to recover sums deducted and retained
by them in respect of such tax, and
paid over to the commissioners. Udney
v. The East India Company, 733.

INFANT.

See HABEAS CORPUS.

INSURANCE.

I. Insurable Interest.
Advances for Repairs and Disburse-
ments.]-A vessel having put into a
foreign port in a damaged state, the
master borrowed money of a merchant
there, for necessary repairs and dis-
bursements; to secure which, he drew
bills upon his owner, and also executed
an instrument which purported to be an
hypothecation of the ship, cargo, and
freight. By this instrument, the mer-
chant who advanced the money forbore
all interest beyond the amount neces-
sary to insure the ship to cover the
advances; and the master took upon
himself and his owner the risk of the
voyage, making the money payable at
all events, and subjecting the ship to
seizure and sale by virtue of process
"out of Her Majesty's High Court of
Admiralty of England, or any Court of
Vice-Admiralty possessing jurisdiction
at the port at which the said vessel
might at any time happen to be lying,
or to be, according to the maritime law
and custom of England," in the event
of the bills being refused acceptance, or
being dishonoured :-

Held, that, this not being such an
hypothecation as could be enforced in
the court of Admiralty,-the payment
of the money borrowed not being made
to depend upon the arrival of the
vessel, the merchant had no insurable
interest in the ship. Stainbank v.
Shepard, 418.

II. Effect of Adjustment.

To a declaration on a policy of assur-
ance, alleging a partial loss, the defend-
ant pleaded, that, before action brought,
the proportional sum which the defend-
ant was liable to pay, was by agreement
settled and adjusted at a certain rate;
that the amount payable by the defend-
ant in respect of the loss was thereby
liquidated and ascertained to be a cer-
tain sum; and that, at the commence-
ment of the suit, the plaintiff was, and
still remained, indebted to the defend-
ant in an amount exceeding the amount
so ascertained for premiums of assur-
ance upon policies before effected by
the plaintiff with the defendant, which
amount the defendant was willing to
set off against the amount so settled
and ascertained as aforesaid :—

Held, bad on demurrer,-the action
being, notwithstanding the adjustment,
an action for unliquidated damages.
Luckie v. Bushby, 864.

INTEREST.
See DEVISE, 3.

INTERPLEADER.

1. The statute 8 Ann. c. 14, s. 1,
which prohibits the taking in execution
of goods without satisfying the land-
lord's claim for rent, does not apply
unless the goods are actually removed.
White v. Binstead, 304.

2. Under a fi. fa. against A., the
sheriff seized the goods of B. B.
claiming them, the sheriff obtained an
order under the interpleader act, and
C., the landlord, claimed 251. for a
quarter's rent. The goods were sold
under the order, and the amount, after
deducting the 257., was paid by the
sheriff into court. On the trial of the
issue, B. established his claim :-Held,

that, under the circumstances, the
sheriff was not justified in paying the
rent. Ib.

IRISH JUDGMENT.
How pleaded.

To a declaration upon a judgment
obtained in one of the superior courts
in Ireland, against an incorporated
company in England, the defendants

-

pleaded, that they were not served
with any summons or process issuing
out of the Irish court, in the action
in which the judgment was obtained,
and that the plaintiff, irregularly, and
behind the backs of the defendants,
caused an appearance to be entered for
the defendants in that action, and
thereby obtained the judgment, when
the defendants were not within the juris-
diction of the said court, and had not
been served with any summons or other
process to appear to the action:-Held,
that the plea was bad, inasmuch as it
did not distinctly allege that the de-
fendants did not know of the summons
in the Irish court, or that they did not
appear thereto. Sheehy v. The Pro-
fessional Life-Assurance Company,787.

ISSUE.

See DEVISE, 2.

JOINT-STOCK COMPANY.
See RAILWAY COMPANY:

JOINT-TENANTS.

Of a Chattel.

Where two or more who are jointly
interested in a chattel, deposit it with
a stranger, a demand by one in his own
name only, and not on behalf of all,
will not entitle such one to maintain
detinue for it. Atwood v. Ernest, 881.

JUDGE'S ORDER.

For Payment of Money.

In trover by the plaintiffs as church-
wardens, to recover possession of a
book belonging to the parish, a verdict
was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to
a special case. Upon the argument of
the special case, the court directed a
nonsuit. The case was afterwards
turned into a special verdict, and, upon
the argument, it was agreed "that the
judgment of the court below should
stand, and the select vestry be at an
end; the costs of both sides to be paid
out of the parish funds." This agree-
ment was embodied in an order of
Erle, J., which was afterwards made
a rule of court.

