S., 612.

As to abandonment of citizenship, see supra, §§ 176–190, 216.

As to seizure in other cases, see supra, §§ 201, 203, 223, 226–228, 318, 336.

As we have seen, partnership property sent to sea by a partner domiciled in an enemy's country partakes of the character of such partner (The William Bagaley, 5 Wall., 377), though this taint does not reach to the separate property of a partner having a neutral domicil. (Ibid.; The Sally Magee, Blatch. Pr. Ca., 382; The Aigburth, ibid., 635.)

That a neutral's residence in an enemy's country exposes his property to enemy's risks, see The Gray Jacket, 5 Wall., 342; The Pioneer, Blatch. Pr. Ca., 61; The Prince Leopold, ibid., 89; The Lilla, 2 Sprague, 177. And see, more fully, supra, §§ 198, 223.

According to Chancellor Kent, the principle that "for all commercial purposes the domicil of the party, without reference to the place of birth, becomes the test of national character, has been repeatedly and explicitly admitted in the courts of the United States." "If he resides" (here "domicil" and "residence" are treated as convertible by Chancellor Kent, which, if the latter term be regarded as defining the rule, would largely extend belligerent rights) "in a belligerent country, his property is liable to capture as enemy's property, and if he resides in a neutral country, he enjoys all the privileges, and is subject to all the inconveniences of the neutral trade." (1 Kent Com., 75; The Chester, 2 Dall., 41; Maley v. Shattuck, 3 Cranch, 458; The Venus, 8 ibid., 253. To the same effect, see The William Bagaley, 5 Wall., 377; The Cheshire, 3 Wall., 231.) Sir Robert Phillimore, on the other hand, evidently accepts this position with reluctance (4 Phill., 169), though it is reaffirmed by Mr. Dicey, who states the distinction to be as follows: "A commercial domicil is such a residence in a country for the purpose of trading there as makes a person's trade or business con

tribute to or form part of the resources of such country, and renders it, therefore, reasonable that his hostile, friendly, or neutral character should be determined by reference to the character of such country. When a person's civil domicil is in question, the matter to be determined is whether he has or has not so settled in a given country as to have made it his home. When a person's commercial domicil is in question, the matter to be determined is whether he is or is not residing in a given country with the intention of continuing to trade there." (Dicey on Domicil, 345; see further Whart. Confl. of Laws, § 70.) This is clearly put; and if we accept the position that an enemy's goods may be seized at sea wherever found, gives us at least a line of demarkation readily understood and easily applied. It is, however, to be regretted that the term "domicil" should be adapted to conditions so different as residence with intention to establish a permanent home, and residence with intention to engage in business. The rejection of this distinction renders still more objectionable the claim of belligerents to seize an enemy's goods at sea. If by an "enemy" is to be considered any one who by his business contributes to the resources of an enemy's country, it would be hard for any goods on the high seas, in any way related to a belligerent country, to escape the meshes of the net of the other belligerent. And even were we to hold that a commercial "domicil" of this kind stamps the party accepting it with the political character of the country in which he does business, the more reasonable view is that if he engage in such business in time of peace, this "domicil," if not adopted as final, ceases when the sovereign of such country enters into a war which could not have been contemplated by the party when he engaged in the business. This is the position taken by Marshall, C. J., in The Venus (8 Cranch, 253), dissenting in this respect from the majority of the court, who held to the English view. Chancellor Kent (Com., i, 79) and Mr. Duer (Ins., i, 498), vindicate the dissent. ing opinion of the Chief Justice; Chancellor Kent saying "there is no doubt of its superior solidity and justice." And even by the English courts a person doing business in a land in which he is not naturalized is allowed, on the breaking out of war, a reasonable time to leave such land, and dissolve his business relations. The Gerasimo, 11 Moore, P. C., 88; The Ariel, ibid., 119; see, for parallel cases in this country, The William Bagaley, 5 Wall., 377; The Gray Jacket, 5 Wall., 342. But where a merchant elects to put his goods in a country engaged in war, he impresses such goods, according to the English view, with the political character of such country; and this "allows a merchant to act in two characters, so as to protect his property connected with his house in a neutral country, and to subject to seizure and forfeiture his effects belonging to the establishment in the belligerent country."

See 1 Kent Com., 81, citing, among other cases, The San José, 2 Gallison, 268.
As to rights and duties of domicil, see supra, §§ 198 ff.

(2) WHEN LEAVING PRORERTY AT ENEMY'S DISPOSAL.

§ 353.

