the jurisdiction and in other cases not, we are not justified in assuming that in this case it intended a distribution which it did not in terms make simply because of the use of the language which somewhat implies that a distribution had already been made.

So far as the mere transfer of the place of trial from one division to another, it would seem,in the absence of express prohibition, to be within the competency of the court having full jurisdiction over the entire district, and certainly presents no ground of error when it is not at the time challenged, and the trial proceeds without objection.

These considerations also show that there is no force in the objection that the indictment does not specify the place at which the grand jury that found it was sitting, and also as to the certainty of the venue.

the court as to actions, prosecutions, and pro- | that in some cases of division it distributed ceedings already begun; that they should proceed where they were commenced, with a proviso that the court might in its discretion transfer all such actions, etc., as might properly be begun in the new division to the court 262]in that division. *This language is broad enough to include criminal actions. Too much stress should not be placed on the word "properly." The creation of divisions and the multiplication of places of trial are for the convenience of litigants, bringing the trial nearer to them and their witnesses. There is a manifest propriety, even when no jurisdictional necessity, in conducting criminal prosecutions as near to the place of the offense as possible. The idea of the vicinage is familiar to criminal law. And all that Congress may have intended by this second provision was to make it clear that the court should have the power to transfer to this new division any pending proceeding which might with more convenience and therefore propriety be prosecuted at the place at which in the new division the sessions of the court were to be held. It must, however, be conceded that these provisions do carry some implication that a dis tribution has been made of territorial jurisdiction between the courts of the two divisions, and the question we have to determine is whether this implication is sufficient to create a distribution which the statute has not in terms made. It may be said, and with force, that there is no need of the last half of the section; that it is superfluous, unless upon the assumption that there has been a distribution of jurisdiction, civil or criminal or both, coextensive with the territories of the two divisions, and yet can it be adjudged that Congress has created such distribution when it has not in terms directed it, simply because some expressions in the statute imply its existence? The question is a difficult one, and yet we think the true rule of construction is this: When there are statutes clearly defining the jurisdiction of the courts the force and effect of such provisions should not be disturbed by a mere implication flowing from subsequent dissent. legislation. In other words, where Congress has expressly legislated in respect to a given matter that express legislation must control,

The only remaining question is in reference to the description of the draft which was in the letter destroyed. It is insisted that this is not sufficient. This objection cannot be sustained. The gravamen of the charge is the destruction of the letter. It is an offense against the postal laws of the United States, and while the letter must contain a draft, check, or some other thing of value or supposed value in order to bring the case within the compass of this statute, yet it is unnecessary to describe this draft, check, etc., with the same precision as if forgery or some other crime directed against the instrument itself was charged. A full description *of the check [264 or draft being unessential, it is clearly sufficient when the grand jury say that the instrument having been destroyed they are unable to give any further description than such as is found in this indictment, for that, as will be seen, contains some matters of description and identification. There being no other questions presented in the record, and in these appearing no error, the judgment of the circurt court is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Gray and Mr. Justice White

in the absence of subsequent legislation THE VALENCIA, Her Tackle, etc., Will

equally express, and is not overthrown by any mere inferences or implications to be found in such subsequent legislation. Es

pecially is this rule to control when it appears

iam G. Boulton et al., Claimants, Appts.,

V.

WILLIAM H. ZIEGLER et al.

that Congress in some cases has made express (See S. C. ("The Valencia") Reporter's ed. 264-273.) 263] provision for effecting a change. This does not conflict with the doctrine stated in Re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 256 [38: 149, 151],

Maritime lien for coal.

plying coal to it on the order of a charterer, without any order or procurement of the master or his expressed consent, where the charterer was required by the charter to provide and pay for

that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal A maritime lien on a vessel is not created by supcases cannot "be enlarged by any mere inferences from the law or doubtful construction of its terms." It is rather the converse of that, for the effort is to destroy a jurisdiction otherwise clearly existing, by mere inferences and doubtful construction.

