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244 U. S.
Argument for Appellants.
than a codification of the common law. Matter of Davies, 168 N. Y. 89; People v. American Ice Co., 120 N. Y. Supp. 443. The commodities produced by plaintiffs are included. The motive which actuates the members of the combination is immaterial, but the purpose and object of the combination is material. Kellogg v. Sowerby, 190 N. Y. 370; People v. American Ice Co., 120 N. Y. Supp. 443; Schwarcz v. International Union, 124 N. Y. Supp. 968; State. v. Minneapolis Milk Co. (Minn.), 144 N. W. Rep. 417. If the plaintiffs are to prevail under this statute, it is because the acts of the defendants constitute a public offense forbidden by the statute and have resulted in injury to the plaintiffs. The character of the participants is immaterial. The fact that the defendants are endeavoring to suppress competition in the supply and price of completed articles in common use removes their combination and conduct from the case of National Protective Assn. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, and brings them within the purview of the Anti-Trust Law. Rourke v. Elk Drug Co., 77 N. Y. Supp. 375; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274.
If the combination of the defendants is illegal, then every act in furtherance thereof, though otherwise innocent and constitutionally protected, becomes illegal because done in furtherance of the illegal purpose. Acts which might be innocent when done by one person may become illegal when done by a number in combination in violation of the statute. Rourke v. Elk Drug Co., 77 N. Y. Supp. 375; Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 195 N. Y. 565; Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 106 N. Y. Supp. 118 (Judge Gaynor's opinion); Walsh v. Dwight, 58 N. Y. Supp. 91.
Generally as to the application of this law to cases like the present, see People v. McFarlin, 89 N. Y. Supp. 527; Irving v. Neal, 209 Fed. Rep. 471; Paine v. Neal, 212 Fed. Rep. 259; Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. Rep. 111. Within the meaning of this act defendants' combination
Argument for Appellants.
244 U. S.
(a) seeks to create and maintain a monopoly in the manufacture, production and sale of the articles in question. Their own reports show that they have already acquired a complete monopoly at higher prices of trade in wood trim on the Island of Manhattan, thereby terminating all trade in that borough with any open shops, People v. American Ice Co., 120 N. Y. Supp. 443. (b) It attempts to restrain or prevent competition in the supply and price of these articles. (c) It seeks to restrain or prevent the free pursuit of a lawful trade or business, in order thereby to create or maintain a monopoly in the production and sale of these articles. Straus v. American Publishers' Assn., supra; People v. McFarlin, 89 N. Y. Supp. 527; Cummings v. Union Blue Stone Co., 164 N. Y. 401; Arnot v. Pittston Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558.
The restraint is not incidental to any legitimate end which the defendants seek, but is the direct purpose of the combination. The benefits sought by the defendants are the result of the restraint of trade, and the restraint of trade is not the result of the benefits or incidental to them.
The defendants' combination violates subdivision 6 of § 580 of Article 54 of the Penal Law of New York; also subdivision 5 of 8 580 of that law; also $ 530 of Article 48 of that law.
Section 582 of the Penal Law of New York is declaratory of the common law and does not legalize the defendants' acts.
A combination of traders, to promote their own interests by suppressing the competition of rivals, is illegal at common law and it is immaterial whether the combination aims at one rival or a class of rivals. If the complainants are being irreparably injured in their property rights by unlawful acts committed within the State, they would be entitled to relief regardless of the existing federal law, whether those acts were unlawful at common law or because of some state statute.
244 U. S.
Argument for Appellants.
The facts establish a combination to cause strikes against customers of complainants for the purpose of preventing the sale of their products as long as they operate an open shop, and is, in effect, a secondary boycott of the complainants, which is unlawful. [Citing many authorities).
The combination of defendants to bring about the employment of members of their organization exclusively in their industry throughout an entire community is unlawful. (Counsel here went into an analysis of the means employed and the rights affected and dangers involved, referring to numerous authorities.]
The relief prayed for will not interfere with the legal provisions of any of the arbitration agreements.
Complainants are entitled to an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act, of October 15, 1914. This section is declaratory of ancient common-law principles and is highly remedial, and should be construed so as to advance the remedy. It was meant to remove doubt arising from divergent federal decisions, and is to be taken as a legislative construction of the prior law, of retrospective operation, applicable to pending suits like this. Bailey v. Clark, 21 Wall. 284; Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 189 U. S. 274; Dinsmore v. Southern Express Co., 183 U. S. 115; Sampeyreac v. United States, 7 Pet. 222; United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch, 105.
It was not the intention by § 6 of the Clayton Act to change in any respect the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as it had been construed and applied by this court in any case. The history of the legislation, shown by the committee reports and even the debates in Congress, establishes this. Moreover, the act in § 4 re-enacts, word for word, $ 7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, under which the Loewe Case was brought to and decided by this court, without excepting that or any other case from its provisions,
Counsel for Appellees.
which action, upon established principles of construction, is an adoption by Congress of the doctrines of that
The presence of 8 6 in the act is due to the fact that it was thought desirable to put at rest the contentions of some, that the existence of labor unions for legitimate purposes was forbidden by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Section 20 of the Clayton Act has obviously no application since here the relation of employer and employee does not exist actually or prospectively between the contending parties.
It is further obvious that the various acts mentioned in § 20, against which injunctions shall not issue in this limited class of cases, are most of them acts which in and of themselves are ordinarily lawful, and that this section accomplishes no other purpose than to declare the previously existing law on this subject. The recognition of a right by a statute, such as the Claytc 2 Act, will not justify the exercise of that right in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy, which is expressly defined by the same statute. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 439.
Otherwise construed, the Clayton law would be unconstitutional as class legislation, and depriving persons of property without due process of law. Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Nebraska, 252; Connolly v. Union Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540.
It is proper for the complainants to unite as co-plaintiffs since they were all similarly affected by the same combination.
Mr. Charles Maitland Beattie for the labor union appellees.
Mr. Frederick Hulse for appellees.
Mr. Anthony Gref, Mr. Charles J. Hardy and Mr. Fred
244 U. S.
Opinion of the Court.
erick P. Whitaker filed a brief in behalf of appellee James Elgar, Inc.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a bill in equity brought by corporations, of States other than New York, engaged in the manufacture of doors, sash, etc., in open shops, against officers and agents of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and of the New York branch of the same, certain union manufacturers of doors, sash, etc., members of the Manufacturing Wood Workers' Association, and many master carpenters, members of the Master Carpenters' Association, whose business is to install such products in buildings. The bill was dismissed by the District Court, 212 Fed. Rep. 259, and the decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 214 Fed. Rep. 82; 130 C. C. A. 522.
The bill alleges a conspiracy of the members of the Brotherhood and the New York branch to prevent the exercise of the trade of carpenters by any one not a member of the Brotherhood, and to prevent the plaintiffs and all other employers of carpenters not such members from engaging in interstate commerce and selling their goods outside of the State where the goods are manufactured, and it sets out the usual devices of labor unions as exercised to that end. In 1909 the Master Carpenters, coerced by the practical necessities of the case, made an agreement with the New York branch, accepting a previously established joint arbitration plan to avoid strikes and lockouts. This agreement provides that “there shall be no restriction against the use of any manufactured material except non-union or prison made”; the arbitration plan is confined to shops that use union labor and the employers agree to employ union labor only. The unions will not erect material made by non-union mechanics.