A most significant feature, both of the report and the Secretary of State's order, is not the contained matter, but the omitted. Not one word is said of the fact that the new Indian gold standard must seriously alter the value of money by increasing both the demand for gold and the reputation of gold money, so as to intensify the scramble for it in every land. This is the fundamental fact of the controversy and the root of all the trouble, whereby the nations of the world in their anxiety have been obliged to meet in repeated conferences, to issue commissions, to destroy free trade, and to upset the whole law of landcontracts in Ireland.

The committee, however, thinks that India will not require much gold and that the quantity needed can easily be supplied by the recent extension of gold-mining. Just at present the production of gold is enormous and has no doubt contributed to the recent rise in the price of goods; but the demand for gold is enormous, and the committee proposes to increase it still further, both by practice and example to other nations, doing all that is possible to make the world dependent for its money-supply on the hazard of mining a single metal. Professor Suess of Vienna, who is accepted as the highest authority on the future of the precious metals, has an admirable paper on this subject in the Volume of Appendices (C. 93766, p. 130).

"

He points out that the resources of civilization have carried gold-mining to the remotest regions and so improved it as to present the prospect of quickly-failing supplies and "hasten the approach of a universal economic danger. "In place of continued fluctuations," he says, "the whole production of the world tends to unite into one great wave, and consequently to hasten the end and increase the danger." For the near future, he thinks some new discoveries are reserved in the Kuenlun Range of China, in Central Africa, or Siberia; but the necessities of man will go on increasing, and the crisis will come when production begins to fail. "Perhaps America will in the meantime decide upon the

free coinage of silver and, setting up a monetary barrier right across the traffic of the world, will defer the crisis of gold." We make no apology for quoting at length the following conclusion of this great savant's memorandum :

"Germany has loosened the old tie of gold and silver without anticipating the consequences. In the long-run the profits have without merit fallen to the bondholders and the losses without any fault to the debtors. The holders of foreign securities in England are in the first line responsible to the world for the continuation of this state of monetary affairs, so perilous also for themselves. I know well that personal interest is a very strong item; but national interest is a stronger item and when national interest speaks personal interest must rest silent. But the interest of humanity is a stronger item still, and even if national interest should eventually point the other way, which I contend is not the case for England, the common interest of humanity must prevail. A great nation claiming to be a leading member of mankind must feel this as a duty."

Possibly Sir Samuel Montagu had not read this solemn warning when he said (Question 6644) to the committee, "You would do a service, I think, to Europe if you were to gradually utilize this extraordinary surplus of gold"that is to say, he wishes to increase the demand for gold. What will America think of such an opinion coming from one of London's chief bullion merchants? though we know there is no one less disposed to think, in the words of Professor Suess, "of subduing foreign nations by giving to each of their liabilities an ulcerating character."

This remark suggests some notice of the political difficulties which may arise when foreign nations understand that we have resolved to do all that is possible to hinder an international bimetallic agreement. The Americans, under careful political teaching, have learned that every nation is affected for good or evil by the money laws of other nations and that under the gold standard the value of money is increased by every new demand for gold, the value being the average quantity of goods which money will buy-that is to say, the price of goods falls and every debtor, except a gold-miner, has to sacrifice unjustly at lower prices more and more of what his farm or factory produces. The bargain, in fact, is altered against him,

and in favour of his creditors by the action of Government. There is thus less money available for wages, and though the labourer can live more cheaply under low prices, and can of late years, by well-organized union, force up wages to the highest possible limit, he is, nevertheless, a loser on the whole when prices are falling, because employment fails in the consequent depression of business. All these things are matters of common knowledge in the United States, and the people understand the evil in store for them from the Indian gold standard. They are friendly to us, but there are limits It is a mischievous mistake, for example, to suppose, and still worse to proclaim, as the Spectator does (December 17, 1898), that we may feel assured beforehand of America's help in extremity, "no matter what the cause of quarrel, or who is in the right." After what we have done in India, the United States will probably act with no special consideration for us in monetary legislation, not to speak of the Isthmian Canal and other subjects of controversy. A self-reliant and straightforward policy is much more likely to be adopted, especially if Mr. Bryan becomes President in 1900, as now seems increasingly probable. His views, therefore, deserve the earnest attention of all nations, and they are well expressed in a speech delivered by him at Louisville in last June with transparent honesty of purpose and surpassing oratorical power. He deals with the great political questions of territorial expansion, monopolies (trusts), and militarism, if we may use the word; but he puts the money question foremost, and

