As long as trials are permitted to remain subjected
to such interpreters, the rights of minorities in
the American society can never be properly protected.

We hereby demand that a trial based on just
and due process be held using an able, competent,
and qualified interpreter. The sentence for Mr.

Kamiyama must be vacated, and this case must be
retried with such an expert intertreter, to begin with.
It is justice it self that demands such retrial.

[III] CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHT TO
REMAIN SILENT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-

INCRIMINATION

Article 38.1 of the Constitution of Japan states that no person shall be compelled to make statements against himself. Based upon this, the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure states that the defendant may be silent all the time, and may refuse to answer any questions. If a defendant agrees to voluntarily make a statement, the presiding judge can, at any time, question him concerning matters deemed necessary. The associate judge, the prosecutor, the attorney, co-defendant and his attorney who are attendant can also, by so informing the presiding judge, question the accused to give a statement, stipulates Article 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Therefore, the judge, after the completion of the reading of the indictment, must inform the defendant of his right to remain silent at all times, or to refuse to answer any questions, according to Article 291, Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Also, the public prosecutor, the associate officers of the public prosecutor, the judicial

police officials, and the like who belong to the office of criminal investigation can summon the suspect for questioning if and when such action becomes necessary for the conduct of criminal investigation. They must also inform the suspect in advance, however, that he or she is not required to make a statement against his or her own will, and may make any statement if he or she wishes asitent according to Article 198 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure.

However, these are considerably different from

the privileges to refuse self-incrimination granted under the U.S. legal system. In America, the accused can relinquish his or her rights and testify as a witness, but in such case he or she must make testimony which might be against his or her own interest, and is subject to the sanction for perjury. Also, the witness can exercise his privilege to refuse self-incrimination, but such privilege applies only to such questions as are specifically selfincriminating. However, in Japan the accused is not considered to be qualified to act as an witness. Therefore, even if the accused should have made false statements, such act does not constitute perjury, nor are there comparable problems relative to the renuciation of privileges. The accused is granted the freedom in Japan to decide for himself or herself whether he or she should make a statement regardless of whether it is, or is not in the interest of the accused. And, even after the accused has already begun to make a statement, he or she is not considered to have renounced his or her right to remain silent, and is allowed to refuse to answer specific questions subsequently asked. In the U.S., the status of the

accused as an adversary is thoroughly established, but it does not necessarily follow that the safeguard of the interest of the accused is also thoroughly assured. In Japan the accused cannot become a witness. However, insofar as the accused wishes to voluntarily make a statement, he or she can easily do so, and the court and those concerned can also ask him or her to make a voluntary statement. Also in Japan, the act by the accused

of destroying or falsifying the evidence relating to his or her own criminal case does not constitute a crime. It is only when one destroys or falsifies the evidence relative to a criminal case of someone else that one's acts constitute a crime of evidence destruction. This is based on the philosophy that it is in human nature for one to try to destroy the evidence involved in one's own criminal case, and therefore to punish one for such act is too cruel a sanction.

Thus, the thoughts

behind the Japanese concept of the crime of perjury and/or destruction of evidence are markedly different from those accepted in the United States.

In this respect and for this reason, the fact that Mr. Kamiyama is a Japanese, and as such has lived all his life within the conceptual confines of the Japanese justice and judicial system, must be especially remembered. Indeed, his motives and actions are so typically Japanese as far as we have observed them.

If, Mr. Kamiyama had been tried in a Japanese court under the jurisdiction of the Japanese laws, Mr. Kamiyama would not be called upon to testify as a witness. In Japan, we do not have a Grand Jury system, nor can the suspect and/or "sankoonin" (others questioned and examined by the prosecutor: see explanation above) be forced into saying things

that they do not wish to state. I already explained before that in Japan they can say whatever they wish to state, including lies, without being prosecuted

for perjury.

Moreover, for Mr. Kamiyama the testimony was

made on the activities of his revered master, Reverend Moon. In such setting, the typically expected Japanese behavior is to try to protect others, especially his master or superior, by asserting his responsibilities, both real and not real, to a point Such act of self-sacrifice

of self-incrimination.

has always been considered to be a virtuous rather than sinful act in the Japanese social and moral context. Judged by the Japanese sense of morality, this is a consequence of one's socially desirable course of action. Let me quote from a profoundly interesting case study of the Japanese consciousness by the age groups. The survey was taken in 1979, using face-to-face interview of two different age groups, one of those between 15 and 24 years of age, and the other those above the age of 25. 10,000 samples were taken of the young group and 6,000 samples of the older adults. The survey was taken by

the Prime

Minister's Office, and concains such interesting questions as would relate directly to our case in question on the court-administered oath.

The question asked reads: "In court, you are expected to swear to tell the truth as your conscience dictates. But, suppose there is a witness who told a lie while being questioned about his close personal friend's possible violation of election laws. Do you think it couldn't be helped if it was not morally right to tell a lie

under such circumstances?

tioned about his company's

election law violations?

be helped

Or, how about a man quespossible

Do you think it couldn't

in such a case? How about your own relatives in

(1) In case of personal close friends, 43.4% of the young group and 37.7% of the older group answered that it could not be helped, i.e., affirmed a perjurious act.

(2) In case of one's own company, 38.7% of the young group and 33.3% of the older group answered that it could not be helped, i.e., affirmed a perjurious act.

(3) In case of relatives, 48.5% of the young group and 42.0% of the older group answered that it could not be helped, i.e., affirmed a perjurious act.

(4) In case of one's benefactors, 50% of the young group, and 42.7% of the older group answered that it could not be helped, i.e., affirmed a perjurious act.

These results seem to indicate that nearly the majority of the Japanese affirm an act of perjury as unavoidable under certain circumstances. In the case of benefactors, more people affirm a perjurious act as unavoidable than otherwise.

This example

is presented here to support my argument that the