volved in this legislation. We are in no way attempting to amend the laws of nature and God. We are not endeavoring to put women in or out of the home, in or out of offices.

We seek a reasonable range of choices for women. We would in no way try to divide the sexes. In fact, we are convinced that sex discrimination disables both men and women and can only be eradicated by their mutual concern, respect, and effort. We agree with Lord Tennyson that:

The women's cause is man's: They rise or sink together.

The National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc., has no illusion that the equal rights amendment will irrevocably remove all the inequities practiced against women. We seek specific legislative goals and we have testified in the 91st Congress on amending the social security law; providing the Equal Employment Commission with adequate enforcement authority; adding sex to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in Federal programs or activities; providing the Civil Rights Commission with the power to study and report on sex discrimination; adding educational institutions to the employment discrimination prohibition in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; amending the Equal Pay Act of 1963 to include administrative, executive, and professional positions.

This week, we will testify in support of amending the Fair Labor Standards Act to include private household workers under minimum wage coverage.

What specific goal would the equal rights amendment accomplish? The equal rights amendment would effectively prevent passage of any State or Federal laws discriminating between men and women on the basis of sex alone. Significantly, the amendment would invalidate current State laws which restrict the contractual and property rights of married women, and remove those ambiguities, uncertainties, and prohibitions regarding a married woman's right to use her own name or choose her domicile.

For example, 11 States restrict married women's contractual capacity; in three States a married woman does not have the legal capacity to become a surety or a guarantor; in four States a wife cannot, without court consent, and in some cases her husband's consent, enter into an independent business; in only 11 States can women choose, like men, to work overtime-regardless of their need or desire. The list goes on. In four community property States a working wife has no say over how her income is spent. A married woman can run for office where she lives regardless of her husband's domicile in only eight States. In 43 States a married woman's jury service depends on her husband's domicile. In only five States can a married woman establish a separate domicile for all purposes. In 22 States women can be excused from jury service on grounds not available to men. In one State women can sit on a jury only when courthouse facilities permit, and in another State, only after registering for service.

Mr. Chairman, these facts and others are covered in detail in tne "1969 Handbook on Women Workers," published by the U.S. Department of Labor, and by Mr. Leo Kanowitz in his book, "Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution."

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However, I believe they constitute only the tip of the iceberg. Actually, we know very little about sex discrimination laws at the State level and there seems to be no department or agency of government that is completely current on these. Formerly with a larger staff, the Department of Labor fulfilled that function. They no longer provide a full statement on each State as before. One of the real pressing needs is for extensive and intensive analysis of these laws. We are happy to see that a collection of those laws has been commenced by this committee.

I would like to omit the following testimony as it has already been given.

I might add that the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recently adopted a uniform marriage and divorce act providing for alimony for either spouse, maintenance, child support for both spouses in accordance with their means, and custody of children based on the welfare of the child. All of which seems eminently reasonable and in accordance with the equal rights amendment.

There is also the question of Federal social security benefits. Might these be affected if the equal rights amendment became the law of the land? We hope so. Special provisions for dependent wives, now a part of the law, might have to be reconsidered, although there is no certainty that these would become illegal. In actual fact, the social security law is badly weighted at this time against working wives in favor of dependent wives. However, some valid, sensible suggestions to provide more equitably for both have been suggested by "The Report of the Task Force on Social Insurance and Taxes" to the Citizen's Advisory Council of the Status of Women, April 1968. BPW has recommended serious study of this very problem in testimony to this Congress last fall.

Indeed, there are other inequities in the social security law which discriminate directly against men-I use the term directly since discrimination against working wives necessarily affects husbands. This law discriminates against men: (1) as to the computation of their benefits based on age 65 retirement even if they choose an earlier retirement, and (2) as to special dependency requirements made of men but not women.

This should be changed. Is it fair to a husband and wife that she should work, accrue survivor benefits, yet on her death the benefits are not available to him? BPW has long urged removal of these inequities and we would hope that the passage of the equal rights amendment would require a total reevaluation of our current social security legislation.

