Gas Company v. Tiffiu et al. We claim that Shoupe had actual knowledge of a subsisting lease to the company, that this and other knowledge came to him through Taylor and imposed on him the duty to inquire, which, had he done, he could readily have obtained full knowledge of the company's rights, and that he is therefore charged with notice of everything claimed by the plaintiff in error. 16 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, pp. 789-795; and 2 Devlin on Deeds, section 727. One who has a knowledge of facts which would lead a fair and prudent man, using ordinary caution, to make further inquiry, is charged with notice of the facts which such inquiry would have disclosed. Actual notice may be inferred from circumstances. Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me., 195; Drey v. Doyle, 99 Mo., 459; Gibson v. Winslow, 46 Pa. St., 380; s. c. 84 Am. Dec., 552, 555, and note 556. This has long been the rule in Ohio. Reeder v. Barr, 4 Ohio, 446; Bonner v. Ware, 10 Ohio, 465. Bringing the principle "closer home," we call the court's attention to the following cases, in all of which it was held that a grantee was charged with notice of the instruments excepted in the deed. We have been unable to find any cases where the contrary was held. Morrison V. Morrison, 38 Iowa, 73; Ross v. Worthington, 11 Minn., 323; Buchanan v. Balkum, 60 N. H., 406; White v. Kibby, 42 Ill., 510; Brown v. Eastman, 16 N. H., 588; Kerr v. Kitchen, 17 Pa. St., 433; Building Ass'n v. Parsons, 17 Atlantic Rep., 834; Baker v. Mather, 25 Mich., 51. Here there has been no failure to comply with the statute. The lease and transfer being of record, we say the principle contended for must be applied, and Shoupe held charged with notice. Gas Company v. Tiffin et al. of the existence of the lease, together with its terms and conditions. The city of Tiffin, applying the same principle, had constructive notice of whatever lease the company had. 16 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 792, and cases cited; Doren v. Robinson, 16 N. J. Eq., 256. Harry P. Black, city solicitor, for city of Tiffin, defendant in error. J. A. & E. V. Bope, for Shoupe, defendant in error. It is very clear that plaintiff in error founds its entire hope of success in securing a reversal of the judgment of the circuit court upon the assumption that the common law as to notice, unmodified by statute or the interpretations of such statutes by the Supreme Court, prevails undisturbed in Ohio. But does it? Manifestly the legislature of this state may modify the common law by means of the enactment of statutes that are in conformity to the constitution of the state. No cne will dispute this proposition. The statute, or at least one of the statutes that control this case, is section 4134 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio. Section 4112a of the Revised Statutes also bears strongly on this case. No one can doubt that Shoupe, under the definition of our Supreme Court of the term purchaser as used in section 4134, is a purchaser of the sixty acre tract, and a bona fide purchaser. No one claims otherwise. Shoupe's deed was duly entered for record June 21, 1895. He took possession of the sixty acres on or about the first day of April, 1894. There can be no doubt as to his being com Gas Company v. Tiffin et al. pletely under the protection of the statute, unless he had knowledge of the lease of the plaintiff in error. Morris v. Daniels, 35 Ohio St., 406; Varwig v. Railroad Co., 54 Ohio St., 455. The only knowledge that Shoupe had at the time of his purchase pertaining to these unrecorded extensions was that the plaintiff in error had a lease on his sixty acres, but that such lease would expire on the tenth day of June, 1895. To the extent of this knowledge, we must concede he was bound. But the test is the absence of knowledge, not the absence of that which might induce inquiry. Knowledge that the lease of the plaintiff in error extended further than June 10, 1895, was absent from the mind of Shoupe when he made his purchase of the sixty acres, March 31, 1894. There is no evidence that Shoupe acted in bad faith. On the other hand, there is evidence that Shcupe did act in the best of faith, and the circuit court so found. He inquired of his grantor, Taylor, whether he had a copy of the lease that he might verify Taylor's statements with reference to the lease of the plaintiff in error. He exhausted all the means of information that were readily at hand, for the plaintiff in error had negligently refused him information at the source where he might expect to find it--the county recorder's office. We do not doubt that the doctrine contained in the cases of Reeder v. Barr, 4 Ohio, 446, and Bonner v. Ware, 10 Ohio, 465, is good law. It is not out of harmony with the cases of Morris v. Daniels and Varwig v. Railroad Company cited above, and so the Supreme Court understood, for the two former cases are not referred to in the two latter. Gas Company v. Tiffin et al. The case of Bell and Wife v. Duncan et al., 11 Ohio, 192, shows that the construction we have adopted concerning the cases of Reeder v. Barr, and Bonner v. Ware is correct. 46 N. Y. Rep., 384. WILLIAMS, J. The ultimate relief sought by the plaintiff, in the action below, was an injunction against the city of Tiffin, preventing it from taking natural gas from the premises in question. The reformation of the lease under which the plaintiff claimed the exclusive right to the gas, was but a preliminary step in the establishment of the plaintiff's right to the injunction, and unimportant except in aid of that remedy. This inquiry, therefore, is directed primarily to the ascertainment of the rights of the city under the lease obtained by it from Shoupe, rather than to those of the plaintiff against Shoupe, although the former are to some extent, but not entirely, dependent on the latter. It appears from the finding of facts, that when Shoupe purchased the land and received his conveyance from Taylor, the lease made by the latter to Duke and by him assigned to the plaintiff was, together with the assignment, on record in the proper office; and it was excepted from the covenants in the deed; but the term of years for which the lease was made had been allowed to expire without any effort to develope oil or gas, and no person was in possession of the land claiming under the lease or under any extension of it, nor was any agreement for such extension on record. This was also the condition of affairs when the city of Tiffin obtained its lease from Shoupe, who was then in the exclusive occupancy of the land; and the receipt given by Shoupe to the plaintiff D Gas Company v. Tiffin et al. for rent, which it is claimed amounted to an extension of the lease, was not on record, nor possession held under it. The city upon receiving its lease immediately entered into the actual possession of the land and has since continued in possession. One question arising on these facts, and probably the most important one, relates to the construction and effect of the act of April 11, 1888 [85 O. L., 179] supplemental to section 4112, and now section 4112a, of the Revised Statutes. It provides: "That all leases and licenses, and assignments thereof or of any interest therein, heretofore executed, given or made, for, upon or concerning any lands or tenements in this state, whereby any right is given or granted to operate, or to sink or drill wells thereon for natural gas and petroleum or either, or pertaining thereto, shall be recorded in the lease record in the office of the recorder of the proper county by the first day of September, 1888, and all such leases, licenses and assignments hereafter executed, given or made, shall be filed for record as aforesaid, forthwith and recorded in said lease record, without delay, and shall not be removed until recorded, and no such lease or license hereafter executed or given, unless the person claiming thereunder is in actual and open possession, shall have any force or validity until the same is filed for record as aforesaid, except as between the parties thereto, nor shall any such lease or license heretofore executed or given and not recorded by the first day of September, 1888, have any force or validity thereafter until filed for record, except as between the parties thereto, and as to persons claiming thereunder and in actual and open possession." This statute, it will be observed, applies to all |