running in a race is not itself the prize, but the way to obtain it".) Yet in view of the life to come, taking the present and the future as one great whole, virtue is the certain and infallible means to obtain happiness. The virtuous man will sooner or later receive the full reward of his virtue, and the vicious will receive the punishment of his vice.

life, he asserts what

good of all is the

If we ask whether the chief good be the good of the individual or the good of all; Clarke's answer is, they are identical. By seeking the good of all, each man best secures his own. Thus in view of the future Cumberland did of the present, that the good of each. But with Locke, Clarke would say, we must not directly seek our own happiness, lest we miss it. We must rather seek the welfare of all, and we may be assured we shall thereby best promote our own. Also in promoting the good of all, it is not so much their happiness we should directly aim at, but virtue, or perfection of character, the necessary condition of happiness. Thus moral teachers direct their endeavours towards making their fellow-men virtuous, knowing that, if they succeed, they will at the same time secure happiness for all and each.

Although Clarke asserts the identity of the universal with the individual happiness, he does not make individual happiness the ground of obligation. Obligation is not founded on selflove but on fitness. The good of all is in itself fit to be chosen. The mind of man unavoidably recognises this fitness; this recognition of fitness, joined with the consciousness of self as a free agent, lays an obligation upon the soul of man. The knowledge that by working for the good of all, I best procure my own, is rather of the nature of a motive. It is, in fact, the strongest motive imaginable, and only by extending this knowledge, can we hope ever to regenerate the world.

Not only does the good of all supply the strongest motive to right action, but so far as our fellow-men are concerned, it is the measure of right and wrong. Being fit in itself, all

1) N. R. p. 109.

actions which tend towards it must also be fit. This is the subordinate fitness already mentioned, a fitness of certain actions as means towards certain ends. "Those things only are truly good in their own nature which tend either to the universal benefit and welfare of all men, or at least are not destructive of it".) "Whatever tends directly and certainly to promote the good and happiness of the whole, must needs be agreeable to the will of God".") On the contrary, those actions are evil which tend to the disadvantage of all. In every case, the good of all is the measure of the rectitude of men's actions towards one another. Again, not only is the "good of all" motive to action, and measure of right and wrong, but it is the ethical end, and the moral ideal. Including as it does, the highest perfection of character with the greatest happiness, it is the highest possible end and ideal a moral being can set up for itself. It is nothing less than the perfection and happines of God himself. The perfection of God, Clarke says, "is the foundation of his own unchangeable happiness".") So with men, in striving after the divine ideal of perfection, they are advancing towards the happiness to be found alone in God. Thus, in the highest sense, "virtue in its proper seat, with all its full effects and consequences unhindered, must be confessed to be the chief good, as being truly the enjoyment as well as the imitation of God".4)

1) N. R. p. 35.

2) Ib. p. 96.

3) Ib. p. 92.

4) Ib. p. 109. This is the crowning point of Clarke's ethical system. It is not egoistic, but altruistic in the strictest sense. He did not believe that men always act from selfish motives. Experience had taught him the contrary. It was impossible, then, to found obligation in the identity of the universal and individual good. Hence his only refuge from hedonistic egoism, was to declare that moral distinctions are founded in the nature of things, and obligation in the recognition of these distinctions. But none the less did he recognise the insufficiency of mere moral perception to the practical working out of his ethical system. It was for him an undeniable fact that most men are not men of "right reason", but ruled by self-love and the power of passions. Hence the necessity of higher motives than the

CHAPTER IV.

CONCLUSION.

1. Influence of Clarke at the time he lived.

The influence Clarke exerted upon the ethical and religious thought of his day, must have been very considerable. His prominence may be dated from his preaching of the Boyle Lectures of 1704 and 1705. These works placed him at the head of the rationalistic theologians of his time, and distinguished him as the foremost opponent of the Deists. If we except Shaftesbury, Clarke was also the most prominent English ethical philosopher of his time. Indeed his influence among Churchmen must have been far greater than that of the deistically inclined Shaftesbury. Locke had died in 1704. Cumberland was still living, but was already an old man, and belonged to a previous generation. Berkeley although by far a greater thinker than Clarke, devoted but little attention to ethical subjects. Hutcheson's first essays did not appear until the year 1725, while in the meantime Clarke's two lectures had passed through six editions. Butler's "Analogy" was first published in the year 1736. Thus during a period of some twenty years, Clarke enjoyed great esteem and popularity; so much so, that, as Hoadly says, "he could command but very little time for his own studies". His friends considered him a genius of the first order, and his enemies could not but regard him as their strongest opponent. Leslie Stephen says, "Around him clustered a little group of men, chiefly members of his own University, who were among the most vigorous controversialists of their day; though now, without exception,

