immigrant class. Nor was he, naturally, of the stuff of which diplo matists are made. He was too simple and too ready to believe in the sub stantial honesty and common sense of others. To such a President a man like Seward was invaluable. As has been said, he took the burthen of the foreign relations of the United States from the President's overburthened shoulders, and adopted Lincoln's simple statement of policy: "This is our affair; foreign nations must let us alone."

For many months before hostilities had really begun, a slave propaganda had been at work at the principal European courts, preparing the way for the recognition of the Confederacy when the time should be ripe. In many cases the agents of this propaganda had been the diplomatic representatives of the United States, appointed by Buchanan. As a result there was in official circles, especially in England and France, a strong bias in favor of the south, which was strengthened by a natural, if selfish, desire to cripple a formidable commercial rival, and to secure a favorable standing with the great cotton producing states. The missionaries of the south had harped upon their favorite hypothesis of the unwarlike character of the north, until they had caused many persons high in power abroad to believe with them, forgetting 1776 and 1812. Hence England and France only awaited a pretext to recognize the belligerency of the south. Only Russia was, from beginning to end, firmly friendly to the north, though there was a strong sympathy for its cause among the common people of England, France and Germany.

Three days after the surrender of Fort Sumter, on the seventeenth of April, Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation offering letters of marque and repirsal against the shipping of the United States. The Confederacy had no navy and but small prospect of creating one; and counting upon European jealousy, hostility and cupidity, this plan was deemed an excellent one for supplying the defect. The offer assuredly was tempting, but the bloom was taken from it to some extent by the announcement made two days later that the United States would regard and treat as pirates any vessels with their crews operating against American shipping under such letters. At the same time a strict blockade of the ports of all seceded states was ordered, and North Carolina and Virginia were added when they joined the Confederacy.

Davis' proclamation had the effect of intimidating commerce and throwing open to purchase by the government the choice of the merchant marine. This opportunity was made the most of, and the growth of the United States maritime force in 1861 stands as one of the wonders of naval warfare. Before the first regiment had crossed into Virginia, on the twentythird of May, thirty-nine days after the fall of Sumter, an effective navy was on the seas, and the blockade was a stubborn fact.

The resort to this expedient, ably carried out with keels and metal, was

a direct blow to England's pocket, and hence very shocking. Had it been merely on paper it would not have been wrong, but the number of cannon back of it gave it a very different moral significance. In fact, England could not see how the United States could blockade the ports upon its own coasts without an implied recognition of belligerent rights. For the time, however, she contented herself with building fast vessels with which to run the blockade, many of which, when captured, proved very valuable as cruisers in our navy.

Of course the selfish and disloyal element in the north could not see the effects of war upon their own interests, when it brought ruin to our commercial interests and the blockade cut off the profit of trade in cotton and molasses without crying out about tyranny and dictatorship. They were quite as selfish and not half as honest in their selfishness as was England. There was even a wild proposal that New York City should secede and set up a free city. But the great majority in the north was patient, loyal and devoted.

This history has now brought us to the era of actual and bloody war. Thus far it has been the author's object to give such an outline of the conditions precedent and such a view of Lincoln's character and training as would insure an appreciation of the tremendous task he performed and of the elements which made his success possible. If this has been done, much the greater part of his task is accomplished, for from this time out his life becomes part and parcel of general history which may be fairly assumed to be familiar, and which is in any event beyond the scope of this work. Here and there an episode may be taken up which throws light upon the methods and motives of the central figure of that lurid drama, but it will be neither necessary or possible to follow the organization and movements of armies, the fighting of battles, the conduct of campaigns or the progress of diplomacy. All the work of the writers of the present generation in this direction is in fact nothing more than that of collection. They are the hod carriers and stone cutters of history, and when, sometime in the twentieth century, the actors and animosities of the war period being dead, there will come the great architect-some new Tacitus, D'Aubigné or Carlyle-who will select the fit materials and from the accumulation of years, rear a solid and symmetrical structure.

The month of June, 1861, found the whole north crying out for action, that cry so constantly and thoughtlessly repeated for four years. Every editor and every country store oracle knew just how the war could be settled by one decisive blow. Such could not distinguish between a hasty levy of undisciplined thousands and an army. Nor did they know the time necessary to transmute money into arms and ordnance stores. How or with what result the field should be aggressively taken they did not know, but their cry went loudly up, "On to Richmond." There was a

little considered obstacle between Washington and Richmond. General Beauregard held the lines of Manassas with a force which, by the eighteenth day of July, had grown to 32,000 men, better disciplined, armed and equipped, in every way more effective than the 28,000 with which McDowell opposed him. The Confederacy was absolute within its own lines, and its army was as compact and permanent as if a Caligula or a Nero were in command. The Federal force had not developed into a definite organization; it was largely made up of sixty-day militia levies, and of these the terms were hourly expiring. On the seventeenth of July the Fourth Pennsylvania regiment and Vavean's New York battery were dismissed and marched away from the face of the enemy. Some lay within sound of the guns at Bull Run and took no part, because their term of service was over; others, similarly placed, fought like good men and true. The fight of the first Manassas, commonly called the first Bull Run, began on the eighteenth of July and continued until nightfall on the twentyfirst. It was a hard fought and bloody battle, but not as many think, a decisive one. The so-called "stampede" of the Federal forces was only the breaking up of a number of raw regiments, fairly overcome by the strain and fatigue of three days' constant fighting, and these, with a crowd of frightened stragglers who made their way with all speed to Washington and a number of newspaper correspondents of the "Bull Run" Russell type, who obtained their information from stragglers and camp followers, combined to magnify it to a complete route. There was left in the face of the enemy a coherent army quite sufficient to prevent his advancing, and much the better in every way for the men it had lost by the activity of their heels. Not so with the brave hundreds who died during that awful baptism. A comparison of the official reports of the respective commanders disposes at once of the exaggerated assertions then made. The Federal loss was: 25 guns, 481 men killed, 1,011 wounded and 1,460 prisoners. That of the Confederates 387 men killed, 1,582 wounded and a few prisoners. Considering differences of force and organization the battle may well be regarded as drawn, and to the north it was of exceeding value in proving the ability of its volunteers, giving them almost the confidence of veterans, and uniting public sentiment. It was followed by almost the universal rëenlistment for long terms of those who had gone out upon the sixty days' service.

