Why does the IRS not enforce those laws and move to remove the taxexempt status of these two very "liberal" organizations?

My second major point is that S. 2568 should be reviewed in light of the doctrine that the power of the Federal Government to regulate and control private institutions and small businesses is restricted by the enumerated powers in the United States Constitution.

I have reviewed the language of S. 2568, and I have read a number of commentaries on the Bill. From my perspective as one who has traveled the length and breadth of this country, I find a ground-swell of opposition to any expansion of power in the federal bureaucracy which would authorize the Federal Government to arbitrarily regulate and control private institutions and even local units of government simply because they had been an indirect recipient of some federal dollars under such broadly-worded authority as is contained in

S. 2568.

Let me begin with my premise. I had a lawyer friend review the most recent Civil Rights decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Fire Fighters Local Union Number 1784, vs. Stotts, et al., decided June 12, 1984. My attorney friend, who has been involved in Civil Rights cases in Federal Court, tells me that this decision stands squarely for the principle that there is a limit to the remedies that can be fashioned in the name of Civil Rights under existing law. He also said that there is a limit to what can be done in the name of Civil Rights under the United States Constitution.

It is my understanding that most of the logic for the modern Civil Rights law comes from a single paragraph in McCullough vs. Maryland, decided in 1819, in which the Supreme Court stated the principle that Congress could adopt any reasonable legislation to enforce the enumerated powers set forth in the United States Constitution.

specific quote reads as follows:

"Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and

That

The point I wish to make, and which I hope the Senate will consider very seriously as it reviews and deliberates on this legislation, is that under the American system of government, a laudable end does not justify any means. I think it is unfortunate that the limits of the Supreme Court's approval of legislative authority in Congress stated in McCullough vs. Maryland has been forgotten. No legislation can be adopted in the name of any provision of the Constitution that is inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution.

I am afraid we

have gotten into what one French philosopher described as legal plunder, the taking of one man's rights so that they can be given to another. We have forsaken our heritage, we have destroyed our Constitution, and we have chartered a course of self-destruction because we have abandoned the principle of making sure the means is just as laudable as the end.

Let me return to the specific finding of the Supreme Court in Fire Fighters vs. Stotts. After reviewing a lower Court decree which had mandated affirmative action discrimination contrary to a union contract, the Supreme Court described the limits of Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 as follows:

"Our ruling in Teamsters that a
court can award competitive
seniority only when the beneficiary
of the award has actually been a
victim of illegal discrimination is
consistent with the policy behind
706 (g) of Title VII, which affects
the remedies available in Title VII
litigation. That policy, which is
to provide make-whole relief only
to those who have been actual
victims of illegal discrimination,
was repeatedly expressed by the
sponsors of the Act during the
congressional debates. Opponents
of the legislation that became Title
VII charged that if the bill were
enacted, employers could be
ordered to hire and promote
persons in order to achieve a
racially-balanced work force even
though those persons had not been
victims of illegal discrimination."

In noting the pertinent discussion in the Senate by the floor

manager of the Bill as the limits of remedies, the Supreme Court
quoted Senator Hubert Humphrey as follows:

"Contrary to the allegations of
some opponents of this Title, there
is nothing in it that will give any
power to the Commission or to any
Court to require . . . firing
of employees in order to meet a
racial "quota" or to achieve a
certain racial balance."

My point is simply this: there is a limit to the authority of any legislation, no matter how laudable the goal, if we are to live within the confines of a Constitutional system of government.

I trust that my comments will not be considered trite or superfluous, but no one would suggest that a criminal who was caught in cold-blooded murder should be denied his Constitutional right to a free trial. I am simply saying that any legislation that seeks to extend the authority of the Federal Bureaucracy in the area of enforcing Civil Rights laws should be reviewed in the context of the enumerated powers in the Constitution and the principle that there is a limit to the means that can be used to accomplish a laudable goal.

Let me be more specific about some of my particular concerns

about the language that is presently contained in S. 2568.