NOTE. As to lien for repairs and necessaries for

vessels domestic and foreign; and for supplies, salv-
age, and freight; proceedings in rem for, see notes to
6:531, and The General Smith, 4: 609.
Blaine v. The Charles Carter, 2: 636; The Palmyra,

This may be a case of mere omission, but it is an omission which the courts cannot supply. We cannot assume that because Congress in creating some divisions distributed As to lien of the contract of affreightment on the jurisdiction it meant, in creating other divi-vessel, and for damages to goods, see note to The sions, to also so distribute it, and when we find Freeman v. Buckingham, 15: 341.

the coal, and had an office at the port of supply | fact, no maritime lien for such supplies could so that the party providing it could easily have be sustained. ascertained the ownership of the vessel and the relation of the charterer to it, although he acted in fact on a belief that the vessel was responsible. [No. 51.]

Stephenson v. The Francis, 21 Fed. Rep. 715; The Stroma, 41 Fed. Rep. 599; Hazlehurst v. The Lulu (The Lulu") 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 192 (19: 906).

No necessity or apparent necessity is shown

Submitted May 7, 1896. Decided February 1,| for a lien. 1897.

The Patapsco v. Boyce (The Patapsco") 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 329 (20: 696); Hazlehurst v. The In the absence of an agreement or under- Lulu (“The Lulu") 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 192 (19: standing that the credit of the vessel was 906); Pendergast v. The Kalorama ("The Kalopledged for the supplies, the burden of proof rama") 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 504 (19: 941). was on the libellants to prove that the supplies were not furnished on the personal credit of the. charterer.

made no inquiry as to the solvency of the steamship company, or as to the ownership or nationality of the vessel, but, in the belief that the ship was responsible for supplies furnished, delivered the coal as above stated, charging the same on its books to "S. S. Valencia, and owners, New York," in some cases "city," in others "Pier 49, E. R., New York." No fact proved in the case warranted the in266] ference that either the master or the charterer agreed to pledge the credit of the vessel for the coal.

By N. Y. Laws 1862, chap. 482, it is provided: "§ 1. Whenever a debt amounting to $50 or upwards as to a seagoing or oceanbound vessel . . shall be contracted by the master, owner, charterer, builder, or consignee of any ship or vessel, or the agent of either of them, within this state for either of the following purposes: 1st. On account of work done or materials or other articles furnished in this state for or towards the building, repairing, fitting, furnishing, or equipping such ship or vessel; 2d. For such provisions and stores furnished within this state as may be fit and proper for the use of such vessel at the time the same were furnished, such debt shall be a lien upon such vessel, her tackle, apparel, and furniture," etc. No lien was filed under the statute of the state.

The question certified to this court is whether, upon the above facts, the libellants obtained a maritime lien on the steamship for the supplies thus furnished and not paid for.

|

recognized under that law where the supplies are furnished, not upon the order of the master, but upon that of the charterer who did not represent the owner in the business of the vessel, but who, as the claimant knew, or by reasonable diligence could have ascertained, had agreed himself to provide and pay for such supplies, and could not, therefore, rightfully pledge the credit of the vessel for them." 164 U. S. 458, 469, 470 [ante, 512, 517, 518].

The libellants contend that although the coal was furnished on the order of the charterer, and not on that of the master, they have a maritime lien on the vessel to secure their claim, and cite in support of that view The Grapeshot v. Wallerstein ("The Grapeshot") 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 129 [19: 651]; Hazlehurst v. The Lulu (The Lulu"), 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 192, 197 [19: 906, 907]; Pendergast v. The Kalorama ("The Kalorama”), 77 Ū. S. 10 Wall. 204, 210, 213, 214 [19: 941, 942, 944]; and Patapsco v. Boyce (The Patapsco"), 80 U. S. 18 Wall. 329 [20: 696].