Congress duly assembled upon the call of the President and received a message from him which succinctly detailed the events of a few months. passed, pointed out that the grand principle of popular government was upon its trial, stated and defended the acts of the Executive done in provision for the emergency, and asked congress to authorize the raising of 400,000 men and to provide four hundred million dollars for war purposes. He was not dealing with such a congress as had sat in the time of

Buchanan. Its members had well used the interval since the twelfth of April in thoughtful consideration, and its answer was to vote five hundred thousand men and a credit of five hundred million dollars. If by the use of some new philosopher's stone these men could have been at once transformed into organized armies and these dollars into arms and stores, the Rebellion must have been crushed at once; but from a dollar of authorized credit and from an authorized enlistment to an Enfield with a soldier to carry it, is a long path and takes time to travel. So the Rebellion had much needed weeks for strengthening its position before the patriotism of congress bore fruit.

Congress also formally confirmed all of the President's acts and sanctioned the continuance of his policy in every detail. It may be well to say here that he never lacked its warm and ready support. The small minority which voted against these earliest measures soon dwindled to almost nothing. Some slipped away to join the Confederate army, and others, of whom Clement L. Vallandigham was one, retired as their terms expired for lack of support at home. When congress, 'several months later, appointed a committee on the conduct of the war, Lincoln won its members to his own views and it proved no hindrance but rather an invaluable means of continuing the rapport between the executive and legislative branches. Congress performed an immense amount of valuable work and adjourned in two weeks, leaving the President with the largest powers, ample means and free hands.

The diplomatic situation was exceedingly strained both before and after the battle of Bull Run. Enough has been said to show the slavery motives of interest which urged Great Britain and France to recognize the belligerency of the south and they would certainly have done so in form but for the firmness and wisdom of Lincoln and Seward. Their theory was that the United States had everything to gain and nothing to lose by preventing such a recognition, and their stand was boldly taken on this ground. When England was at the very point of recognizing the south, it was notified whenever it gave such recognition to the revolting citizens of the United States, it must be prepared to enter into an alliance with them. A similar intimation was conveyed to France. This was indeed a daring cast for a government with such a civil war upon its hands. Add the naval and military forces of these two great powers to those of the Confederacy and the result could scarcely be doubtful. However, the diplomacy of Mr. Seward was triumphant. England and France adopted a ridiculous hybrid device of neutrality, and that was enough. When the representatives of those nations, bearing the tidings of this determination, came to Mr. Seward and announced that they desired him to receive certain documents which they were charged to deliver, he declined so to do unless he was first permitted to examine the papers unofficially. This

was permitted, whereupon he declined to receive the announcement. Thus the government of the United States never had official notice of the weak and empty acts of France and England. Thus was surmounted the greatest danger of Mr. Lincoln's administration.

The organization of a new army, the strengthening of the navy, the multitu dinous details of equipment, and discipline and the selection of officers for four hundred thousand men added to the more ordinary duties of his place, gave Lincoln not a moment of leisure. He gave personal attention to hundreds of plans and mechanical devices of war. On one occasion he was near being arrested by the guard while trying target practice with a new patent rifle upon the White House grounds. This personal attention to detail was his custom throughout the war, and it was his faith in Erricson's device which gave to the government and the world. the Monitor, before the first attact of which sank the wooden navies of all nations.

After the battle of Bull Run it became necessary to relieve General McDowell from the command of the army before Washington, as it was unfortunately often necessary to relieve able and efficient officers who had failed through no fault of their own. The question of who should be appointed in his place was a momentous one, and was long and carefully considered. Eventually Mr. Lincoln, acting under the advice of General Scott, named George B. McClellan to the command. When in November following General Scott resigned and retired, McClellan, as the senior major-general, succeeded to the command in chief.

Great things were expected of McClellan. Though untried in war, he was the foremost military scholar of his time and full of ambition. As ar engineer and organizer he was without a rival, but proved a great disap pointment in the field. Lincoln's description of him after he had been fully tested is very true: "For organizing an army or preparing an army for the field, for fighting a defensive campaign, I will back General McClellan against any general of modern times. But I begin to believe that he will never get ready to go forward."

McClellan assumed command July 27, 1861, and under him the work of army organization and equipment went forward with a new impetus. From the first, however, he showed traces of a vexatious tendency to question and argue with the President and to hesitate in obeying his orders. He seemed utterly incapable of appreciating that the authority and supervision exercised by the President were not the intermeddling of a civilian official but the proper control of the commander and chief of the army and navy of the United States, his military superior. His failure to recognize this fact and to yield prompt and respectful obedience, indicates a defect which he shared with many other officers and which must have