Difficulties arising in carrying out
this order, the court of error awarded
a venire de novo; and, upon the cause
again coming on for trial, an order of
nisi prius was drawn up, by consent,
referring it to Williams, J., to deter-
mine the cause and all matters relating
to it, with power to direct in what
manner the order (and rule thereon) of
Erle, J., was to be carried into effect.

In August, 1852, Williams, J., made
an order directing the defendants to
pay to the plaintiffs on the 1st of
March, 1853, the sum of 735l. 5s. 5d.
(the amount at which the plaintiffs'
costs had been taxed), "unless in the
meantime the said sum be paid to the
plaintiffs out of the funds of the parish."

This last-mentioned order having
been made a rule of court, and the
money not having been paid, the plain-
tiffs issued an execution thereon, under
the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18:-

Held, that the order of Williams, J.,
was not an award, but a judge's order,
and made with competent authority:
but, that, being conditional, it was not

one upon which an execution could
issue at once, in pursuance of the sta-
tute. Gibbs v. Flight, 803.

JUDGMENT.

See COMMON LAW PROCEDure Act.

LABOURER.
See TRUCK ACT.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. Constructive Occupation.
In an action for use and occupation,
the undersheriff told the jury that "a
constructive occupation" was sufficient
to entitle the plaintiff to recover,-
without telling them what was a con-
structive occupation:- Held, a mis-
direction. Towne v. D'Heinrich, 892.

II. Duration of Tenancy.
In trespass for breaking and entering
the plaintiff's close, the plaintiff relied
upon the bare possession, though it ap-
peared that he had originally become
possessed as tenant to one W. under
a written agreement. The defendant
proved, that, five days after the com-
mencement of the trespass, he obtained
a lease of the close in question from
W., which he produced. The judge
told the jury, that, in the absence of
proof of the quantum of the plaintiff's
interest in the premises (by the pro-
duction of the written agreement), he
was only entitled to nominal damages :
-Held, no misdirection. Twyman v.
Knowles, 222.

III. Notice to quit.

A demand of rent accruing subse-
quently to the expiration of a notice to
quit, is not necessarily a waiver of the
notice: it is a question of intention,

which must be left to the jury. Blyth
v. Dennett, 178.

IV. Year's Rent under 8 Ann. c. 14,
s. 1.

The statute 8 Ann. c. 14, s. 1, which
prohibits the taking in execution of
goods without satisfying the landlord's
claim for rent, does not apply unless
the goods are actually removed. White
v. Binstead, 304.

LARCENY ACT.

See NOTICE OF ACTION.

LETTERS-PATENT.

Assignment of Licence,-See PLEAD-

ING, III.

LIBEL.

Privileged Communication.
The defendant, who had lodged in
the house of the plaintiff, conceiving
that he had whilst there lost certain

documents, and imagining that the
plaintiff had abstracted them from a
box in which he had kept them, wrote
a letter to the plaintiff's wife, stating
his loss, and his suspicions, in language
seriously reflecting upon the character
of the plaintiff, and intimating, that,
unless the plaintiff should think proper
to return them, he would expose him :
-Held, that the occasion did not
justify the writing of the letter, so as
to make it a privileged communication,
and that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover, although the jury negatived
malice. Wenman v. Ash, 836.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
I. Evidence of Payments, to take a
Case out of the Statute of Limita-
tions.

Accounts of a deceased Person.]—In
an action by the executor of the payee

against the maker, upon a promissory
note more than six years overdue, the
plaintiff, in order to take the case out
of the statute of limitations, produced
a book in which he had, in the years
1844 and 1847 respectively, at the re-
quest of the testatrix, entered two
payments as for interest due upon the
note, which she told him she had re-
ceived from the defendant: - Held,
admissible evidence, as entries against
the interest of the party making them.
Bradley v. James, 822.

II. Proviso as to Contracts made by
Persons abroad, in the 21 Jac. 1,

c. 16, s. 7.

The proviso in favour of persons
under disabilities, in the 21 Jac. 1, c.
16, s. 7, applies as well to foreigners
who have never been in this country, as
to parties residing abroad at the time
of the accruing of the cause of action
and returning afterwards to England.
Lafond v. Ruddock, 813.

