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pany for transportation from Ohio to East Buffalo, New York; that its official tariffs, classifications and rules applicable to such interstate shipments, and in print and in force at and during the term of shipments, were duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, pursuant to the acts of Congress. At the trial the Erie Railroad Company put in evidence its tariff rates, showing the alternative rate based upon the lower valuation, and the contract containing the stipulation as to notice already set forth.
The federal question here presented is whether the court was right in leaving to the jury the question of the reasonableness of the requirement that notice should be given within five days, and permitting the jury if it found that this limit was unreasonable to give a verdict in excess of the limited liability contracted for.
This case requires little discussion, as the principles governing it have been settled by frequent decisions of this court. We need not stop to consider whether the requirement of the live-stock contract that a claim for damages should be presented within five days from the time the stock was removed from the cars was reasonable or not, for this question has been answered in favor of the reasonableness of such stipulation in the recent case of Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wall, 241 U. S. 87. See also St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592.
In the case under consideration it appears that the redueed rates under which these horses were shipped and the limited liability arising from shipping under such reduced rates were fixed by the tariff schedules and the form of limited liability contract duly published and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, as required by law. These rates and that contract which contained the notice requirement thus became binding upon the parties until changed by order of the Commission. This is too well
settled to need discussion. The rules and regulations, duly published and filed, which in any wise affect the rates or the value of the service to be rendered are controlling upon both parties to the shipping contract. (Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 586, $ 2.) The binding force of these contracts and regulations has been affirmed in many cases; among them, Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 652; Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 112; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 98; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 232 U. S. 508, 515; Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 236 U. S. 278, 285; Southern Railway Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 638; Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319; Norfolk Southern R. R. Co. v. Chatman, ante, 276.
It follows that the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Crawford County must be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COM
PANY v. UNITED STATES.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
No. 267. Argued May 4, 1917.-Decided June 4, 1917.
The Hours of Service Act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1415, is remedial,
passed to protect both public and employees from the dangers arising from overwork in railway employment, and should be construed, in effectuation of this purpose, as requiring the carrier to do all reasonably within its power to confine the hours of service within the limits stated.
It was the intention of the proviso in g 3, not to relieve the carrier from
a diligent effort to avoid exceeding the limits of service which the act specifies, but only to afford relief in cases where service beyond those limits is necessarily entailed by the causes mentioned in the
proviso. If, as the result of delay due to unavoidable accident, a train crew will
not be able to take the train to the terminal of their normal run without serving beyond the time limit prescribed by the act, it becomes the carrier's duty to prevent such excessive service by substituting a fresh crew whenever, in the exercise of all reasonable
diligence, it is able to do so. 220 Fed. Rep. 748, affirmed.
THE case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Paul Burks, with whom Mr. Robert Dunlap, Mr. E. W. Camp and Mr. Gardiner Lathrop were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Underwood, with whom Mr. Alex Koplin was on the brief, for the United States.
MR. JUSTICE Day delivered the opinion of the court.
The United States brought an action in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, Southern Division, against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, to recover the sum of $1500 for three alleged violations of the Hours of Service Act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1415, 1416, the relevant parts of which are as follows:
“Sec. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier, its officers or agents, subject to this Act to require or permit any employee subject to this Act to be or remain on duty for a longer period than sixteen consecutive hours, and whenever any such employee of such common carrier shall have been continuously on duty for sixteen hours he shall be relieved and not required or permitted again to go on duty until he has had at least ten consecutive
hours off duty; and no such employee who has been on duty sixteen hours in the aggregate in any twenty-fourhour period shall be required or permitted to continue or again go on duty without having had at least eight consecutive hours off duty: “Sec. 3.
Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not apply in any case of casualty or unavoidable accident or the act of God; nor where the delay was the result of a cause not known to the carrier or its officer or agent in charge of such employee at the time said employee left a terminal, and which could not have been foreseen.
From the stipulated facts the following appears: That the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Kansas, and was at the times mentioned in the complaint a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by rail. That at the times mentioned in the petition this railway company operated a certain interstate passenger train from Los Angeles, California, to Phoenix, Arizona, known as train No. 18, and a similar train from Phoenix to Los Angeles known as train No. 17. That this latter train customarily, and on the dates in question, moved from Phoenix to Parker, Arizona, in charge of train and engine crews, which crews were changed at Parker, where there was attached to the train an engine in charge of a crew which ran from Parker to Barstow, California, a distance of 183.5 miles. That at Parker train No. 17 was taken in charge of and handled from that point to Los Angeles, a distance of 335.3 miles, by a passenger train crew, consisting of a conductor and two brakemen, who were the employees of the railroad company mentioned in the complaint.
That the terminals for the passenger train crews engaged in the operation of trains Nos. 17 and 18 are Los Angeles and Parker. That the employees described in
244 U. S.
Opinion of the Court.
the complaint resided and had their homes in Los Angeles, from which point they customarily left for Parker in charge of train No. 18, which arrived at Parker at or about 1:15 o'clock A. M., whereupon they were relieved until 10:40 o'clock P. M., on the same day. That during the interval they were permitted to enjoy the accommodations for rest at Parker, which was their "away-from-hometerminal.” That at 10:40 o'clock P. M. they reported for the return trip to Los Angeles on train No. 17, and customarily reached Los Angeles at or about 10:15 o'clock A. M. on the next day, from which time until 10:30 o'clock P. M. on the following day they were not on duty, and during that time they were permitted to repair to and remain at their respective homes in Los Angeles, which was their "home-terminal."
That on October 2nd and 3rd, 1912, passenger train No. 17 was operated between Parker and Los Angeles by the employees named in the complaint, and that they were compelled to be and remain on duty in connection with the movement of that train from 10:40 o'clock P. M. on October 2nd, until 8:25 o'clock P. M. on October 3rd, under the circumstances hereinafter set forth.
That the employees named reported for duty at Parker, at 10:40 o'clock P. M. on October 2nd, and at 11:10 o'clock P. M. departed from Parker in charge of train No. 17, which arrived at Barstow, California, at 7:10 o'clock A. M. on October 3rd, having been delayed for a period of two hours and thirty minutes on account of washouts, the cause of this delay not being known to the defendant, or to any of its officers or agents in charge of the employees at the time they left Parker, and incapable of being foreseen. That train No. 17 was scheduled to leave Barstow at 4:45 o'clock A. M. on October 3rd, but by reason of the delay in reaching Barstow it actually left that point at 7:45 o'clock A. M., with ample time then remaining to 'reach Los Angeles within less than sixteen hours after