3. H having received from S, property in pledge for his indemnity, lent his
note to S for the purpose of raising money upon it. S lost the note at ga-
ming, and the winner lost it in the same way. The third holder took it to
H, who being ignorant of the facts, executed to him a new note, in lieu of
the old one payable to him. After this, S notified H of the facts, and for-
bade the payment of the note. Held, that a payment by H, after notice,
created no charge upon the property placed in his hands for his indem-
nity. Whitlock v. Stewurt,
790
4. A notice by one of the parties to a horse race, to the stakeholder, not to
pay over the money deposited with him, unless all the judges of the race
should determine, that V had won the race, cannot be countervailed by
proof of the rules of racing, or the rules of "the Hayneville Jockey Club."
Ivey v. Phifer,
GARNISHMENT AND GARNISHEE.
1. When a garnishee answered, that he would be indebted to the defendant
in attachment, or to another person, who is named, in a certain sum, at a
future time, the court may cause citation to be issued to such person, to
contest with the plaintiff the right to the money. Moore v. Jones, 296
2. When the plaintiff controverts the answer of the garnishee, or the right of
a transferee to the debt, an issue will be sufficient, if it re-asserts, that the
garnishee is indebted, or conceding the answer to be true, denies that the
assignee has any adverse rights. Ib.
3. The mere fact, that a bond for title to real estate is made to a married
woman, does not establish that it is her separate estate, at least in a court
of law; and if the property be occupied by tenants, the husband may sue
for the rent, or the tenant may be garnisheed by the husband's creditors.
If the wife has any equitable rights, she may assert them in a court of
equity. Ib.
296
1. A father desiring to give his son the use of three slaves for a year, hired
them to P, with directions to pay the hire to the son, which P promised to
do-Held, that this was not the transfer of a chose in action, and that the
administrator of the son, could maintain an action against P, for the hire.
Pope v. Randolph, Adm'r,
214
2. A gift of the use, or hire of slaves for a year, the slaves being delivered
to the person hiring, to consummate the gift, is complete by such delivery,
and cannot be revoked by the donor. Ib.
3. Delivery of possession, or something equivalent to it, is an essential in-
gredient of a gift. Phillips v. McGrew,
See Deeds, and Registry of, 5, 6, 7, 8.
1. When upon the settlement of a guardian's account, a balance was found
in his favor, quere, is it necessary to insert in the decree the amount of the
ward's share of the estate. But if the account as recorded furnishes the
means of ascertaining it, it may be amended, if desired, in this court, at
the cost of the plaintiff in error. Lucas & wife v. Hamilton,
447
1. The widow can claim nothing from advancements made by the husband
to his children, and by them brought into hotchpot. Logan v. Logan,
Adm'r,
653
1. A judgment against a female dum sola, but no execution issued thereon
until after her marriage, creates no lien whatever on her property, and con-
stitutes no impediment to the levy of an execution on the property, upon
a judgment obtained against the husband and wife. Haygood v. Har-
ris,
65
2. A suit against husband and wife, for a tort, does not abate by the death of
the husband, unless the tort was committed by her in his presence, or by
his coercion. Douge v. Pearce,
127
3. A consent by husband and wife, to live apart, does not authorize either to
charge the other with a desertion from bed and board, with the intention of
voluntary abandonment. Jones v. Jones,
145
4. The mere fact, that a bond for title to real estate is made to a married
woman, does not establish that it is her separate estate, at least in a court
of law; and if the property be occupied by tenants, the husband may sue
for the rent, or the tenant may be garnisheed by the husband's creditors.
If the wife has any equitable rights, she may assert them in a court of
equity. Moore v. Jones,
296
5. The husband is an incompetent witness for the wife, in a controversy in
which she is asserting property levied on as the property of the husband,
to be her separate estate. Hodges v. The Br. Bank at Montgomery, 455
6. A decree in chancery, vesting in the wife certain property of the husband,
to her sole and separate use, upon the allegation that the husband was in-
debted to the wife an equal amount, is void, as against the creditors of the
husband, if the design in instituting the suit in chancery was to hinder,
or delay them, in the collection of their debts. Ib.
7. The right of a married woman to recover interest upon a general legacy.
is not affected by the fact that no trustee had been appointed to act for her;
especially in a case where the executors had determined not to pay lega-
cies, until the estate could be made available without a sacrifice. Hallett
and Walker, Ex'rs, &c. v. Allen, &c.
554
8. The widow can claim nothing from advancements made by the husband
HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONTINUED.
to his children, and by them brought into hotchpot. Logan v. Logan,
Adm'r,
9. The husband is a tenant by the curtesy, of waste and uncultivated lands,
not held adversely by another, of which the wife had only the legal seizin, if
the other incidents necessary to create the tenancy by curtesy exist.-
Wells v. Thompson,
10. The adultery of the husband is not a forfeiture of the tenancy. Ib. 794
11. Though the husband may forfeit his estate, as tenant by the curtesy, by
a wrongful alienation, tending to the disherison of the reversioner, or re-
mainder man, the sale of his interest as tenant, has no such effect. Ib. 794
INDIAN TITLES.
