more scientific than critical".1) As a proof of Clarke's continued interest in scientific studies may be mentioned his Latin translation of Newton's Optics, prepared at the request of the author. Clarke's sermons were published after his death in two folio volumes, containing one hundred and seventy-three long discourses. 2) They are very carefully written, full of quotations from Scripture, and frequently refer to the ethical subjects treated in his Boyle lectures. The ethical theory they contain is the same as that more systematically given in the "Boyle Lectures"; consequently they are of little importance for our present purpose.

Although church preferment was offered to Clarke, he refused to accept it, and remained Rector of St. Jame's Westminster until his death in 1729. Hoadly speaks in the highest terms of his consistent life, and says "he endeavoured to live out the principles he taught". He appears to have enjoyed a very high reputation for learning on almost every subject, and his opinions on matters philosophical were sought by such men as Butler, Hutcheson, Kames and Collier. He had many friends and warm admirers among both scientists and theologians, and Bishop Hoadly declared it his highest wish, that he might be remembered "in ages to come, under the character of the Friend of Dr. Clarke”.

NB. In referring to the works of Clarke we have in general used abbreviations:-B. & Att., for "Being and Attributes of God", the first Boyle lecture; N. R., for the "Discourse concerning the obligations of Natural Religion"; Leibn. & Cl., for Clarke's correspondence with Leibniz; Let. Dodw., for "A letter to Mr. Dodwell &c."; Remarks, for "Remarks on a Book &c."; Letters, for "Several letters to Dr. Clarke &c.".

1) "Types of Ethical Theory" p. 463.

2) "One hundred and seventy-three Sermons on several Subjects and Occasions, in two Volumes; by Samuel Clarke D. D., late Rector of St. James' Westminster". Published from the Author's Manuscript by John Clarke D. D., Dean of Sarum. Dublin, 1734. The John Clarke here mentioned was the son of Samuel Clarke. He afterwards became Prebendary of Canterbury and Chaplain to the queen, and, curiously enough, preached the Boyle lectures for 1719 and 1720, his subject being "An Enquiry into the cause and Origin of Natural and Moral Evil".

II. Influences from various quarters.

As we have endeavoured to show in Chapter I., Clarke was most directly influenced by previous English ethical philosophers. He belongs in general to the school of Cudworth, Cumberland and Locke. His conception of the importance of Ethics, his attempt to reduce morals to an exact science, his method of investigation, and the results he announced, were all very similar to those of his predecessors. Yet it is impossible to assert with any degree of assurance, that Clarke was a disciple of Locke or Cumberland or even of Cudworth. Neither is it possible to say he was a Platonist, or a follower of Aristotle, or a Stoic. To none of these schools can he be said to have attached himself completely, although they all doubtless exerted their influence upon him. He quotes frequently from all the prominent philosophers of antiquity and from most of the modern philosophers. Wherever he can find an opinion to support his own, he uses it with thanks, especially if the writer quoted belongs to one of his favorite schools of thought. He is always ready with an apt quotation from Plato, Cicero, Epictetus, and frequently from Aristotle, and in his theological discussions he refers often to Origin, Lactantius and many of the Church Fathers besides. Yet Clarke is by no means an eclectic. He is rather, if we leave the subjective factor out of account, a product of the times in which he lived. All that can be done towards estimating the influence of previous ethical writers upon Clarke, is to show a few analogies between their ideas and his, as we have already done in the case of his chief predecessors in English Ethics.

A. Ancient writers.

Although, as Clarke says, the ancient philosophers failed to reform mankind, yet many of them "gave to the world admirable systems of Ethics, of excellent use and benefit to the generations wherein they lived, and deservedly of great value and esteem even unto this day".1) Of these, the most

1) Nat. Rel. p. 133.

important in Clarke's estimation, are Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus and Antoninus. 1) Considering the similarity between Clarke's ethical system and that of Cudworth, and in view of the fact that Clarke was educated at Cambridge, it is not surprising that he frequently quotes from the works of Plato. With Socrates, Clarke is inclined to assert the identity of knowledge and virtue; for as Socrates based morality on knowledge, so Clarke makes it rest on the perception of moral truth as manifested in the difference and fitness of things. For men of right reason it was sufficient to perceive the truth, and right action would follow as a matter of course. For Clarke as for Socrates, the good, the beautiful and the useful are identical, and in the ethics of both, virtue is regarded as teachable. Plato places the highest good in the greatest possible likeness to God, and happiness consists in the possession of the Good; while Clarke says the chief good lies in the imitation of God, which includes also the greatest happiness. Virtue, according to Plato, is the fitness of the soul to the performance of its proper work; according to Clarke, virtue is the conformity of the soul's life and actions to the "eternal fitness of things". Clarke's eulogy of "Universal Justice" is in the very words of Plato, and he quotes from the works of Plato 2) in support of many less important parts of his ethical theory. With Aristotle Clarke shows less affinity, although he often quotes his opinion,3) especially where it coincides with his own.

