DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 20, 1860. 1 WASHINGTON: 1860. SPEECH. Mr. NOELL rose and said: 1. That the Federal Government is a compact between the States, not as organized State governments, but in their highest sovereign capacity as communities of people. 2. That the powers of the various departments of the Federal Government have been arranged with special reference to the reserved rights of the States and people, and means are thereby provided for the protection of both. 3. That in case of any attempted or actual infraction or violation of those rights, the protection, and remedy are to be sought through the means provided by the Constitution, and not by secession or nullification. 4. That in case all these remedies are appealed to and fail, and our grievances shall become so enormous that revolution and the overthrow of the Government are preferable to further submission, then we may resort to the ultima ratio of all people under every form of government—to overthrow by force the existing, and establish a new government to secure our safety and happiness. 5. That it is against the true policy of the South to dissolve the Union or secede from it; and that on the real question that divides parties, the South always did hold, and will continue to hold, under this Government, all the power necessary for her security, protection, and equality. I have already disclaimed on this floor, for myself and my constituents, the extreme views expressed by some of the gentlemen who are acting with the Democratic organization. That disclaimer was incidental and informal. Many gentlemen on this side of the House have, since then, with a zeal and ability worthy of a better cause, pressed those doctrines upon the country. If no attempt is made to meet them on the Democratic side, it might be construed into an admission that they were part of the Democratic creed. In order that the country may not be misled, I will now, in a more formal manner, attempt to place before the House my opinions on these vital questions, and sustain them with the best reasoning I can command. Sir, the dogma that each State, and the people of each State, are to be the solo and exclusive judge to determine when the rights of a State or her citizens have been violated by the Federal Government, and that such State is to determine the mode and measure of redress for such violation, in the sense for which it is contended here, is, in my opinion, a fatal heresy. It is, in my judgment, founded on a misapprehension of the true theory of the national Government, and its adequacy to protect the rights of the States and the people. Sir, I maintain the true theory of the Federal Government to be, that within the scope of its powers, it is the government of each and every one of the States, as fully and completely as each separate State government within the scope of the reserved powers is the government of such State. Each is gupreme within its own sphere. The State has no more right to encroach upon the rights and prerogatives of the Federal Government than has the Federal Government the right to encroach upon the rights and prerogatives of the State government or the people. They are co-ordinate departments of the same system—the one invested by the conjoint sovereignties of all the States with national powers; the other invested by the separate sovereignty of the particular State with all other powers of government. The adoption of the national Constitution by all of the States, operated to that extent as an amendment or change of each State constitution, by which certain powers before that time vested in the State authorities, were referred to, and vested in, the national Government. The General Government is no less a State government, for all the States within its sphere of powers, than is each State government the government of the particular State. This proposition is established in two ways : First, by the mode of its formation ; second, by the peculiar features of the Government itself. As to the mode of its formation. It was not framed by the then existing organized State governments. The then existing organized State governments could only act by their then constituted authorities-by their Legislatures and by their executives. If the States had acted through their existing organizations in framing the Federal Government, the result could not have been à Government, but a treaty or league. Such treaty or league, according to the laws of nations, may always be entered into by independent sovereigns through their constituted authorities. But then such league could only affect them as States. It would not reach the individuals of which the State is composed. Therefore, this plan of league was repudiated for most obvious reasons. The people of each State, acting in their highest sovereign capacity, independent of the State constitutions already existing, and by an authority paramount to, and which created such constitutions, met in convention, by their representatives; pot as a solid mass of the whole people, without reference to the States, but as the people of the several States, and framed the Constitution of the Federal Government. Such was Mr. Jefferson's understanding. Mr. Jefferson says, volume 1, page 78: “ The sandamental defect of the Confederation was, that Congress was not authorized to act immediately on the people, and by its own officers. Their power was only requisitory, and these requisitions were addressed to the several Legislatures, to be by tbem carried into execution, without other coercion than the moral principle of