latter to degrees of good. The latter Bacon does not discuss at all, but leaves to the "infinite disputations" of the schools. Simple good is of two kinds,-"Individual or Self-good", and "Good of Communion". In Aristotelian language he asserts the latter is "the greater and worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form". 1) He gives no other reason why the good of all should be preferred to the individual good, nor does he attempt to show, as did Cumberland later, that both are necessarily identical. The "Light of Nature" he also mentions as indicating the performance of certain duties, but this seems a foreign and undigested element in Bacon's Ethics. 2) The "good of communion" does not mean the good of all mankind, but the sphere of obligation is confined within the limits of the state. This principle of the good of all is of the greatest value to philosophy and ethics. It shows that the active life is to be preferred to the contemplative; that happiness consists in virtue; that individual pleasure is not the highest good; and it supplies the highest possible end of life. By thus supplying an end of life it at the same time provides a standard of moral action, for in order to decide whether a man be virtuous or not it is necessary to know what ends he has set before himself, and how faithfully he conforms his life and action in accordance therewith. 3) Virtue is the regulating and conforming of life and action with reference to the highest end of life. With respect to the "good of communion", there are two classes of duties,-duties of man in common, and respective duties. The former are the duties of men as members 1) According to Bacon, the fundamental problem of Philosophy is the discovery of forms. He seems to have borrowed this idea partly from the Atomists, and partly from Aristotle, though he largely developed it himself. It is difficult to obtain an exact idea of what he meant by the word form. Sometimes it is declared to be the thing itself, or its essence; sometimes the necessary condition or cause of individual existence, the sine qua non of all physical qualities. See Encycl. Britt. Art. "Bacon”. 2) De Aug. lib. IX. Also Jodl, Gesch. d. Ethik, Vol. I. p. 95. of the state; the latter are the duties arising from the various minor relations of men to one another, as in family, profession, employment. The end of duties in common is the good of the nation; the ends to be attained by respective duties, are the good of the family, the profession or the individual, as the case may be, but the lower ends are to be subordinated to the chief end. After indicating the various divisions and kinds of good, Bacon then treats of the cultivation of the mind, as the necessary condition for attaining the end desired. This he divides into three parts,-the "doctrine of men's natures and dispositions"; the "inquiry into the affections"; and the "doctrine of remedies". The discussion of the two first classes is an attempt at a psychological basis of practical Ethics. We must carefully observe and study human nature in general, and also the peculiarities of individual character and circumstances, if we would be successful in the education of men in virtue. But not only must the physician know the patient's constitution; he must also know the disease, if he would administer proper remedies. The affections are the "infirmities of the mind". "The mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation". 1) The affections of pleasure and pain are the general affections; the affections of anger and tenderness, fear and hope, are examples of particular affections. In order to incite to right action, affection must be set against affection, that the stronger may overcome the weaker. Thus the state must use the affections of fear and hope "for the suppressing and bridling of the rest". Fear of punishment overcomes the love of wrong-doing; hope of reward overbalances the desire for present gratification.2) 1) Adv. of learn. Bk. II. p. 63. 2) We are here strikingly reminded of Descartes' treatment of the passions, in his "Traité des passions de l'âme"; also of Spinoza's proposition,-"A passion can only be restrained or removed by a passion opposite to and stronger than itself". Sp. Eth. Bk. IV. prop. 7; Bk. III. prop. 43 &c. The doctrine of remedies, based upon this knowledge of human nature, gives us rules for the education of the mind in virtue, and towards the highest good. Of these rules the chief is, "the electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain". ) The highest possible end is the good of all. Thus we have an ideal of life. Towards the realization of this ideal, no power is so efficacious as the Christian religion, because it implants in the soul "divine love or charity", "which is excellently called the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together".") Bacon was the first English philosopher to attempt a systematic theory of ethics. Still his ethics is only given in outline, and the outline was never filled, nor did any later writer develope the system as a whole. 