Ill. 317, 331. There the deed ran to "M. A. L. and her heirs by her present husband, H. L." This was held to give M. A. L. a fee tail special at common law which the statute on estates tail turned into a life estate to M. A. L. and a remainder in fee to the bodily heirs of herself and her rusband. The Court then said that even proceeding upon the supposition that M. A. L. took a life estate by the original limitation in the deed the result would be the same, since M. A. L. by the Rule in Shelley's case “would, at common law, be seized of an estate in fee tail, and brought directly within the terms of Section 6 of the Conveyance Act. "1-A. & D. R. E. S. 439; Laws 1819, p. 223 (1 A. & D. R. E. S. 446); Laws 1829, p. 191 (1 A. & D. R. E. S., p. 464); R. S. 1845, Ch. 109, Sec. 46 (1 A. & D. R. E. S. 505); Laws 1871-2, p. 352, Sec. 1 (1 A. & D. R. E. S. 579): R. S. 1874, Ch. 39, par. 1 (Hurd's R. S. 1901, p. 677). "115 Fed. Rep. 468 (C. C. A.). *164 Mo. 336. *146 Mo. 352. Horseley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458; Myar v. Snow, 49 Ark. 125; Wilmans v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517. Viris v. Sloan, 68 Ill. 588; Lehndorf v. Cope, 122 Ill. 317, 330 (semble); Kyner v. Boll, 182 Ill. 171, 177 (semble); Turner v. Hause, 199 Ill. 464, 471 (semble). "Thompson v. Carl, 51 Vt. 408. *2 Bl., Com., Ch. 14, pp. 200-240; 4 Gray's Cases on Property, 9. "Frame v. Humphreys, 164 Mo. 336; Burris v. Page, 12 Mo. 358. "This reasoning evidently prevailed over a strong prejudice against the result which it entailed, for in Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 352, at page 360, the Court had said: "It might prove interesting to examine and discuss at length the exceedingly ingenious and plausible argument of the able counsel for Mrs. Mullen trat our statute of 1835 [Mo. R. S. 1835, Act of Conveyances, Sec. 5] docking entails has been the means of preserving the common law rule of descent of primogeniture, but having disposed of the only two grounds upon which his contention could possibly exist in this case, the stress of work forbids that we should enter upon such a discussion. While it is somewhat startling, we do not think it is altogether new, and we feel justified in saying that however plausible the theory evolved from the mere words of the statute, no such construction ever has been given that statute in this State, or ever will be. There are no mourners for the doctrine of primogeniture in this State." “1 A. & D. R. E. S., 439; also L. 1819, p. 223 (1 A. & D. R. E. S. 446). Corbin v. Healy, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 514 (1838); Wight v. Thayer, 67 Mass. 284 (1854). "Reinhart v. Lantz, 37 Pa. St. 488 (1860), overruling the earlier case of Price v. Taylor, 4 Casey (Pa.) 95, 106, 28 Pa. State 95, 106. Sauder v. Morningstar, I Yeates (Pa.) 313, is no authority upon the point of the text because there the statute of descent (Act of 1705) only regulated the descent of lands amongst children, where the father is seized thereof, and might dispose of them by deed or will. "Riggs v. Sally, 15 Me. 408 (1839). "In Corbin v. Healy, supra, the statute of descent involved (Mass. Laws of 1780-1791, p. 124, Act of March 9, 1784) read: "That when any person shall die seized of lands, tenements or hereditaments, not by him devised, the same shall descend in equal shares to and among his children," etc. In Reinhart v. Lantz, supra, the statute involved (Session Laws of Pa., 1832-3, p. 315) applied to "the real and personal estate of a decedent, whether male or female, remaining after payment of all just debts and legal charges, which shall not have been sold or disposed of by will or limited by marriage settlement." "In I Leading Cases in American Law of Real Property (note by Sharswood and Budd), 104. "The existence and incidents of an estate tail, have always been recognized in this Commonwealth, and provision made for an easy mode of barring them; and common recoveries to bar them have been in frequent use." Per Shaw, C. J., in Corbin v. Healy, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 514, 517 (1838). In Sauder v Morningstar. 1 Yeates 313 (1793), counsel who were arguing that the estate tail descended to all the sons equally were stopped by the Court. "The Court observed that it was too late now to stir this point whatever reason there might have been for it in the first instance. The invariable opinion of lawyers since the Act of 1705 has been, that lands entailed descended according to the course of the common law. and it has been understood generally, that it has been so adjudged in early times. All the common recoveries which have been suffered by the heirs of donees in tail have been conformable to that principle; to unsettle so many titles at this late day would be productive of endless confusion." "See language of the Court in Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa. Stat. 95 at 106; 4 Casey 95, 106. "See the suggestion of Lowrie, J., in Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa. St. 95, 106; 4 Casey 95, 106. "It might be urged that the Act of 1827 itself furnishes an example where a reference to the common law admittedly includes a statutory amendment of the common law, since, while referring to "cases where by the common law any person or persons might hereafter become seized, in fee tail," cases where by the statute de donis of Edward I any person is seized in fee tail are meant. But a fair argument can hardly be drawn from this because the result was reached not because "common law" includes a subsequent statutory amendment of the common law, but because the statute in terms applied to estates tail and at common law there were none such at all. "The Court adds that by the Revision of 1845 "this last vestige of the system of feudal tenures was swept from our statute book." That is true because the Act of 1845 referred to must have been Mo. R. S. 1845, p. 116, Sec. 5 (Act regulating conveyances), where it was provided that the remainder "shall go and be vested in the children of such grantee or devisee equally to be divided among them," etc. But by the Act of 1866 (see supra note 6), this "last vestige of the system of feudal tenures" was evidently restored by the re-enactment of the Act of 1825 regarding entails. (Frame v. Humphreys, 164 Mo. 336.) Laws 1829, p. 191; 1 A. & D. R. E. S., p. 464, Sec. 46. R. S. 1845, p. 534, Sec. 46. R. S. 1874, p. 417, Ch. 39, Sec. 1. Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57; Welliver v. Jones, 166 Ill. 80. 480. "Welliver v. Jones, supra. "Rev., p. 299, Secs. 10 and 11. "Doty v. Teller, 54 N. J. L. 163. "Zabriskie v. Wood, 23 N. J. Eq. 541; Weart v. Cruser, 49 N. J. L. 475, 1 Hayes' Conveyancing, 543 "In the following cases the Court said that the Rule had no application in case of an estate tail: Baker v. Scott, 62 Ill. 86, 98; Griswold v. Hicks, 132 Ill. 494, 501; Schaefer v. Schaefer, 141 Ill. 337, 343. In the following cases the same thing was assumed without mention of the point: Blair v. Van Blarcum, 71 Ill. 290; Welliver v. Jones, 166 Ill. 80; Atherton v. Roche, 192 Ill. 252. "It was also destructable. How far it may still be destructable by means other than the creation of the preceding statutory estates is not here considered. "Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, par. 108. *203 Ill. 341. "This position was squarely taken by the Court, but it was unnecessary to the result reached. The only object in calling the remainder vested was so that it might pass by descent upon the death of the remainder-man. It would just as clearly have descended if it had been a contingent remainder, since the death of the remainder-man was not an event which forever made it impossible for the remainder to vest. (Fearne C. R. 364; Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, par. 118.) It seems, however, that the position of the Court that the remainder was vested was supported by the case of Boatman v. Boatman, 198 Ill. 414. "Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, pars. 106-107. "Evers v. Challis, 18 Q. B. 224, 231; 7 H. L. C. 531; Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, pars. 338-340a. No separation of contingencies can be accomplished upon the reasoning if the ultimate interest is an equitable interest in realty. In re Bence, Smith v. Bence (1891), 3 Ch. 242. "This is founded upon the rule that a future interest must take effect as a contingent remainder rather than as an executory springing or shifting future interest. (2 Preston, Abs., 153-154.) It is supported by every case where a contingent remainder has been held to be destroyed because of the failure of the event to happen upon which the remainder would vest before the termination of the preceding estate. 159 Ill. 300. There the rule of the feudal law of remainders that a fee cannot be mounted upon a fee by way of remainder triumphed over the later rule of conveyancing under the statute of uses that by bargain and sale a fee might be mounted upon a fee by way of shifting use. "1159 Ill. 300. 12202 Ill. 275. "Forth v. Chapman, 1 P. Wms. 663; 5 Gray's Cases on Property, 256. "Smith v. Kimbell, 153 Ill. 368; Hinrichsen v. Hinrichsen, 172 Ill. 462. "Theobald's Law of Wills, 563. 107 Tenn. 54. "203 Ill. 341. "The usual expression seems to have been "for default of such issue." 2 Greenleaf's Cruise on Real Property, 666; Hayes and Jarmen, Forms of Wills (8th ed.), 388. "I Vic. c. 26 s. 29; Leake, Digest of Land Law, 183; Theobald on Wills, p. 535; 2 Jarmen on Wills (6th ed.), 1322 (star page). 02 Hill 554; 2 Denio 336. $12 Denio 336. "The language of the will in this case was particularly strong for an indefinite failure of issue. It read, to Rachel and the heirs of her body forever; "and in case of her death without such heirs," then to another. "See also Wilkes v. Lion, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 333, 397 (1823). THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGES. In a recent authoritative American work on international law the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Springbok is characterized as a "new and dangerous extension of the doctrine of continuous voyages which received from the publicists of the world outside of the United States, general and emphatic condemnation." Even conceding that the facts were as found by the court, the author says that the decision rested upon reasons which were subject to well grounded objections, and quotes with approval the language of Lawrence that, "if a belligerent may capture a neutral vessel honestly intended for a neutral port and condemn her cargo because he vaguely suspects it will be transferred to some vessel unknown to him, and sent on to some hostile destination also unknown to him, a new disability has been imposed upon neutral commerce."1 Mr. Taylor's treatment of this important subject seems very inadequate, as he completely ignores the subsequent history of the doctrine, and leaves the reader to infer that the rule to which this country gave its adherence is now discredited before the world. I do not intend in this brief article to discuss the merits of the doctrine of continuous voyages as applied during our civil war, but merely to disclose its subsequent history and show that the matter is not so simple and one-sided as Mr. Taylor's excellent book would leave us to infer. A doctrine of international law which the great maritime powers of Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy have advocated and actually enforced against 'Taylor's International Law, pp. 778, 779 (1901). I include France because of her action during the war with China in 1885. French writers on international law generally condemn the entire doctrine of continuous voyages, as was done by American statesmen when it was first worked out by the British courts in the early part of the nineteenth century. See 3 American State Papers (For. Relations), 106, 118. Spec. Messages Pres. Jefferson, Jan. 17, 1806; Mess., & Papers of the Presidents (Richardson), Vol. 1, p. 395. The reader interested in the antagonistic views of neutral rights is referred to Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres en temp de guerre maratime, by Hautefauille, a review of his theories by Sir Vernon Harcourt (Historicus), |