1. Parol evidence is inadmissible to establish, whether land was, or was not
an Indian reservation, as higher evidence exists of the fact at the general
land office. Mitchell v. Cobb,
137
2. The failure of an Indian reservee, or his or her heirs, under the provis-
ions of the treaty of the 24th March, 1832, with the Creek tribe of Indians,
to take possession of the land allotted to them, or in any manner to signify
a desire to remain in this state, after the five years expired, determined the
estate to which they would otherwise have been entitled, and the land re-
vested in the United States, without an entry, or other act on the part of
its agents. Wells v. Thompson,
1. An indictment need not conform to the exact words of a statute, creating
the offence. It is sufficient if the words used in the indictment descrip-
tive of the offence, are equivalent to those used in the statute. The State
v. Bullock,
413
2. An indictment charging that the prisoner, "with a certain large knife,
which he then and there had and held, at and against the body of the said
HW R, then and there did cut, thrust and stab, with the intent him, the
said H W R, then and there, feloniously, wiifully, and of his malice afore-
thought, to kill and murder," sufficiently states that the intent to commit
the act was by the use of the weapon described. Ib.
1. B, an indorser on a bill of exchange, paid the amount to the bank, upon
an agreement that the bank should prosecute their claim against T, a sub-
sequent indorser, for the benefit of B, but the agreement was not to ap-
pear on the books of the bank. The bank obtained judgment against T,
who was ignorant of the payment by B, collected the money, and paid it
over to B. Held, that T could recover the amount so paid, of B, in an
action of assumpsit. Boyd v. Talliaferro,
424
INDORSER AND INDORSEE-CONTINUED.
2. When a writ is properly sued out against the maker of a note, judgment
obtained, and the statutory return of "no property found," made by the
sheriff, it will be sufficient to charge the indorser, though it be shown,
that the maker removed to another county, after the institution of the suit.
Quere, if the indorsee is informed of such removal, and that an execution
would be more likely to be availing there, than if issued in the county in
which the judgment was obtained, would it not be his duty to send it to
such county? Weed & Co. v. Brown,
449
3. A writ is properly sued out, so as to charge the indorser, although the
maker removed from the county a few days previous to the institution of
the suit; it not appearing that such removal was open, visible, and noto-
rious, or that the indorsee had knowledge of the fact; or that the maker
was a freeholder in the county to which he removed, or was exempt from
suit in the county in which he was sued. Ib.
See Evidence, 33.
1. An indorsement of a note may be made on the paper on which a torn
note is pasted, so as to vest the legal title in the indorsee. It is not ne-
cessary in such a case, any more than in an indorsement on the note itself,
to prove when it was made. Crutchfield v. Easton,
1. An infant, ten days before his majority, in the purchase of a note, drew
an order on a third person, of the non-payment of which he had notice.
Being sued several years after, upon the order, Held, that his omission to
return the note, or disaffirm the contract, after he attained his majority,
warranted the implication that he intended to abide by his contract, and
countervailed the defence of infancy. Thomasson v. Boyd,
1. Insanity intervening between the time of the alledged offence, and the
trial, will not exculpate the prisoner. Jones v. The State,
153
2. If, from the appearance and conduct of the prisoner, when called on to
plead, there is reason to believe he is insane, the court should institute a
preliminary proceeding, to ascertain his sanity. Yet this must be left to
the sound discretion of the court, and if the prisoner pleads to the indict
ment, the omission of the court to institute the preliminary inquiry cannot
be assigned as error, though from the facts as set out in the record, there
may be strong grounds for the belief, that the prisoner was insane at the
time of the trial. Ib.
153
3. Though the opinions of medical men, are entitled to more weight on the
trial of a cause involving the question of sanity, than that of those who are
not physicians, yet it is the duty of the jury to weigh the whole evidence,
and if satisfied that the testator was sane, should so find, although the
medical men examined were of a differeut opinion. Watson v. Ander-
INTENDMENTS AND LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS.
1. When the sureties of a constable, suffer him to act under a bond to which
their names have been signed, without objection, the jury is authorized to
infer a waiver by them of any previous demand of additional sureties, be-
fore it was to be binding on them, and their consent to be bound by it as
it stands. May, et al. v. Robertson,
2. When, upon the purchase of a plantation and slaves, on credit, a number
of notes are executed, falling due during a series of years, if the maker
discharges, or pays the notes first falling due, to the payee, he will be pre-
sumed to have availed himself of any payment, or off set, which then ex-
isted, and will not be permitted to make such a defence against an assignee
of notes subsequently falling due. Nelson & Hatch v. Dunn,
1. Interest upon general legacies, is not demandable until eighteen months
after the grant of letters testamentary. The statute rate of interest fur-
es the proper rule. Hallett and Walker, Ex'rs, &c. v. Allen, &c. 554
2. The right of a married woman to recover interest upon a general legacy.
is not affected by the fact that no trustee had been appointed to act for her;
especially in a case where the executors had determined not to pay lega-
cies, until the estate could be made available without a sacrifice. Ib. 554
3. Interest cannot be computed on the damages. Murphy & Brock v. Añ.
drews & Bros.
708
4. When the judgment of another State, is by the terms of the judgment, to
carry interest at a given rate, from a specified time, the interest may be
recovered in this State, without showing that by the statute law of the State
in which the judgment was rendered, judgments carry interest. Hudson
v. Daily,
1. A reference to the master, to ascertain the sum which by the decree is
ordered to be paid to the complainant, does not render it interlocutory,
when the principles are settled by the chancellor by which the amount is
to be ascertained. McKinley v. Irvine, et al.
1. A justice of the peace cannot be permitted to prove the contents of pa-
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