JUDGE, at Plattsmouth, Nebraska, on April 26, 1984.

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CERTIFICATE

I, Vicky Nickeson, Official Court Reporter in the

district court of Nebraska for the second judicial district,

do hereby certify that the within and following partial

transcript contains all the evidence requested to be transcribed

by me, and the rulings of the Court thereon, from the proceedings had in or at the trial of the foregoing cause in said court;

and that said transcript is a correct and complete transcription

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of the evidence requested to be ttanscribed from the record

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(On the 26th day of April, 1934, in the District

2 Court of Cass County, Nebraska, before the HONORABLE RONALD E.

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REAGAN, Judge, the following requested proceedings were had:)

THE COURT: The credibility of the witness Sileven

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is really negligible for several reasons. And I'm sure a

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full bill of exceptions of his testimony would more specifically

point out other incidents, but I was able to pick up two

that were glaring. And that was on direct examination, he
immediately testified he was aware that the school was

opened in 1983 in violation of the court order. The court

order required it not to be open absent compliance and approval

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by the State Department of Regulations (sic). And later

on in his testimony when he's still under the same oath,

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he testified that he thought the school was in compliance. 15 Those are directly contradictory statements. And they quite obviously were brought up to meet the exigencies of the circumstances.

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He further testified on direct examination that

he did not use the term "school", but that it was a week
day educational ministry. And yet not 30 minutes later

on redirect examination, in a question posed by the County
Attorney, in answering that question Mr. Sileven used the
term "our school" twice and used the term "school" once,
referring to the Faith Baptist School.

Willful contempt Willful, under Nebraska statutes,

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1 Nebraska case law, simply means intentional and with knowledge.

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There is no question but what the defendant Sileven violated

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the injunction and order of this Court in August, September,

October and November of 1983. And there's no question beyond

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a reasonable doubt that that violation was willful.

The adjudication is therefore made at this time

that the defendant Sileven was in willful contempt of the
court order in the fall of 1983, as alleged in the motion
of the County Attorney for contempt proceedings.

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In accordance with the bench conference and the joint motion made by counsel, the bench warrant for Mrs. Schmidt is withdrawn and the motion to dismiss the contempt proceedings is granted.

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I will now hear any statements that counsel wish

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to make on sanctions to be imposed on the contempt proceedings. These sanctions are punitive in nature for past violations

THE COURT:

(At this point, arguments were
made by Mr. Moravec and Mr. Gibbs.)

It's mine to determine now, and I guess

whatever decision I reach will promote comments pro and con.

And I recognize that that's a particular thing that comes

with the office that I hold. Mr. Moravec has already taken

some of my thunder because I pulled out 212 Neb. 830 which

was the Sileven versus Tesch decision when the three month

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or four month jail sentence was ultimately appealed by

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virtue of a habeas corpus proceeding. I have in front of

me an individual who says his faith demands him to be
obedient, who must keep his sacred conscience before God,

and yet has now been adjudicated guilty for the fifth time
of willfully violating an order of the Court. And as the
Chief Justice said in his opinion, the extent to which the

state must set aside its laws in order to accommodate

religious beliefs is not to be determined under our form of

government by the individual, but rather by the Court.

Freedom of religion in the First Amendment is

no different from freedom of speech and is no different from freedom of the press. It's not absolute.

Simply because

you have freedom of speech, as the old legal scholar said,

doesn't give you the right to shout "fire" in a crowded theater. And freedom of religion as an individual determines

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it does not give him the right, or them the right, whatever

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their numbers may be, to violate the laws, including

19 court orders of the State of Nebraska that have been enacted

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for the benefit of all citizens.

And I suppose this will sound cruel, but there was

an answer to Sileven's problems. After the Nebraska Supreme 23 Court ruled and the United States Supreme Court ruled, you

24 could have left. You could pick up and leave. If there

are states that choose not to have those conditions and