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says:

"I believe that independent action (on the part of America) will force international bimetallism, and that it is the only way that you will ever bring the nations of the old world to an international agreement. When our Commissioner goes over there, it will not be to petition; it will be to announce the purpose of the American people. He will tell them that (our) seventy millions of people have as much right to protect their property from depreciation as a handful of financiers have to legislate more value into the notes and bonds and mortgages they hold. He will tell them that, by the free and unlimited coinage of gold and silver at 16 to 1, we can maintain

Reported in the National Watchman, Washington D.C., June 8, 1899.

the parity between gold and silver; but he will say, If you people doubt it, just remember that you have a good deal of money loaned in the United States that is payable in coin, and that coin means either gold or silver; and remember that if we fail to maintain the parity, it will be because you men conspire to make one of the metals cheap, and if you conspire to decry the value of silver-if you conspire to make gold dearer merely because you want to increase the value of your dollar—we will punish you by paying you in the metal you make cheap, and thus give you an interest. Now, my friends, if we do that, we will bring the interests of the financial classes of Europe over to our side, and it is a great thing to have the financial classes on your side. I want to make it their interest to hold gold and silver together, instead of making it their interest to drive these metals apart."

Mr. Bryan might have added, what no one has ever disputed, that the failure of bimetallism would simply place the United States on a silver standard, a result which need not be feared, as it involves but one evil-an unsteady par of exchange with gold as against the immeasurable advantage of steady value which we have seen in the case of Mexico and India (Mr. Stephen A. Raili, Question 6310). We mean, of course, a high degree of steadiness in the valuation of goods.

Mr. Bryan, being a sound economist, a lawyer and a Free Trader, naturally refrains from a threat of retaliatory import duties against such nations as may refuse an agreement for international bimetallism; but, if America persists in keeping protective duties, it is difficult to see why they should not be thus used for the protection of money, the foremost item of trade, as it enters into every bargain. Before we have done with Mr. Bryan, we must note his significant adherence to the old coinage ratio of 16 to 1, for it is admitted by all authorities that the establishment of it in America, or even an attempted establishment, must enforce a re-opening of the Indian mints (Mr. Leonard Courtney, Question 13096), and upset the Indian valuation of sixteen pence now fixed for the rupee.

France also desires the old ratio, and though Mr. McKinley, in desperation, may possibly suggest the Indian ratio for an international agreement, it could not be adopted

in the face of such opposition. International bimetallists will therefore do well to decide between the old ratio and a gold standard, for there is probably no other possible choice, and to aid the efforts of Mr. Bryan's party which holds the key of the position.

The committee have omitted from their report another great difficulty connected, like almost all the others, with the altered value of money, for this is the very kernel of the question-"the whole thing," as Lord Aldenham told the committee. We refer to the loss brought upon the natives of India by the fall in value of their uncoined silver, set apart against times of distress. From the semi-official evidence an uninstructed person might believe that the natives either didn't hoard much uncoined silver, or somehow didn't mind the fall in its price. The truth is that few natives know enough to see that the closing of the mints has done the harm. Knowledge, however, may spread, and autocratic Governments should remember that outspoken revelations of discontent among subject races are generally kept back till a commission makes inquiry after some serious tumult. At the same time, we do not believe that this grievance, taken by itself, will ever be a serious political danger. It will merely add to the other great difficulties of our position. The same may be said of discontent among our feudatory native princes, several of whom have been induced to give up their rights of coining money. The official and semi-official witnesses would have us believe that the privilege was willingly surrendered by the chiefs; but persons who know the power, practically though not expressly possessed by the British political officers at the court of every native state, will not accept that view. Such an officer's suggestion, with a hint that it will be pressed, is equivalent to a command, and is obeyed, except in the greater states, with a polite expression of willingness. Who could expect a really willing surrender of what to Orientals is a principal symbol of sovereignty? In every Indian village the coins of the Great Mogul still