mere knowledge of moral truth or even the love of virtue. The consideration of a future life and the consequent identity of the universal with the individual good, supplied the necessary link in the chain, and but for Clarke's inconsistent position with regard to motives, his system from a theological point of view, would have strong claim to be regarded as logical, notwithstanding the objections that may be taken to certain minor points less carefully treated by him.

consigned to utter oblivion. Poor half-mad Whiston was his admiring friend and biographer. Sykes Jackson and Balguy, were amongst his attached adherents. Hoadly, the leader of the Latitudinarian party, was his intimate friend and warm admirer. Young men of promise, such as Butler, Hutcheson, Kames and Collier, appealed to him in philosophical difficulties; and though assailed by the orthodox, lead by Waterland, and accused of dishonest compliance with the articles, he plainly exerted a powerful influence upon the more liberal thinkers of the day".) The fact that he was chosen by the Princess of Wales to defend English philosophy against Leibniz, is sufficient to indicate the reputation he must have enjoyed.

II. Influence of Clarke on later ethical thought.

In Ethics Clarke may be considered the head and founder of the later "Intellectual School", of which he and Wollaston and Price were the most important members. Of this school, John Balguy was most closely allied to Clarke, while Wollaston and Price were more independent in their speculations.

In the year 1728, Balguy published his chief work-"The Foundation of Moral Goodness".") The immediate object of this work was to refute the ethical theory of Hutcheson, and to establish that of Clarke. Balguy's central thought is Clarke's position that "virtue is conformity to reason; the acting according to the fitnesses which arise out of the eternal and immutable relations of agents to objects". His criticism of Hutcheson is interesting as being made entirely from Clarke's point of view, and since it is possible he may have consulted Clarke before publishing the work. His four chief objections to Hutcheson's theory are as follows: 9)-(1) "It represents virtue

1) "English thought in the 18th Century" Vol. I. p. 129.

2) Of Balguy's other works, the most important is: "A letter to a Deist concerning the beauty and excellency of moral virtue, and the support and improvement which it receives from the Christian religion". Published in 1726. See Encycl. Britt., Art. "Balguy".

3) Encycl. Britt., Art. "Balguy".

as arbitrary and insecure, by making it depend on two instincts, benevolent affection and the moral sense". (2) "That if true, brutes, since they have kind instincts and affections, must have some degree of virtue". (3) "That if such affections constitute virtue, the virtue must be greater in proportion as the affections are stronger, contrary to the notion of virtue, which is the control of the affections". (4) "That virtue is degrated by being made a result of instincts, instead of being represented as the higher part of our nature". Balguy also assailed Tindal in defence of Clarke.1) Tindal had said that if the laws of nature be perfect, then there is no place for revelation. Balguy replied,-"The law of nature is perfect and unchangeable, and men can thereby know what it is their duty to do, but the light of reason may have, and has had, added knowledge by revelation".

If Balguy was throughout a disciple of Clarke, Wollaston,2) a man of greater importance, represented a curious one-sided development of Clarke's theory. From Clarke's doctrine of the differences of things, and the consequent fitness of things, it was not a long step to the assertion that whatever is, is right. In fact, such a conclusion would seem the only logical one, were it not that Clarke's "fitness of things" is not so much a fitness at present existing, as an ideal fitness which Clarke indeed says exists in things, but which, as his own words show, rather proceeds from the approval of the mind when things exist in certain relations, or are thought of as so existing. But Clarke is not clear on this point, and frequently it would seem as if the subjective element were altogether left out of account, and the fitness of things something existing apart from any perceiving mind. Fitness was the natural order of things; unfitness, the negation of that order. Thus Clarke makes the strange and obscure statement, that those who refuse to act according to the rules of justice, and to con

1) "A second letter to a Deist concerning a book entitled, 'Christianity as old as creation', more particularly that chapter which relates to Dr. Clarke". 2) "The Religion of Nature delineated". Lond. 1722.