Kihlken v. Kihlken et al. "her just claim," still it does not help the plaintiffs below. This very question here raised was disposed of in Fride v. Andrews, 51 Ohio St., 405. It was there held that "where an owner, during the pendency of a suit against him, and in view of a possible judgment being rendered adversely to him, conveys his property to another with intent to defeat the satisfaction of such judgment as may be recovered against him in the suit, he cannot, after judgment in such suit in his favor, have the aid of a court of equity to compel the grantee to reconvey to him the property." The fact that no suit is pending at the time of the conveyance cannot vary the application of the principle, where it was made to defeat the satisfaction of any claim that might be established against him. The fact of the conveyance having been made, may have dissuaded the girl from commencing any suit, just as was said in Pride v. Andrews, it may have caused the party to abandon his suit, rather than enter upon the task of pursuing the property. The case of Norton v. Blinn, 39 Ohio St., 145, much relied on, is not in point. There Norton as agent received from Blinn $500 to be invested in margins on wheat. He invested the money and made $395 and refused to account for the principal and what was made, on the ground that the transaction was an illegal one. The agent was required to account, on the ground that "it is contrary to public policy and good morals, to permit employees, agents or servants to seize or retain the property of their principal, although it may be employed in illegal business and under their control." In the case before us the defendant below was not acting in the capacity of agent for any one. The conveyance was made to and accepted State ex rel. Plimmer v. Poston et al. by her, in her own capacity and right; and not as a trustee or agent to transmit the title to some one else. If the application here claimed for Norton v. Blinn were admitted, it would result in overruling all the decisions heretofore made, denying any relief to one, making a conveyance to hinder and delay his creditors. The defendant below, by leave of the court, amended her answer, adding a prayer that her title to the property be quieted. We think she is entitled to the relief asked. Therefore, Judgment reversed; and judgment for the widow quieting her title. STATE EX REL. PLIMMER v. POSTON ET AL. Conduct of elections-Papers to secure nomination of candidatesSigners must pledge to support nominee—Act of April 8, 1898— Constitutional law. The requirement of section 7 of the act of April 8, 1898 (93 Ohio Laws, 93), that papers to secure the nomination of candidates for public offices "shall contain a provision to the effect that each signer thereto pledges himself to support and vote for the candidate or candidates whose nominations are therein requested," operating uniformly and impartially upon all classes of electors and interposing no unreasonable impediment to the exercise of the elective franchise, is valid. (Decided November 1, 1898.) IN MANDAMUS. The petition of the relator alleges that he is a qualified elector of Franklin county, Ohio; that defendants compose the board of election of the city of Columbus and are charged with the duties of deputy state supervisors of election of Franklin county. That on the nineteenth day of September, 1898, the State ex rel. Plimmer v. Poston et al. relator presented to the defendants a nomination paper signed by more than three hundred qualified electors of said county, containing a list of nominations for the several offices of said county to be filled at the general election in November, 1898, including the nomination of the relator for the office of county commissioner. The allegations of the petition show that the paper conforms in all respects to the acts of the general assembly to provide for the mode of conducting elections, et cetera, except that it does not comply with the requirement of section 7 of the amendatory act of April 8, 1898, 93 Ohio Laws, 93, that "such nomination papers shall contain a provision to the effect that each signer thereto thereby pledges himself to support and vote for the candidate or candidates whose nominations are therein requested." The petition shows that because the paper did not comply with the requirement of the statute in the respect indicated, the defendants refused to receive and file it and to have the names of said nominees printed on the ballots to be voted at said election. The defendants demurred to the petition, and for the purpose of final judgment admit that its allegations are true. F. M. Mecartney; G. T. Stewart and Mahlon Rouch, for plaintiffs. Brief of F. M. Mecartney. The relator admits that the party on whose ticket he desires his and said nominees' names to be printed did not poll one per cent. of the total vote at the next preceding general election in the state, as required by section 6, and has not secured the signatures to nomination papers, as required State ex rel. Plimmer v. Poston et al. by said section 7; but he maintains that both said sections are unconstitutional and void; and that the constitution guarantees to him and every other qualified elector of the state the right to be a candidate for office and to vote at all elections on equal terms, without regard to party affiliation; that he is denied the right to vote and to be a candidate for office at the next election by this action of said board of elections; and that he is without remedy at law. The act of the general assembly brought in question by this proceeding is sections 6 and 7 of the act commonly known as the Ballot Laws. It is here held that the foregoing sections are in direct contravention of section 1, article V, of the constitution of Ohio, as qualified and explained in section 1, article XIV and article XV, of the constitution of the United States; and section 26, article II, of the constitution of Ohio. The following provisions of the constitution of Ohio also have a bearing upon the question before us: 1. Preamble: "We the people;" 2. Section 2, article V; 3. Section 4, article V; 4. Section 5, article V; 5. Section 6, article V; 6. Section 4, article XV; 7. Section 2, article I; 8. Section 20, article I; 9. Section 1, article II. While the principles and rules applicable to the consideration of this case are perfectly familiar to this court, it may not be a work of supererogation to briefly state them here, in order that we may appear to order our argument in accordance with their requirements. First-The duty of the judiciary. C. W. & Z. Railroad Company v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St., 81; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch., 137. State ex rel. Plimmer v. Poston et al. Second-The conflict must be clear. This principle is too well founded in sound reason and has been too well established by an unbroken line of decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States down through our state courts to need further amplification. Hylton v. U. S., 3 Dallas, 371; Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dallas, 14; Fletcher v. Peak, 8 Cranch., 87; Mc Cormick v. Alexander, 2 Ohio, 65; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St., 573; State ex rel. v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St., 18; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St., 14; W. U. Telegraph Co. v. Mayer, 28 Ohio St., 521; Kendle v. State, 52 Ohio St., 346; Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass., 345; Wellington v. Petitioners, etc., 16 Pich., 95; City of Louisville v. Hiatt, 2 Mon., 178; Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 914; Ohio ex rel. v. Dudley, 1 Ohio St., 441. Third--The constitutionality of a law is determined by its application. State ex rel. v. Judges, 21 Ohio St., 1; State ex rel. v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St., 199. Fourth-The extent of legislative power. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 445; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 607; Evans v. Dudley, 1 Ohio St., 437; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137; Powers v. Bergon, 2 Seld., 358; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 386; Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 J. R., 735; People v. Platt, 17 J. R., 195; People v. Supervisors, etc., 4 Barb., 64; Benson v. Mayor of New York, 10 Barb., 223; People v. Edmonds, 15 Barb., 229; Hatch v. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co., 25 Vt., 49; R. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. and Bat., 451. Fifth--Special grant of power. As an instance of the extreme care of the people to secure to themselves the sacred rights to "alter, reform, or abolish their government, whenever they might deem it necessary," and to prevent the |