In The Grapeshot it was said, among other things, that "where proof is made of necessity for the repairs or supplies, or for funds raised to pay for them by the master, and of credit given to the ship, a presumption will arise, conclusive, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, of necessity for credit;" in The Lulu, that "exLibellants insisted that for other supplies of perience shows that ships and vessels employed coal of the aggregate value of $1,608.75, fur-in commerce and navigation often need renished in the months of June, July, and Au pairs and supplies in course of a voyage, when gust, they were entitled to a maritime lien on the owners of the same are absent, and at times the ship. The district court having sustained and places when and where the master may their claim, an appeal was prosecuted to the be without funds, and may find it impracticacircuit court of appeals. ble to communicate seasonably with the owners of the vessel upon the subject," and that "contracts for repairs and supplies under such circumstances, may be made by the *mas [268 ter to enable the vessel to proceed on her voyage, and if the repairs and supplies were necessary for that purpose, and were made and furnished to a foreign vessel or to a vessel of the United States in a port other than the port of the state where the vessel belongs, the prima facie presumption is that the repairs and supplies were made and furnished on the credit of the vessel, unless the contrary appears from the evidence in the case;" and in The Kalorama-in which case all the advances were made at the request of the master, in the absence of the owner, or by the owner in person when he was present, and with the understanding that they were made on the credit of the vessel-that "the necessity for credit must be presumed where it appears that the repairs and supplies were ordered by the master, and that they were necessary for the ship, unless it is shown that the master had funds or that the owner had sufficient credit, and that the repairers, furnishers, and lenders of the money knew those facts or one of them, or that such facts and circumstances were known to them as were sufficient to put them upon inquiry, and to show that if they had used due diligence they would have ascertained that the master was not authorized to obtain any such relief on the credit of the vessel."

In The Kate, decided at the present term, in which case the libellant claimed a maritime lien on a vessel for coal furnished upon the order of a charterer who was bound by the charter party to provide and pay for all coal required by the vessel,-this court said: "The principle would seem to be firmly established that when it is sought to create a lien upon a vessel for supplies furnished upon the order of the master, the libel will be dismissed if it satisfactorily appears that the libellant knew, or ought reasonably to be charged with knowledge, that there was no necessity for obtaining the supplies, or, if they were ordered on the credit of the vessel, that the master bad, at the time, in his hands, funds which his duty required that he should apply in the purchase of 267] needed supplies. *Courts of admiralty will not recognize and enforce a lien upon a vessel when the transaction upon which the claim rests originated in the fraud of the master upon the owner, or in some breach of the master's duty to the owner, of which the libellant had knowledge, or in respect of which he closed his eyes, without inquiry as to the facts." Again: "If no lien exists under the maritime law when supplies are furnished to a vessel upon the order of the master, under circumstances charging the party furnishing them with knowledge that the master cannot rightfully as against the owner, pledge the credit of the vessel for such supplies, much less is one

These were cases of supplies furnished on the order of the master, and what was said by this court must, therefore, be taken in the light of the principle, that as the master of the ship

vessel or of the owners is the only point of inquiry in this case."

Nor is there anything in The Guy v. Tall, ("The Guy") 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 758 [19: 710], which bears directly on the question now presented. The opinion was very brief and stated nothing more than that upon the facts established that case was governed by the principles announced in The Grapeshot. Wallerstein ("The Grapeshot") decided at the same term (76 U. S. 9 Wall. 129 [19: 651]). According to the reporter's statement of the facts it was a case of repairs ordered by one claim. ing to be the proprietor and agent of the company operating the vessel, and who "seemed to have been the owner." It was substantially the case of necessary repairs made pursuant to an agreement or understanding with the owner that they were made on the credit of the vessel, the owner himself being known to be insolvent and unworthy of credit.

stands in the position of agent or representative of the owners, the latter "are bound to the performance of all lawful contracts made by him, relative to the usual employment of the ship, and the repairs and other necessaries furnished for her use." The Aurora, 14 U. S. 1 Wheat. 95, 101 [4: 45, 46], or, as expressed in The St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 409, 416 [6: 122, 124], the law maritime, in order that the ship may get on, "attaches the power of pledging or subjecting the vessel to materialmen, to the office of shipmaster, and considers the owner as vesting him with those powers by the mere act of constituting him shipmaster." Upon this ground, as was said in The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 9 [37: 345, 346], maritime liens or privileges for necessary ad269] vances *made or supplies furnished in good faith to the master in a foreign port to keep a vessel fit for sea "are preferred to a prior mortgage, or to a forfeiture to the United States for a precedent violation of the navigation In the present case, the question of lien or laws." The relations of the master to the vessel no lien on the vessel arises under circumand its owners, as well as to shippers of cargo, stances not disclosed or discussed in any of the are such that his power and duty of determin-cases upon which libellants rely. Although ing what part of the common adventure shall be sacrificed for the safety of the rest, and when and how the sacrifice shall be made, were held in Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386, 400, 401 [39: 742, 749], to appertain to him, "magister navis, as the person intrusted with the command and safety of the common adventure, and of all the interests comprised therein, for the benefit of all concerned, or to someone who, by the maritime law, acts under him or succeeds to bis authority."

