Railway Co. v. Fulton, Admr. and expense of again causing it to be removed, or submit to the jurisdiction of the state court. The view we have taken finds support in the well considered case of Cox v. Railroad Co., 68 Ga., 446. It is there held that "where a case has been removed from a state court to the circuit court of the United States, the jurisdiction of the former ceases, and, after non-suit in the federal court, the case cannot be renewed in the state court within six months so as to avoid the statute of limitation." Such right is given by statute on a non-suit in the courts of that state. A non-suit not being a decision on the merits. Referring to the statute, which reads as follows: "If a plaintiff shall be non-suited, or shall discontinue or dismiss his case, and shall recommence within six months, such renewed case shall stand upon the same footing as to limitation with the original case," the court said. "To be thus renewed it must be the same case as to cause of action and parties; and this is identically the same case in both respects. So that the question is, can a case which has been removed to the United States circuit court be renewed in the same court. We think not, because the act of removal ipso facto transfer the jurisdiction of the cause to the circuit court of the United States, and divests that of the state court." Citing Kern v. Huidekoper, 13 Otto, 485. In the case before us the plaintiff averred that the cause of action in the case removed, was identical with the cause of action in his present petition. If it had not been, he could not have been within the provisions of section 4991 Revised Statutes under favor of which he claimed the right to recommence his action in the state court. Judgment reversed and petition below dismissed. 59 582 67 82 Silberman et al. v. Hay. SILBERMAN ET AL. v. HAY. Right of trial by jury-Subject-matter of general legislation-Act of May 29, 1894, known as Cuyahoga county jury law, invalid— Constitutional law. 1. The right of trial by jury is a subject-matter of general legislation, and laws affecting it must be uniform in operation throughout the state. Section 26, Art. 2, Const. 2. A statute, by the provisions of which the parties to a suit in which the issues are of right triable by jury are "deemed" to have waived the right, unless a certain time before the term at which the issues are, by the laws of the state, required to be made up, a demand is made for a jury, attended with a "deposit" of a certain sum of money for the benefit of the jury fund, affects the right of trial by jury, and must be uniform in its operation. The Cuyahoga County Jury Law adopted May 29, 1894, (91 Laws, 793), is, in substance, such a law; and being limited in its operation to Cuyahoga county, is invalid. (Decided January 31, 1899.) ERROR to the Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county. The first proposition upon which is alleged error, is that we were deprived of our right to a trial by jury. Second. That the so-called Cuyahoga County Jury Law, under which they undertook to deprive us of such right, is unconstitutional. That the so-called Cuyahoga County Jury Law is unconstitutional. It seems to us that, from the nature of the subject-matter, its operation and effect, this act violates section 26 of article 2 of the constitution. If acts in relation to roads and bridges and methods of punishing crime are unconstitutional because local laws on a general subject, most assuredly, it seems to us, is a law un Silberman et al. v. Hay. constitutional which undertakes to levy a tax on a certain class of litigants in one county only of the state. If it applied to all counties of the state it might perhaps be deemed general. If it applied to all litigants in one county, something might, it seems, be claimed for it, but when it applies only to a certain limited class, in only one county of the state, and is on a general subject, and that subject perhaps the one where persons would look first for uniformity, as the most desirable point on which to have uniformity, the administration of justice, there can, it seems to us, be no doubt of its unconstitutionality. Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St., 573; Swan's Revised Statutes (ed. 1854), p. 267; Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio St., 588; Falk. Ex parte, 42 Ohio St., 638; Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St., 269; State v. Winch, 45 Ohio St., 663; Nye v. State, 1 C. C., 365; 1 C. D., 198; Costello v. Wyoming, 49 Ohio St., 202; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 617; State ex rel. v. Ellet, 47 Ohio St., 90; Commissioners v. Rosche Bros., 50 Ohio St., 103. We say that any law establishing the jurisdiction of any of the courts of common pleas must be a general law whether it is as to a class of its business or a class of its litigants. The constitution, article IV, section 4. That must necessarily mean general law; it can not mean special. Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, trustee, 54 Ohio St., 284; State ex rel. v. Commissioners, 54 Ohio St., 333; State ex rel. v. Davis, 55 Ohio St., 15. In Gaylord et al. v. Hubbard, Treasurer, 56 Ohio St., 25, The Cleveland Board of Equalization Law was held unconstitutional. Hixson v. Burson, 54 Ohio St., 470. In construing a clause of our constitution it hardly seems necessary, after the thorough dis Silberman et al. v. Hay. cussion in the Hixson-Burson case, to cite authorities from other states. But we will call your Honors attention to one, the case of Commissioners v. Bank, Col. (40 Pac. Rep., 894), where almost the precise question here raised was passed upon by that court. We further say that this law is in contravention of sections 1 and 2, of article 12, of the constitution, which provides: Section 1, no poll tax, etc. Section 2, "laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule, etc." And on the question that this is a tax, we cite the court to the definition given by Bouvier in his Law Dictionary "Tax." "A contribution imposed by government on individuals for the service of the state." State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St., 226. By the provisions of this act, section 2, the sum of $5 deposited with the clerk of the court shall be appropriated towards the payment of jury fees generally, and to the extent that that goes into the county treasury, that litigant especially contributes towards the tax in that behalf. By section 5189m each juror is paid his fees by the county treasurer, and that is paid from the general fund. The $5 paid by this class of litigants, in one county especially makes it a special contribution by him towards the service of the government, and therefore his tax is not levied by a uniform rule. He is already taxed on his property, and he pays in addition a special tax in this way. Ry. Co. v. State, 49 Ohio St., 189. And so, in this case, the expense of a jury is $2 per man per day. And in some cases Cuyahoga county has paid for the trial of a single case upwards of $300 jury fees. How can there be said, then, to be any relation between the $5 required Silberman et al. v. Hay. under this law and the $24 per diem paid to the jury called in the case. Wasson v. Commissioners, 49 Ohio St., 622. Emil Joseph, for defendant in error. The act of 91 O. L., 793, is not a law of a general nature within the meaning of the constitution. In McGill v. The State, 34 Ohio St., 228, the act of 74 O. L., 218, was held constitutional although its provisions applied solely to the selection of jurors for the county of Cuyahoga. State ex rel. v. Commissioners, 35 Ohio St., 458; Bronson v. Oberlin, 4 1 Ohio St., 476; State ex rel. v. Shearer, 46 Ohio St., 275. The act complained of does not deprive litigants of the right to trial by jury, but prescribes the circumstances under which "a jury shall be deemed waived in all cases appealed, etc." The act therefore simply enlarges the scope of sections 5130 and 5204, Revised Statutes of Ohio, the constitutionality of which has never been questioned. Bonewitz v. Bonewitz, 50 Ohio St., 373. Similar laws of other states governing the selection of jurors have been held constitutional. Randall v. Kehlor, 60 Me., 37; Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn., 265; Cushman v. Flanagan, 50 Texas, 389; Bailey v. Joy, 132 Mass., 356; Vitrified Wheel Co. v. Edwards, 135 Mass., 591; Vierling v. Stifel Brewing Co., 15 Mo., App., 125; Foster v. Morse, 132 Mass., 354. MINSHALL, J. The suit below was brought in the common pleas court of Cuyahoga county, by Levi Hey against the defendants, Silberman & Co. to recover a balance due on an account for certain iron sold and delivered. The latter claimed that |