Smith v. State. standing the lapse of time, or the commingling of the goods. Nor, does a new act of concealment arise from the discovery of the property. Its being found in the possession of the accused is an important fact in the proof of the crime, and, in the absence of evidence showing that different parts of the property were received or concealed at different times, such possession unexplained, coupled with the necessary proof of the scienter, would be sufficient to warrant a conviction according to the value of all of the property. That, however, is not purport of the charge. It warranted a conviction of an offense corresponding in degree with the value of all of the property, although it should be established to the satisfaction of the jury that different parts of it were received and concealed by the accused on separate and distinct occasions. It was a rule of the common law, and is now a statutory one, that when the thief carried the stolen property from one county to another, he might be convicted in either, on the principle that, as the property remained that of the owner, each removal of it was a new taking; and now by statute that rule is applied to receivers of stolen property. Revised Statutes, section 7213. We know of no authority, however, statutory or otherwise, to the effect that each day of concealment in the jurisdiction where the offense was committed shall be treated as a new offense, or regarded as repeated whenever other stolen goods are added to those concealed, so as to form one crime whose grade is to be determined by their aggregate value. It may be that legislation would be wholesome which would enable a series of petit offenses of this nature, when the total value of the property involved amounted to enough to constitute a felony, Smith v. State. to be punished as such; but as far as our legislation has gone is to provide for cumulative sentences and increased punishment for petit larcenies and other misdemeanors after three convictions. The court denied a request of the defendant to direct the jury to make special findings in answer to certain written interrogatories submitted; and that is assigned as error. Counsel rely on sections 5200 and 5201, of the Revised Statutes, but those sections are part of the civil code, and have no application in criminal cases. There appears to be no corresponding provision in the criminal code. The verdict on the issue of not guilty is regulated by the oath which the jury is required to take, and that is to well and truly try and true deliverance make between the state and the prisoner. Revised Statutes, section 7281. The court therefore properly denied the request. For the errors in the charge which have been pointed out, the judgment is reversed and cause remanded. SPEAR, C. J., and MINSHALL, J., dissent. State of Ohio ex rel. Kelly v. Thrall. 50 368 160 210 60 214 60 297 60 510 59 368 67 306 THE STATE ON RELATION OF THE ATTORNEY GEN- IN QUO WARRANTO. THE STATE ON RELATION OF THE ATTORNEY GEN- IN QUO WARRANTO. THE STATE ON RELATION OF SAAL v. BUSHNELL, IN MANDAMUS. STATE OF OHIO EX REL. KELLY v. THRALL. IN QUO WARRANTO. Election of county officers-Provisions of state constitution-Invalidity of act of April 26, 1898-Official term of sheriff-Constitutional law. 1. The provisions of the 10th article of the constitution, requiring the general assembly to provide by law for the election of county officers, and that such officers shall be elected on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, disable the general assembly to provide by law for an interval between the official terms of a sheriff and one elected to succeed him. 2. The power conferred upon the general assembly by the 27th section of the second article of the constitution to provide for the filling of vacancies in office, refers to such vacancies as may occur fortuitously. It does not authorize the creation of an interval between the official terms of persons elected to the office of sheriff. 3. The act of April 26, 1898, "to amend sections 1202 and 1203 of the Revised Statutes (93 O. L., 351) is void, including its repealing section, and said original sections continue in force notwithstanding said act. 4. All persons elected at the November election, 1898, to the office of sheriff in the several counties of the state, were entitled upon qualification to enter upon the discharge of their official duties on the first Monday in January, 1899, and those who have not so qualified and entered are entitled to do so now. (Decided January 17, 1899.) State of Ohio ex rel. Kelly v. Thrall. In the case of the State ex rel. v. Heffner, the petition alleges that the defendant Heffner, having been elected sheriff of Mercer county for two successive terms of two years each, and having on the first Monday of January, 1899, occupied said office continuously for four years, nevertheless he refused to vacate said office and asserted his right to continue therein until the first Monday of September, 1899, and prayed that he be ousted therefrom. In his answer Heffner admits his election to said office in November, 1894, and his re-election thereto in November, 1896, and that he qualified and held the office for both of the terms for which he was so elected, but that in consequence of the act of April 26, 1898, to amend sections 1202 and 1203 of the Revised Statutes he really believes that he is entitled to hold the office until the first Monday in September, 1899. That the governor has failed to issue to him a commission for that purpose, but that he is ready, able and willing to qualify according to law; that no candidate was nominated or elected to fill said office during the interim of eight months between said first Monday in January, and said first Monday in September, 1899, but that at the general election held in November, 1898, one Lawrence Shunk, was duly elected sheriff in Mercer county and thereafter and prior to the first Monday of January, 1899, received his commission from the governor and has qualified according to law, but that he was not voted for by the electors of said county to fill said interim of eight months; but that Shunk has nevertheless made demand upon the defendant for the surrender to him of said office which the defendant has refused. He further alleges that on State of Ohio ex rel. Kelly v. Thrall. the second day of January, 1899, the county commissioners of said county of Mercer appointed one James B. Shock, sheriff of said county of Mercer to enter upon the duties of said office and hold the same until the first Monday of September, 1899; and that pursuant thereto the governor commissioned Shock as sheriff, who duly qualified according to law and made demand on the defendant for the surrender to him of said office. Wherefore, the defendant, if not entitled to the office himself, is unable to determine to which of said demandants he should surrender the same. To this answer there is a general demurrer. In the State ex rel. the Attorney General v. Stallsmith, the petition alleges that the defendant was duly elected and commissioned to the office of sheriff at the general election in 1896, qualified and entered upon the office on the first Monday in January, 1897, for the period of two years to be completed on the first Monday of January, 1899; that at the general election in November, 1898, the defendant was chosen as his own successor in the office of sheriff of Perry county, but refused to qualify as such elected officer, averring and claiming that in consequence of said amended act he was entitled to hold the same during said interim by virtue of section 8 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, and praying that he be ousted from said office. Defendant Stallsmith answering admits the averments as to his several elections in November, 1896 and 1898 and alleges that he served the full term for which he was first chosen and that pursuant to his re-election in 1898 he qualified as such sheriff for his second term by giving bond to the satisfaction of the commissioners of said county and taking the oath of office which was endorsed |