the libellants were not aware of the existence of the charter party under which the Valencia was employed, it must be assumed upon the facts certified that by reasonable diligence they could have ascertained that the New York Steamship Company did not own the vessel, but used it under a charter party providing that the charterer should pay for all needed coal. The libellants knew that the steamship company had an office in the city of New York. They did business with them at that office, and In the case of The Patapsco it appeared that could easily have ascertained the ownership the supplies were furnished to the vessel in of the vessel and the relation of the steamship a foreign port. This court, récognizing the company to the owners. They were put upon case to be an embarrassing one and not free inquiry, but they chose to shut their eyes and from difficulty, proceeded on the ground that, make no inquiry touching these matters or in as according to the weight of the evidence the reference to the solvency or credit of that comsupplies were furnished on the credit of the pany. It is true that libellants delivered the ship, and not on that of the company which coal in the belief that the vessel, whether a used it, and which was notoriously insolvent, foreign or a domestic one, or by whomsoever there was a lien on the vessel that should not owned, would be responsible for the value of be displaced except upon affirmative proof such coal. But such a belief is not sufficient that the credit was given to the company to in itself to give a maritime lien. If that belief the exclusion of the vessel. Nothing, how was founded upon the supposition *tha1[271 ever, was said in that case to justify the con- the steamship company owned the vessel, no tention that a lien will arise for necessary sup- lien would exist, because in the absence of an plies furnished a vessel, in a foreign port, on agreement, express or implied, for a lien, a the order of a charterer, if the libelant at the contract for supplies made directly with the time knew, or by reasonable diligence could owner in person is to be taken as made "on his have ascertained, that it was being run under ordinary responsibility, without a view to the a charter that obliged the charterer to provide vessel as the fund from which compensation and pay for all needed supplies. That case is to be derived." The St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U. turned largely upon its special facts, and was S. 9 Wheat. 409, 416, 417 [6: 122, 124]. And so presented to this court as to restrict its in- if the belief that the vessel would be responquiry to the single point whether the coal was sible for the supplies was founded on the supfurnished to the Patapsco on the credit of the position that it was run under a charter party, vessel or of the owners. In point of fact the then the libellants are to be taken as having Patapsco was run under a charter party by furnished the coal at the request of the owner the Commercial Steamboat Company a corpor-pro hac vice (Stephenson v. The Francis, 21 ation of Rhode Island. But that corporation Fed. Rep. 715, 717; The Samuel Marshall, 54 owned and operated steamers of its own on the Fed. Rep. 397, 399), without any express agreesame line in which the Patapsco was employed; ment for a lien, and in the absence of any cirand the court in examining the case seemed to cumstances justifying the inference that the 270]have *treated that company as the owner supplies were furnished with an understandof all the vessels used on its line. This is apparing that the vessel itself would be responsible ent from the opinion, which states that "wheth- for the debt incurred. In the present case, er the coal was furnished on the credit of the we are informed by the record that there was

furnishing supplies or making repairs on the order simply of a person or corporation acquiring the control and possession of a vessel under such a charter party cannot acquire a [273 maritime lien if the circumstances attending the transaction put him on inquiry as to the existence and terms of such charter party, but he failed to make inquiry, and chose to act on a mere belief that the vessel would be liable for his claim.

For the reasons stated the question certified to this court is answered in the negative.

CELESTINE PIM, Piff. in Err.,

D.

ST. LOUIS and St. Louis Sectional Dock
Company.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 273, 274.)

Federal question.

The claim of a Federal right comes too late, so far

as the revisory power of this court is concerned, when set up for the first time after final decision of the case by the state supreme court, and then by petition for rehearing which is overruled without determination of or allusion to the alleged Federal question.