The principle that personal dispositions of the individual inhabitants of enemy territory cannot, in questions of prize, be inquired into, applies in civil as well as foreign wars. Property captured on land by the officers and crews of a naval force of the United States, is not

"maritime prize;" even though, like cotton, it may have been a property subject of capture generally, as an element of strength to the enemy.

Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall., 404.

As to principle in this case, see further §§ 203, 224, 228, 352, 373.

NOTE.-By the act of Congress of March 12, 1863, the proceeds of the sale of such property were deposited in the National Treasury, so that loyal owners might obtain restitution, on making satisfactory proof of their loyalty in the Court of Claims.

As to cotton as contraband, see infra, § 373.

The property of a commercial house, established in the enemy's country, is subject to seizure and condemnation as prize, though some of the partners may have a neutral domicil.

The Cheshire, 3 Wall., 231.

When a neutral, who places his vessels under belligerent control, and engages them in belligerent trade, or permits them to be sent with contraband cargoes, under cover of false destination, to neutral ports, while the real destination is to belligerent ports, he impresses upon them the character of the belligerents in whose service they are employed, and the vessel may be seized and condemned as enemy property.

The Hart, ibid., 559. See supra, §§ 223 ff, 227 ff.

Property, the product of an enemy country, and coming from it during war, bears the impress of enemy's property. If it belongs to a loyal citizen of the country of the captors, it is nevertheless as much liable to condemnation as if owned by a citizen or subject of the hostile country, or by the hostile Government itself.

The only qualification of these rules is, that where, upon the breaking out of hostilities, or as soon after as possible, the owner escapes with such property as he can take with him, or in good faith thus early removes his property, with the view of putting it beyond the dominion of the hostile power, the property in such cases is exempt from the liability which would otherwise attend it.

The Gray Jacket, 5 Wall., 342.

The presumption of the law of nations is against an owner who suffers his property to continue in the hostile country for a considerable length of time.

If a person, abandoning a hostile country, has had his property in partnership with citizens thereof, it is his duty to withdraw or dispose of his interest in the firm. If he neglects to do so, his property becomes liable as enemy's property.

The William Bagaley, ibid., 377; supra, §§ 223 ƒfƒ, 227 ff.

Where, after active hostilities had ceased in Georgia, cotton, as private property, was seized there by the military forces of the United States, in obedience to an order of the commanding general, during their occupation and actual government of that State, it was held to have been taken from hostile possession within the meaning of that term, and was, without regard to the status of the owner, a legitimate subject of capture.

Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S., 187. See as to cotton, supra, §§ 203, 224, 228; infra, § 373.

What shall be the subject of capture, as against an enemy, is always within the control of every belligerent. It is the duty of his military forces in the field to seize and hold that which is apparently so subject, leaving the owner to make good his claim as against the captor, in the appropriate tribunal established for that purpose. In that regard they occupy on land the same position that naval forces do at sea.

A person residing in an enemy's country long enough to acquire a domicil there, is subject to the disabilities of an enemy, so far as his property is concerned.

U. S. v. Cargo of the El Telegrafo, 1 Newb. Adm., 383.

A Frenchman who had resided thirteen years in Mexico, was held to have acquired a domicil in the enemy's country, subjecting him, so far as his property was concerned, to all the disabilities of an alien enemy. Rogers v. The Amado, ibid, 400.

That the question of enemy or friend depends upon the domicil, see The Ann Green, 1 Gallison, 274; The Joseph, ibid., 545; The Francis, ibid., 614. And see as to domicil, supra, § 198.

If there be a house of trade established in the enemy's country, the property of all the partners in the house is condemnable as prize, notwithstanding some of them have a neutral residence. But such connection will not affect the other separate property of the partners having a neutral residence.

The San José Indiano, 2 Gallison, 268. Supra, §§ 198, 352.

The rule of international law is well established that a foreigner who resides in the country of a belligerent can claim no indemnity for losses of property occasioned by acts of war of the other belligerent. Hence American merchants domiciled for commercial purposes at Valparaiso cannot sustain a claim for indemnity against Spain or Chili for losses of merchandise in the conflagration caused by the bombardment of Valparaiso by, the Spanish fleet in March, 1866.

12 Op., 21, Stanbery, 1866. Supra, § 198.

As to neutral property under enemy's flag, see supra, § 343.

As to seizures of enemy's goods under neutral flags, see supra, § 342; and see further, as to alien neutral's liability to seizure of goods, §§ 201, 203, 223, 227, 228, 318.