bounds of reasonable regulation to establish through service and a joint rate. Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 296, 301; Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 615, 629.

The decree of the District Court, so far as appealed from, is

Affirmed.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA dissent because they are of the opinion that this case as a matter of authority is controlled by Detroit United Railway v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238, and that as a matter of original consideration the assailed legislation has impaired the obligation of a contract in violation of the Constitution of the United States and was repugnant to the Constitution because wanting in due process.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS also dissents.

LANHAM, ADMINISTRATOR OF LANHAM, ET AL. v. MCKEEL.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.

No. 245. Submitted April 30, 1917. Decided June 11, 1917.

An order of the Secretary of the Interior, approving an Indian agent's recommendation that restrictions on alienation be removed from an Indian's allotment, was made on March 26, "to be effective thirty days from date." Held that the approval became effective on the thirtieth day after its date, i. e., on April 25th, and enabled the allottee to make a valid conveyance on that day.

47 Oklahoma, 348, affirmed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Orion L. Rider, Mr. Geo. E. Rider and Mr. E. S. Hurt for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. J. F. McKeel (in propria persona), Mr. C. H. Ennis and Mr. James E. Webb for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court.

This writ of error presents but a single federal question, and that is within narrow compass. The suit involves the title to a part of the surplus allotment of Mary Jane Lanham, who was a Choctaw Indian of three-fourths blood. Defendant in error claims title under a deed made by her on April 25, 1908. It is conceded that because of legislation by Congress prior to the Act of April 21, 1904, c. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 204, the land was inalienable, unless the restriction upon its alienation had been removed by an order of the Secretary of the Interior, made pursuant to that act. In conformity to its provisions, the United States Indian Agent, after investigation, made the appropriate finding and recommended the removal of restrictions upon the alienation by Mary Jane Lanham of her surplus allotment, and this was approved by the Secretary of the Interior in writing under date of March 26, 1908, in these terms: "Approved: This approval to be effective thirty days from date." If either the day of the approval or the day of the conveyance be included, thirty days had expired on the day the deed was executed. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, following Taylor v. Brown, 147 U. S. 640, and Baker v. Hammett, 23 Oklahoma, 480, held that the date of approval should be included in computing the thirty-day period, and that therefore the deed was valid. 47 Oklahoma, 348.

In our opinion the decision was correct, although we sustain it upon grounds differing somewhat from those

Opinion of the Court..

244 U. S.

upon which the cited cases rest. In Taylor v. Brown, the question arose under the proviso to § 15 of an Act of March 3, 1875, c. 131, 18 Stat. 402, 420, that the title to lands acquired by certain Indians under that section should "remain inalienable for a period of five years from the date of the patent." In Baker v. Hammett, the language in question was that contained in § 16 of the Supplemental Creek Agreement (Act of June 30, 1902, c. 1323, 32 Stat. 500, 503), to the effect that lands allotted to citizens should not be alienated "before the expiration of five years from the date of the approval of this supplemental agreement." In each case the statute contemplated a vesting of title accompanied with a prohibition of alienation during a specified period, and it was held that the initial date should be included in the computation because, but for the restriction, the land might have been alienated on that date. Here the restriction upon alienation arose out of antecedent legislation, and continued until the effective approval by the Secretary of the Inte rior of an appropriate finding by the Indian Agent. The approval was required to be, and in this case was, in writing, and we have to do merely with its interpretation. What, then, is the meaning of "effective thirty days from date"? Certainly this cannot be construed the same as if it read: "effective after thirty days from date." Plaintiffs in error, in argument, suppose it to have read: "effective one day from date," and ask whether in that event it would have become effective immediately upon being signed by the Secretary of the Interior. We answer "No," but that it would have become effective on the following day, that is, on the first day after its date. By like reasoning, the order as written became effective on the thirtieth day after its date, that is to say, on April 25th, and enabled the allottee to make a valid conveyance on that day.

Judgment affirmed.

McCOACH, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 475. Argued March 14, 1917. Decided June 11, 1917.

A fire and marine insurance company in Pennsylvania is not required to maintain a reserve against unpaid losses by the law of that State (P. L. 1911, p. 607), and, therefore, amounts added by it to such a reserve may not be deducted in determining the company's taxable net income under § 38 of the Federal Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112.

224 Fed. Rep. 657, reversed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Wallace for petitioner.

Mr. B. F. Pepper, with whom Mr. G. W. Pepper and Mr. Bayard Henry were on the brief, for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action brought by respondent, a fire and marine insurance company of the State of Pennsylvania, to recover a part of the excise taxes exacted of it for the years 1910 and 1911 under the Act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. As the case comes here, only two items are in dispute, one for each of the years mentioned, representing the tax upon amounts added in each of those years to that part of what are called its "reserve funds" that is held against accrued but unpaid losses.

The act imposed upon every insurance company organ

Opinion of the Court.

244 U.S.

ized under the laws of the United States or of any State an annual excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business, equivalent to one per centum upon its entire net income over and above $5,000, with exceptions not here pertinent. The second paragraph of § 38 provided: "Such net income shall be ascertained by deducting from the gross amount of the income of such in

surance company (second) all losses actually sustained within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise, including a reasonable allowance for depreciation of property, if any, and in the case of insurance companies the sums other than dividends, paid within the year on policy and annuity contracts and the net addition, if any, required by law to be made within the year to reserve funds."

The italics indicate the particular words upon which the controversy turns; the question being whether, within the meaning of the act of Congress, "reserve funds,” with annual or occasional additions, are "required by law," in Pennsylvania, to be maintained by fire and marine insurance companies, other than the "unearned premium" or "reinsurance reserve," known to the general law of insurance.

The District Court rendered a judgment in plaintiff's favor, excluding however the disputed items (218 Fed. Rep. 905); on plaintiff's writ of error the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this judgment, with instructions to allow the claim in full (224 Fed. Rep. 657); and the case was brought here by writ of certiorari.

Plaintiff was chartered by a special act, but is subject to the state insurance law. Its business is confined to fire and marine insurance.

The law of Pennsylvania (Act of June 1, 1911, P. L. 607, 608) creates a State Insurance Commissioner with supervisory control over the companies; provides in § 4 that he shall see that all the laws of the Commonwealth