The possible revocation by the equal rights amendment of State labor laws undoubtedly disturbs some of you, as your letters to us indicate. I turn to that issue now.

A summary of State labor laws for women was published March 1969 by the U.S. Department of Labor. These laws establish maximum daily or weekly working hours, require certain lunch and rest periods and seating facilities, establish weight-lifting limitations, restrict the kinds and places of employment.

Mr. Chairman, the term "protective" no longer applies to this kind of legislation. At one time special labor regulations for women were protective because these were the only labor laws on the books; there

were no Federal or State laws protecting a worker as to the hours of employment, wages due, or health and safety working conditions. The movement for special labor legislation for women was encouraged by the famous Muller case in which the Supreme Court upheld Oregon's 10-hour day limitation on working hours for females only, after 3 years before invalidating a New York statute limiting working hours of bakery employees of both sexes to 10 hours a day.

Today, however, the sweatshop conditions, the dawn-to-dusk hours, the subsistence level pay are to a large degree sins of the past. Judicious legislation and courageous labor organization have helped to amend that situation. I would think labor organizations would be the first to call attention to this fact. Women do not today need protection against oppressive conditions which have ceased to exist. They need the same things men workers need: broad coverage by Federal wage and hour legislation; adequate guarantees against occupational hazards, the right to apply for any job based on individual capacity, the right to take special training, managerial training programs—in a word, equal opportunities.

Today State labor laws for women impose additional considerations for the employer who hires women; they give him an adequate reason for paying women less for the same work, or refusing to hire a woman who must have a 30-minute lunch hour, who must have special seating arrangements, or must depart from the factory without a minute of illegal for her overtime regardless of her own financial needs and/ or choice.

Increasingly this view of State legislation for women is being adopted. On March 5, 1970, Illinois Bell Telephone filed a suit against the Illinois director of labor regarding the Illinois Maximum Hours Act. A similar suit was filed at the same time by Caterpillar Tractor Co., also a large employer of women.

Illinois Bell took that opportunity to explain that such hours legislation for women is discriminatory and means "that if overtime work becomes necessary-at premium pay-it is available to men but not to women, even on identical jobs. Neither can women be promoted or assigned to jobs which regularly require extended hours of work."

On March 25, 1970, the Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, issued the following opinion on this Federal City's "8 Hour Law for Females."

I will omit that if you put that in my testimony.

Special female labor legislation operates to prevent millions of women from competing on equal terms with men; they prevent women from providing for themselves and their dependents with the proper support and care. Yet women are working today because they must.

Through special labor legislation for women, employers have been able to deny these women jobs, promotions, seniority benefits, wage increases, and overtime; to prevent these women from being hired, promoted, transferred. Often employers prefer to give overtime to men who are already at the maximum deductible earnings for social security, thus the employer does not contribute more whereas with women he would have to do so.

Special hours legislation protected his interest, not that of the women employees. This means these women are also denied maximum pensions. They loose the chance to pay into social security the pay

ments necessary for maximum pensions while their company pension, based on their earnings, is affected also. These same women may be forced to hold down two jobs instead of one since hours legislation affects employer, not employee.

We must ask, then, whom does such legislation protect? The men who get the jobs unavailable to women due to the hours of work or weight-lifting requirements or special conditions of employment? If the protections imposed by this labor legislation are so good, we see no reason why they should not cover all workers, not only women.

In fact, were the equal rights amendment adopted such legislation would be either nullified or extended to include men. If what the poor need, as one eminent sociologist has pointed out, is more money in their pocket-why should poor women accept a substitute? Why should they accept maximum hours, no overtime, no lifting of certain amounts of weight, when what they need and want is more cash in their pockets, more food and housing and education for their families?

In the Bowe case, Thelma Bowe and others sued the Jeffersonville, Ind., plant of Colgate-Palmolive on the grounds that they were being excluded from better paying jobs on the excuse that these jobs required the lifting of 35 pounds or more and that women had to be "protected" from such work. The women lost their first round in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, but that decision was reversed in their favor September 26, 1969, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh District. BPW did enter an amicus curiae in that case.

