ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. See Action, 1.
ACTION. See Duress, 2; Implied Promise.
1. A voluntary acceptance by a claimant of a sum smaller than one claimed,
as a full satisfaction of the whole, and acknowledging this in a receipt
for the amount paid; the demand having been disputed for a long
time, and the smaller sum accepted without objection or protest, is a
bar to further claim. United States v. Child, 232.
2. The law as to the recovery of money paid on an illegal contract stated
and defined. Thomas v. City of Richmond, 350.
8. A party to an action who has received his discharge in bankruptcy
pending the action cannot bring a writ of error to a judgment ren-
dered against him before receiving such discharge. The assignee of
the bankrupt is the proper party to bring error in such case.
v. Exchange Bank, 379.
ADMIRALTY. See Collision; Pleading, 7, 8; Practice, 16.
ADVANCEMENT OF CASES ON DOCKET. See Practice, 5-8.
AGENCY. See Principal and Agent; Public Agent.
APPEALS AND APPEAL BOND. See Practice, 1, 16, 19.
Involving questions of fact will be affirmed without a statement of reasons,
when two courts below have both decided in one way. The Spray, 866.
ARMY ORDER. See Contract, 2.
Does not lie where the party has had a legal opportunity of defence, and
neglected it; nor in any case against the United States. Avery v.
United States, 804.
1. What sort of stranding constitutes a claim for general, by shipowners.
Fowler v. Rathbones, 102.
2. What sort of injury to vessel and cargo does not constitute such claim,
but is particular average. Ib.
8. What expenses the shipowners may claim by way of general average,
and what are particular average. Ib.
4. Questions of fact, found by verdict or case stated, not reviewable
5. Owners of cargo in questions of, bound by a settlement made pursuant
to terms of an average bond. Ib.
What constitutes a passenger's. Hannibal Railroad v. Swift, 262.
BANKRUPTCY. See Action, 3.
The supervisory jurisdiction (from which no appeal lies to this court) of
the Circuit Courts, under the 2d section of the Bankrupt Act of 1867,
defined and distinguished from its appellate jurisdiction; and a case
stated held to have fallen within the former. Hall v. Allen, Assignee,
452.
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE. See Customs of the United States.
CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY. See Jurisdiction, 9.
Claims of persons under, must, on suit brought for breach of official bonds,
be pleaded (if meant to be invoked) by way of set-off to the suit.
They cannot be profited of by way of motion to satisfy a judgment on
the bond or by auditâ querelâ. Avery v. United States, 304.
CARRIER. See Common Carrier.
CAUSA PROXIMA, &c. See Insurance, 1-4.
CHARGE OF COURT.
A special one as to acceptance of a lease interpreted. Wadsworth v. War-
ren, 808.
CITATION. See Practice, 19.
1. Even flagrant fault committed by one of two vessels approaching each
other from opposite directions does not excuse the other from adopt-
ing every proper precaution required by the special circumstances of
the case to prevent a collision. Damages equally divided in a case of
collision on an application of this rule. The Maria Martin, 31.
2. A steamer having a very large tow, and approaching a place where,
from the number of vessels in the water, and the force of counter
currents, navigation with such a tow is apt to be dangerous, but with
a small one is less so-bound to proceed with great care, and if within
two or three miles of the place, though not nearer, she can divide her
tow, she is bound to divide it. The Steamer Syracuse, 167.
8. A vessel racing in order to enter a harbor before, another and pre-
occupy a loading-place condemned for a collision resulting. The Spray,
866.
4. When a vessel is sailing in close proximity to other vessels, the fact
that her hands are engaged in reefing her mainsail is no sufficient
excuse for failure to keep a lookout, or to take such precautions as are
needful to avoid collisions. Thorp v. Hammond, 408.
5. One of several general owners, who sails a vessel on shares, under an
arrangement between himself and the other owners, whereby he in
effect has become the charterer, is to be considered the owner "pre
hac vice," and, as such, is liable personally for a tortious collision with
another vessel. Ib.
COMMERCE BETWEEN STATES.
A discriminating tax tending to prevent, is void. What constitutes such
tax shown.
Ward v. Maryland, 418.
COMMON CARRIER. See Baggage; Private Carriers; Railroad Corpo-
1. His obligations are imposed by law. Hannibal Railroad v. Swift, 262.
2. If he have ground to object to carry persons or property, must object
when they ask to be carried. Ib.
8. His liability attaches when the property passes into his hands. Ib.
4. Not discharged by fact that owner of the property accompanies and
keeps watch of it; no interference being attempted with the carrier.
Ib.
6. Liable as for merchandise for property not "baggage" carried on pas-
senger trains. Ib.
6. Liable as for baggage of a military surgeon's surgical instruments
travelling with troops. Ib.
7. When goods in the hands of are threatened to be destroyed or seized
by a public enemy, he is bound to use due diligence to prevent such
destruction or seizure. It is not necessary that he should be guilty
of fraud or collusion with the enemy, or wilful negligence, to make
him liable; ordinary negligence is sufficient. Holliday v. Kennard,
An instrument on its face an absolute deed, held to be a mortgage, the
relations between the parties being confidential, and the consideration
a debt due. Villa v. Rodriguez, 323.
CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION,
BETWEEN STATE GOVERNMENTS.
A State statute imposing a discriminating tax on traders, citizens of
other States, coming into the State imposing the tax, to trade, is un-
constitutional. Ward v. Maryland, 418.
CONSIDERATION. See Public Policy.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. Congress has power to make notes of the United States a legal tender
in payment of all debts, public and private. Legal Tender Cases, 457.
2. A State statute imposing a discriminating tax on non-resident traders
is void. What constitutes such tax shown. Ward v. Maryland, 418.
8. Taxes cannot be imposed by a State upon vessels owned by its citizens,
"at so much per ton of the registered tonnage." State Tonnage Tax
Cases, 204.
4. Nor is the case varied by the fact that the vessels were exclusively en-
gaged in trade between places within the State. Ib.
CONTINUANCE. See Practice, 9.
CONTRACT. See Insurance, 6; Public Policy.
1. There were three points along a river course, the highest A., the next
B., the last C. Held, that a party having by contract a right to trans-
port with the United States government goods from B. to C., and to
and from all points between them, when the transportation was to be
by water, did not have a right to transport such goods from B. to C.
when the government, transporting from A. to C. touched at B.,
but did not discharge there, although such transportation necessarily
involved (as a greater includes a less) a transportation between E
and C. Scott v. United States, 443.
2. Army regulation No 1002 does not apply to contracts on behalf of
the United States, which require for their validity the approval of
the Secretary of War. United States v. Burns, 246.
CORPORATION. See Municipal Corporation.
COURT AND JURY. See Direct Tax Commissioners, 8.
COURT OF CLAIMS. See Practice, 9.
1. A claim for property accidentally destroyed in the bombardment and
burning of a town, by the naval forces of the United States, is not of
itself within the jurisdiction of the. Perrin v. United States, 315.
United States v. Burns,
2. Not bound by any special rules of pleading.
CUSTOMS OF THE UNITED STATES.
Under the 6th section of the act of March 3d, 1865, relating to importa-
tion of goods, &c., the growth of countries east of the Cape of Good
Hope, when imported from countries west, a duty of 10 per cent. is
chargeable on them when imported from places west, though no duty
was payable when imported from places east. Sturges v. The Col-
lector, 19.
DIRECT TAX COMMISSIONERS.
1. Certificate signed by only two of those appointed under the act of June
7, 1862, is not void, and is admissible in evidence. Cooley v. O'Con-
nor, 891.
2. The act contemplates a certificate of sale, though the United States be-
comes the purchaser. Ib.
8. Whether there has been a sufficient advertisement is a mixed question
of law and fact. Ib.
1. A deed procured through fear of loss of life, produced by threats of the
grantee, may be avoided for. Baker v. Morton, 150.
2. Acceptance from the government of a smaller sum than one claimed,
in full of such one (the acceptance being without force or intimida-
tion, and with a full knowledge of all the circumstances), does not
leave the government open to further claim on the ground of duress
because the sum was so large that the claimants were induced by
their want of the money to accept the less sum in full. United States
v. Child, 282.
EQUITY. See Estoppel; Mortgage; Practice, 20.
1. A judgment being but a general lien and the creditor under it obtain-
ing no incumbrance but on such estate as his debtor really had, the
equity of such creditor gives way before the superior right of an
owner in the land who had conveyed it to the debtor only by duress
and who never parted with possession. Baker v. Morton, 150.
2. A deed, absolute on its face, made by nephews and nieces, with their
mother, to an uncle-a debt to the uncle from them being at the time
of the deed secured by mortgage on part of the premises-held to be
but a mortgage. Villa v. Rodriguez, 828
8. A vendee cannot defend as a bona fide purchaser without notice, against
an unrecorded mortgage, where his rights lie in an executory con-
tract; nor where he has a right to call for no deed but that of a
"quit-claim." Ib.
ESCAPE. See Sheriff.
ESTOPPEL.
1. Where a party having an inchoate title to land gave a power to "sell
and convey" it, declaring, however, in the power, subsequently, that
the attorney was authorized "to sell and convey such interest as I
have and such title as I may have, and no other or better title," and
that he would not hold himself "personally liable or responsible"
for the acts of his attorney in conveying the land, "beyond quit-
claiming whatever title I have," and the party afterwards acquired
complete title, and the attorney conveyed by quit-claim for full con-
sideration, which consideration passed to the principal, Held, that the
grantor could not, six years afterwards, disavow the act of his attor-
ney and convey the land to another person. Smith v. Sheeley, 358.
? Although under the act of Congress of July 1st, 1863, a bank created
by a Territorial legislature cannot legally exercise its powers until
the charter creating it is approved by Congress, yet a conveyance of
land to it, if the charter authorize it to hold land, cannot be treated
as a nullity by the grantor who has received the consideration for the
grant, there being no judgment of ouster against the corporation at
the instance of the government. Ib.
8. Silence of a party works no estoppel, unless it have misled another to
his hurt. Railroad Company v. Dubois, 47.
EVIDENCE.
I. IN CASES GENERALLY.
1. Where a court on the preliminary examination of a witness can see
that he has that degree of knowledge of a party's handwriting which
will enable him to judge of its genuineness, he should be permitted to
give to the jury his opinion on the subject, though he have never
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