Of all ancient philosophers he is most in sympathy with the Stoics, and with those writers who were most influenced by the Stoical philosophy. For Clarke, "Moral virtue is the foundation and the sum, the essence and the life of all true religion".4) Therefore Ethics is the chief of all sciences, and all other sciences, including Mathematics and Natural Philo

1) Nat. Rel. pp. 138–153.

2) Comp. Nat. Rel. pp. 44, 48, 55, 64, 69, 119, 133, 139, 141, 157, 298. 3) Comp. Nat. Rel. pp. 36, 56, 85, 126, 132, 139; Being and Attr. pp. 28, 31, 76.

4) Nat. Rel. p. 90.

sophy, derive their chief value from the fact that they contribute largely to ethical knowledge. Speaking of Newton, Clarke says, "the foundations of natural religion have never been so deeply and so firmly laid as in the mathematical and experimental philosophy of that great man".) With Clarke, as with the Stoics, Philosophy was of value only in so far as it lead to the practise of virtue; it is knowledge as applied to action that is of use to mankind. to mankind. Indirectly from the Stoics, directly and chiefly through Cicero, the Roman Jurists and Hugo Grotius, Hobbes and the English ethical philosophers of his century would seem to have derived the conception of the Law of Nature. For the Stoics, human nature was but a part of universal nature. The Law of Nature was therefore the law for man, and to live according to nature was to fulfil the end of his being and to lead a virtuous life. Reason in man and the reason in the universe are one and the same thing. Very similar to this is the Philosophy of Clarke. The universe is reasonable, for it has God as its creator. In the nature of things are certain fitnesses and unfitnesses, and these, perceived by the mind of man, become for him the rule of action, the Law of Nature. Virtue is conformity of life and action with the nature of things. Clarke even goes so far as to say, with the Stoics, that virtue is worthy to be chosen for its own sake alone, and the man of right reason will chose virtue for this reason alone; yet he denies the Stoical assertion of the self-sufficiency of virtue. The virtuous are not always the most happy in this world, and although it be reasonable to choose virtue, men cannot be expected to choose it, if it be not rewarded with happiness. The Stoics could not reconcile this apparent contradiction between reason and reasonable desire for happiness; the reconciliation could only be made in view of the immortality of the soul and the rewards and punishments of a future life. Clarke's division of actions into good, bad and indifferent is similar to that of the Stoics. The Stoical virtue of Insight or Practical Wisdom (gyórnois),

1) Dedication of Clarke's correspondence with Leibniz.

is similar to Clarke's Moral Perception, and the Stoical virtues of Moderation and Justice remind one of Clarke's Sobriety or duty to self, and Equity or duty towards others. Clarke's Moral Perception lies at the foundation of all virtue, as the necessary condition of virtuous action, and Zeno reduces all the virtues to Insight. Clarke's treatment of the Passions is also similar to that of the Stoics. Passion and prejudice blind the moral eyesight, so that men do not perceive moral distinctions, and even when they do perceive them, the passions hinder right action. The less a man is ruled by his passions the more he is a free agent. Finally, Clarke, like the Stoics, makes the ethical end not the welfare of the individual, nor of the nation, but of all mankind, and in view of this he would also declare the highest work of man is not contemplation but action.

Clarke quotes occasionally from Chrysippus, Seneca and Epictetus, but it would appear to have been from Cicero that he chiefly acquired his admiration for the Stoical philosophy. Cicero, Clarke says, was "the greates and best philosopher that Rome, or perhaps any other nation ever produced".1) He delights in quoting the opinions of "Tully", especially with regard to the Law of Nature, 2) the excellence of virtue, 3) the existence of God, 4) and the immortality of the soul. 5) He is especially pleased when he can quote Cicero in opposition to Hobbes, to show that the Law of Nature is antecedent to all positive law, and that mankind is naturally inclined to benevolence.") Next to Cicero, among Stoically inclined writers, Clarke most frequently mentions the apologete Lactantius, whose "Institutiones Divinae", was written in the early part of the fourth century A. D.7) In 1685, but six years

1) Nat. Rel. p. 141.

2) Ib. pp. 54, 65, 67, 128.

3) Ib. pp. 46, 49, 55, 72, 73.

4) Ib. pp. 15, 16, 18, 52, 139.

5) Ib. pp. 116, 115, 111, 112, 118, 145.

6) Ib. pp. 60, 61, 67.

2) Ueberweg-Heinze Bd. II. pp. 82-87.