[No. 180.]

no express agreement for a lien, and that noth- | We mean only to decide, at this time, that one ing occurred to warrant the inference that either the master or the charterer agreed to pledge the credit of the vessel for the coal. In Beinecke v. The Secret, 3 Fed. Rep. 665 (United States district court for the southern district of New York), which was a suit against a vessel owned by a foreign corporation having an office and transacting business in New York, and with good credit there, but operated by Murray, Ferris, & Co., a New York firm, under a charter party requiring the charterers to furnish all supplies, Judge Choate said: "They [the libellants] knew they were dealing with New York parties and not with the foreign owner or the master, who presumably represents the owner; and they were put upon inquiry as to the interest and relation of Murray, Ferris, & Co. to the vessel, and are chargeable with the facts they might have ascertained on such inquiry. They could easily have learned that Murray, Ferris, & Co. had no right or power to bind the owners or the vessel for the supplies, and that they were, in fact, the owners, so far as concerned parties supplying the ship." So, in The Norman, 28 Fed. Rep. 383, Judge McKennan said: "But 272] Murray, Ferris, & Co. [the *charterers] were residents of New York, at which port the vessel was lying when the coal was furnished, and they furnished it directly, without the intervention of the official representatives of the vessel. They were the owners of the pro hac vice, because they had possession of the vessel and she was at their sole disposal until Argued January 27, 1897. Decided February the end of the charter. These facts repel the implication that the coal was furnished upon the credit of the vessel, but warrant the inference that it was furnished upon the personal credit of the charterers and ostensible owners. At least they were sufficient to put the libellant upon inquiry as to the actual relations of Murray, Ferris, & Co. to the vessel and their obligations under the charter party, and this must Lave resulted in the knowledge that the act of the charterers could not, under the circumstances, impose a lien on the vessel.' In The Samuel Marshall, 49 Fed. Rep. 754, 757, affirmed in 6 U. S. App. 383, Judge Severens said: "If the vessel is then in the use, possession, and control of others than the owner a presumption arises that such others are liable to pay the charges incident to the employment, and if the party furnishing the supplies knew or should have known the facts in regard to the use and control of the vessel, there is the This was an action for the recovery of cersame reason for the presumption against the tain real estate in the city of St. Louis, of the credit being given to the vessel, when the char- possession of which the plaintiff in error, who terer or other person standing in a similar rewas the plaintiff below, alleged that she was lation to the vessel resides at the port of supply, illegally and wrongfully deprived by the deas in cases where the owner operating the ves-fendants. The city denied the plaintiff's sel on his own account resides at such port, and where there is the same reason there should be the same law." See also The Suliote, 23 Fed. Rep. 919; The Pirate, 32 Fed. Rep. 486; The Glenmont, 34 Fed. Rep. 402; Hill v. The Golden Gate, 1 Newb. Adm. 308.

Under what circumstances, if under any, a charterer who has control and possession of a vessel under a charter party requiring him, at his own cost, to provide for necessary supplies and repairs, may pledge the credit of the vessel, it is not necessary now to determine.

IN

1, 1897.

TN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the
State of Missouri to review a judgment of
that court affirming a judgment of the Circuit
Court of the City of St. Louis in favor of the
defendants, the City of St. Louis et al., in an
action brought by Celestine Pim, plaintiff, for
the recovery of certain real estate in the city of
St. Louis. Dismissed.

See same case below, 122 Mo. 654.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Leverett Bell and Henry B.
Davis for plaintiff in error.

Mr. W. C. Marshall for defendants in error. Court declined to hear counsel for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

claim and relied upon continuous adverse possession for ten years prior to the accruing of the plaintiff's cause of action.

NOTE. As to jurisdiction in the United States Supreme Court where Federal question arises or

where are drawn in question statutes, treaty, or Constitution, see notes to Martin v. Hunter, 4: 97. Matthews v. Zane, 2: 654, and William v. Norris, 6: 571. As to jurisdiction of Federal over state courts: necessity of Federal question; what constitutes Federal question,-see note to Hamblin v. Western Land Co. 37: 267.