3) Although we may notice apparent anticipations of later ethical thought, it was rather the spirit and method of Bacon that influenced English ethics, than any positive contribution to the science. What was new in his ethics was in great measure an attempt to apply the method of observation to the facts of human nature. Hobbes carried this method further in his endeavour to show the historical development of ethical ideas. Bacon's theory of the "affections" we find further developed by Descartes and Spinoza, as also by writers of the school of Shaftesbury and Hume. His emphasizing of right education as essential to growth in virtue might be regarded as the forerunner of Locke's "Thoughts concerning Education", and other moralists, as Clarke, did not neglect the importance of right education, as the means whereby men are delivered from prejudice and moral blindness. Bacon's principle of the "good of all" forms an 1) Adv. of learn. Bk. II. p. 65. 2) Compare Spinoza on "Intellectual love";-Eth. Bk. V. prop. 37 &c. $) See Fraser's "Selections from Berkeley", Intr. p. XIV.; Sidgwick “Hist. of Eth.”, p. 155. Also, Paulsen in Vierteljahrsschrift f. wissensch. Philos. I., S. 588. important part of the ethics of Cumberland and Clarke, and especially of the Utilitarian school of Bentham and Mill. It has been said that Bacon separated ethics from religion.1) This is partly true and partly false. He separated ethics from religion in so far as he did not make use of the expectation of future rewards and punishments as motives to right action. But he united religion and moral philosophy in that he made true religion the means whereby divine love or charity is implanted in the hearts of men, and made this love the inward power which leads and impels men to the practise of virtue. In regard to this, we find after Bacon two principle lines of thought in England. The one sought to separate Ethics entirely from religion, and was even hostile to it; the other endeavoured to create a system of ethics which should be in accordance with both Reason and Revelation. The former trend is represented by Hobbes, and to a less extent by the English Deists; as defenders of the latter position we may mention Locke, Clarke, and the apologians Butler and Paley. The controversy thus occasioned raged throughout the latter part of the 17th and the former half of the 18th century, and every ethical writer was more or less influenced by it. II. Hobbes (1588-1679). Although a friend and whilom secretary of Bacon, Hobbes cannot be considered his disciple either in natural or moral philosophy. The problem of the origin of obligation he much more clearly comprehended than did Bacon; its solution is entirely different; and on the whole, the system of Hobbes shows but few resemblances to that of his great predecessor.2) Hobbes begins his ethical system 3) with an investigation of 1) Jodl, Gesch. d. Eth. Vol. I. p. 96. 2) Compare Robertson's "Hobbes" in Prof. Knight's "Philosophical Classics for English readers"; p. 20 and foll. 3) Hobbes' ethico-political system is most amply set forth in his chief work,-"Leviathan", Lond. 1651; in which are incorporated the chief ideas expressed in his former works, "De Homine", and "De Cive". human nature as it was, or may be supposed to have been, in man's original or natural state. In this state man was but little superior to the beasts in material conditions, although richer in the possession of reason. All men are by nature equal. They are not free beings, but impelled in all their actions by supreme selfishness. This selfishness manifests itself in the three ruling passions,-desire of safety, desire of gain, and desire of glory. In this original state of equality, all men have a right to everything, and men may injure and even kill one another without having committed any wrong, for where there is no law there can be no moral distinctions. The passions of men inevitably lead them to strife and war. The desire for gain leads men to take the possessions of others; the desire for glory causes them to endeavour to kill and enslave their fellow-men, and just precaution arising from the desire of safety leads men to resist the encroachments of others. Thus arises from the very first a state of war of all against all. 1) The result is a condition of extreme misery. But from this miserable state of nature there is a way of escape. Men have still other passions which act in a contrary direction to those already mentioned. These are, the fear of death, the desire of things necessary to commodious living, and the hope by industry to obtain them. These all induce men to seek deliverance from the state of war, and thereupon Reason directs them to seek after peace, and suggests the means whereby this may be attained. Since the reasoning faculty is natural to man this Law of Reason may also be called the Law of Nature. 2) Among some twenty Laws of Nature, Reason commands primarily two things, that peace 1) Lev. XIII. Also Robertson "Hobbes" p. 139 and foll. 2) Although an opponent of Grotius, Hobbes would seem to have borrowed from him the ancient conception of the "Law of Nature", and to have introduced it into English philosophy, where it afterwards played so important a part. Grotius' chief work on the subject is his "De Jure Belli et Pacis", published in 1625, and is considered to have laid the foundations of modern International Law: See Ueberweg-Heinze, Geschichte d. Phil., Vol. III. p. 44. |