I am, of course, concerned, as are all the opponents to this legislation, about the broad definition of "recipient" which would have the effect of overturning the Grove City College decision. I hope no Senator who has pledged to uphold the Constitution would take his task so lightly as to concede that there is a need to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Grove City case.

I would go so far as to suggest that Congress should even review the whole concept of who is the recipient of Federal Funds. I am not even sure of the validity of the part of the decision which determined the college was a recipient because a few students were getting Federal education grants, just as I am not sure it should be determined that a student going to a college under the GI Bill results in Federal financial assistance to the institution. I understand that I am raising some questions that will hardly see the light of day; but that

doesn't mean that a shrinking minority, yea, a persecuted minority-private, religious educational institutions in this country--should

not be heard from and their position should not be considered. I can find no logic to the reasoning that says when one little segment of a private institution is a beneficiary of some small amount of Federal financial assistance, the whole institution should be entangled in a web of legal and bureaucratic controversy in order to correct a single violation of a single Civil Rights regulation.

On this point, although there has been some assurance by the proponents of this legislation that tax exemptions and tax deductions would continue to be excluded from the definition of Federal financial assistance, I can tell you from experience that the bureaucrats will find some way of changing that law through bureaucratic interpretation and through the implementation of public policy against conservative institutions across this nation. The Supreme Court, in the Bob Jones University case, has already ruled that tax exemption constitutes Federal financial assistance.

This august body is considering legislation that could be catastrophic. The passage of this Bill could strike the death knell for all private institutions as we have known them in this nation. The passage of S. 2568 could very well destroy the pluralism that has made this nation great. Unless some of the nebulous language which is contained in the Bill at this time is tightened, so as to require pinpointing of the termination of funds, and so as to limit the ultimate reach of the regulatory authority of Federal Bureaucracies from entrapping private citizens as ultimate beneficiaries of Federal financial assistance in extended litigation, then this Bill could be the death of the private free enterprise system in America. Democracy in this land has survived more than 200 years because of pluralism, because of diversity, because of dissent, and, yes, because of non-conformity to some of the half-baked ideas cooked up in Washington.

My reading of the Commentaries on S. 2568 convinces me that the obvious result of its enactment would be an immediate extension of Federal regulatory power with regard to age, sex, handicapped, and

race discrimination to virtually all of the activities of every state and political subdivision in the land.

I think it has been conceded by the proponents that aid to a State Government would bring all counties, cities, villages, school districts, and every other local sub-unit of government under the control of the Federal bureaucracy. Simply because the State receives a single Federal grant, automatically all of its sub-units are brought within the coverage of age, sex, handicap, and race discrimination statutes and regulations.

The broad and almost unlimited scope of this new enforcement power for the Federal bureaucracy was accurately described in the Wall Street Journal of May 23, 1984, by Chester E. Finn, Jr.:

"In short, assistance of any kind
to any part of any public or
private enterprise will trigger all
the civil-rights regulations and
enforcement procedures of all the
cognizant federal agencies with
respect to all other parts of the
enterprise, however remote they
may be from the part being aided.
If a state education department
receives funds from the U.S.
Education Department (as they all
do), the Office for Civil Rights
gains jurisdiction over that state's
highway department. If a
municipal hospital is assisted by
the Public Health Service, the
city's police and fire departments
will become subject to challenge by
the Department of Health and

Human Services if they reject job
applicants with heart conditions."

I do not think this Committee should favorably report this Bill until the questions about the spending of Social Security checks and the use of Food Stamps in the "Mom and Pop" grocery stores have been satisfactorily answered. To me, the definition of the words "recipients" and "transferee" raises innumerable possibilities of government regulation of heretofore private, non-government entities.

Perhaps the following may seem at this time to be so far out as to deserve no consideration; but knowing how the IRS usurps to itself most outrageous powers, I feel the injection of a hypothetical question is entirely warranted. Suppose an employee of the IRS donated to his