Evidently Thelma Bowe and the women who joined in the suit did not think they were being "protected," nor did Leah Rosenfeld, who applied for a position as "agent-telegrapher" with Southern Pacific Co. only to find that California laws and weight-lifting regulations prevented her advancement to a position she sought. Passage of the equal rights amendment would open doors for these women. Hours and other restrictions for women alone are not only unreasonable but also fundamentally inconsistent with title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This title prohibits employment discrimination on account of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. An exception is made whenever sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) necessary to the normal operation of a particular business or enterprise.

There is an irreconcilable conflict between the sex discrimination provisions of title VII and State labor regulations for women. In August 1969, the EEOC, after earlier assuming a possible valid purpose for these laws, reversed itself and concluded that these laws which "prohibit or limit the employment of females" as to certain occupations, nightwork, maximum weekly hours of work, weightlifting regulations tend to discriminate rather than protect."

Increasingly women are testing the validity of these laws since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination by sex. The State attorneys general in six States-South Dakota, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Oklahoma-have said they will not enforce hours laws for women in view of that conflict. In the Rosenfeld and the Richards case two Federal district courts have rendered decisions against State protective laws-Oregon and Cali

fornia. The hours laws and weight-lifting regulations were deemed superseded by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

I will not read the Commissioner's conclusions.

He did conclude, however, that to the degree the 8-hour law results in adverse discrimination, by denying to women employment opportunities available to males, it is superseded by title VII. Thus for all practical purposes the Minimum Wage and Industrial Safety Board, which enforces this legislation, has determined that the hours law for women is superseded by title VII.

We believe if any of these cases reaches the Supreme Court that body will determine that all such special labor legislation just for women irreconcilably conflicts with title VII and thus is void. We need passage of the equal rights amendment, however, to speed the process, more than that, to help insure the end result; namely, nullification of special labor legislation for women alone; assurance that labor legislation will affect workers regardless of sex.

We hope this Congress will pass the historic legislation-the equal rights amendment enabling women to assume their full rights and responsibilities.

(The complete prepared statement of Mrs. Easterling, above referred to, follows:)

TESTIMONY PRESENTED ON THE PART OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL WOMEN'S CLUBS, INC., BY RUTH MOSS EASTERLING, NATIONAL PRESIDENT

Mr. Chairman, I am honored and pleased to be here today representing The National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc. and our 180,000 working women. I am Mrs. Ruth Moss Easterling, National President. I have with me Mrs. Lucille Shriver, Federation Director and Dr. Phyllis O'Callaghan, Legislation Director.

For those on the Committee who are not familiar with our organization and therefore might not be aware of whom we represent, our organization is composed of 53 federations representing the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Any working woman may belong to our organization and therefore we represent women who are teachers, secretaries, consultants, doctors, lawyers, salesladies, clerks, government workers, nurses, housekeepers, beauticians, and hundreds of other occupations. These women are married, single, divorced, widowed; they are mothers and grandmothers.

Our members adopt a legislative platform at our annual National Convention, following proposals made by the states, by our Legislation Committee and by our Legislative Platform Committee (the latter representing all 53 of the federations).

Thus, we do not approach legislation lightly, without profound consideration and the assent of the representatives of all our members. When we testify before the Congress we have the assent of that whole membership for we are confined to the items actually on our legislative platform. We were first organized in 1919 and we have supported the Equal Rights Amendment since the 1930's.

With the support of 180,000 working women, then I appear before you today to re-affirm our dedication to the Equal Rights Amendment which reads: Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.

This Amendment has passed the House of Representatives in the form of H.J. Res. 264 and is embodied essentially in S.J. Res. 61. We oppose the substitute proposed by Senator Ervin, S.J. Res. 231.

In all candor we cannot accept S.J. Res. 231 as a "substitute" for the House passed bill or for S.J. Res. 61. We feel that since S.J. Res. 231 explicitly provides so many exceptions to the original declaration of equality before the law of the sexes, it would serve no purpose. It guarantees nothing except the con