duty." Acting in this high sovereign capacity, they withdrew from the State authorities the exercise of certain sovereigo powers, and vested the same in the General Government. So much for the mode of its formation. I come now to the second ground of proof-that is, the peculiar features of the Government. First. This body, which represents all the people of a whole Union by a system of equal representation, is intended to embody the national sentiment as a whole. Here all revenue measures must originate. Here the Executive, in any attempt to encroach on the rights of the people as a nation, is held at arms' length. No ambitious scheme can be carried out by the Executive without the consent of the people's Representatives here, who hold the purse strings. In this body, too, when a contingency happens, (that no candidate for President receives a majority of all the electoral votes,) must the election of that officer be made. And how, sir ? Not in our usual form of deciding by a majority of members, but by giving to each State, great and small, an equal weight. In a country so diversified as ours, having our North and South, our East and West, our various and conflicting interests, it is not probable that an intensely sectional President would ever be elected by this House, when three candidates are brought before it. Here is a great conservative principle, intended to protect the States. It was placed there by design, in order to provide against some of the evils which many of us now so seriously apprehend, not the least of which is the election of a sectional President. We come to the Senate, the peculiar representative of State sover. eignty. No law can be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the States represented in the Senate. The popular branch may pass what laws they please through their own body. Perhaps the Representatives of five or six large States, if they were identified'in interest, might get a bill through here destructive of the rights and interests of the other States; but when it goes over to the Senate, it meets the representatives of the States, a majority of whom must agree to it before it can become a law. This body likewise holds a check on the Executive. It must not only agree to all revenue measures before they become laws, but, sir, no treaty with foreign nations is of any validity till ratified by a majority of the States. The great public functionaries of the Government appointed by the Executive must be confirmed by the Senate, so conservative in its character. Next we take the Executive. He represents a mixed basis of State and popular sovereignty, and when his election is brought to the House he represents the people in their capacity of citizens of the several equal States, each having equal power in his election. While conservative elements enter into his election, he is at the same time guarded by co-ordinate departments of the Government still more conservative. He is sworn to support the Constitution and armed with the veto power. This power is not creative—therefore its exercise never has an active operation to bring forward or carry through bad or unjust laws--but is negative. The power of the veto is to protect against hasty or unconstitutional legislation. Last, though not least, we come to the Federal judiciary. Its constitution is peculiar. The judges are nominated by the President himself, representing both people and States through the form of his election. But still they cannot be judges until they are confirmed in the Senate by a majority of the Staten. Thus it will be seen that the judges of the Federal judiciary are, by the mode of their appointment, placed in an eminently conservative position. When once appointed, they are far above the influence or reach of either the executive or legislative departments. They hold their offices for life. They are placed in that independent position that no motives can exist for bending to either executive or legislative control. When the people of the several States, acting in their highest sovereiga capacity, framed and adopted this Constitution, entered into this compact, they provided for their own protection in the peculiarities with which they invested its various departments. All voluntarily agreed, in their highest sovereign capacity, that this Government should perform certain national functions which, before that time, these same several communities of sovereign people had confided separately to their several State governments. Such being the theory of our Government, the question arises, when there is a conflict of jurisdiction between the Federal and State governments, who is to decide the boundary line of that jurisdiction. On the one hand it is contended that each State must determine this question for itself; on the other hand it is contended that such construction would render the General Government utterly powerless to perform its functions. If the Federal Union is a mere league or treaty between independent sovereignties, then the former construction would undoubtedly be correct, but, at the same time, would be precisely such an arrangement as existed under the old Articles of Confederation. Now, I bave already stated that the States, by and through their then existing organizations, did not create the Federal Union, but that the people of the several separate States, in their sovereign character, framed the Government, and provided, in the balances of its rarious departments, and its conservative State-rights features, for their own joint and several protection. It remains only to inquire what the people of the several |