A replication to a plea of the statute
of limitations stated, that, at the re-
spective times when the causes of
action accrued, the plaintiff was in
parts beyond the seas, &c., and that he
afterwards returned from the said parts
beyond the seas into this kingdom, and
which was his first return into this
kingdom from the said parts after the
said causes of action accrued, and that
he commenced the suit within six years
next after his said first return into this
kingdom.

The court refused to allow, in addi-
tion to a traverse (under the 15 & 16
Vict. c. 76, s. 81), a rejoinder that the
plaintiff was and is a Frenchman born
in France, and was domiciled there at
the time of the accruing of the causes
of action, and which said causes of
action respectively first accrued to the

plaintiff in France; that more than six
years before the commencement of this
suit, the plaintiffs recovered judgments
against him in France, in respect of the
same causes of action, whereby ac
cording to the law of France the causes
of action were merged and extinguished
in the said judgments; and that the
defendant had been domiciled and
resident in England for more than six
years from the date and recovery of
the said judgments,-on the ground
that, so far as it related to the judg-
ments recovered in France, the re-
joinder was a departure from the plea;
and, as to the rest, that it was no
answer to the replication, for the rea-
son above stated. Ib.

III. In Debt on Statute, for Railway
Calls.

An action of debt by a railway com-
pany against one of its members, for
calls, under the companies clauses con-
solidation act (8 & 9 Vict. c. 16), and
the special act (8 & 9 Vict. c. cxxii), is
an action founded upon a statutory
liability; and therefore a plea "that
the action is founded upon contracts
without specialty, and that the alleged
causes of action did not, nor did any or
either of them, accrue within six years
before the suit," is a bad plea,—the
proper limitation to such an action
being twenty years, by the 3 & 4 W.
4, c. 42, s. 3. The Cork and Bandon
Railway Company v. Goode, 826.

LONDON SMALL DEBTS ACT.
Suggestion to deprive Plaintiff of Costs
under 15 & 16 Vict. c. lxxvii, s. 119.

The 119th section of the London
small debts extension act, 15 & 16 Vict.
c. lxxvii, is not repealed by the 120th
section, the latter provision not being
necessarily inconsistent with the

former, the combined effect of the
two being, that, if the plaintiff, in an
action on contract in the superior court,
for which a plaint might have been
entered in the local court, recovers 20l.,
and not more than 501. (or less than 51.
in tort) a suggestion may be entered
to deprive him of costs; but that, if he
recovers less than 207. in an action on
contract (not being an action for breach
of promise of marriage), or less than
51. in trespass, trover, or case (not
being an action for malicious prosecu-
tion, libel, slander, criminal conversa-
tion, or seduction), he loses his costs
absolutely, unless the judge certifies
under the 121st section. Castrique v.
Page, 458.

LUNATIC ASYLUM.
Contract by Committee of Justices, for
Plans, &c.

1. A declaration in assumpsit against
the defendant, sued as clerk to a com-
mittee of visitors appointed pursuant
to the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126, for the regu-
lation, &c., of a county lunatic asylum,
stated that it was agreed by and be-
tween the plaintiff and the committee
of visitors, that, in consideration that
the plaintiff would render his services
as an architect in examining the site
for a proposed lunatic asylum, and
preparing the requisite probationary
drawings for the approval of the com-
mittee of visitors, and all other draw-
ings and documents required to be sub-
mitted to the commissioners in lunacy,
and afterwards to the secretary of state,
pursuant to the statutes, and subse-
quently would prepare the whole of the
working-drawings, estimates, and speci-
fications for an asylum to contain two
hundred patients, the committee agreed
that the sum of 4371. 10s. should be paid

to the plaintiff. The declaration then
alleged that the plaintiff did render his
services in examining the site, and did
prepare the requisite probationary draw-
ings for the approval of the committee,
and had always been ready and willing
to prepare all other drawings and docu-
ments required to be submitted to the
commissioners in lunacy, and secretary
of state, and subsequently to prepare
the whole of the working-drawings,
estimates, and specifications,—of which
the committee had notice; but that
they refused to permit him to complete
the agreement, and wrongfully dis-
charged him from the further perform-
ance thereof.

Second plea, that the plaintiff did
not prepare the requisite probationary
drawings in the count mentioned :-
Held, that the term "probationary
drawings," meant drawings to be ap-
proved of, by the committee, and, if
approved of then to be submitted to
the commissioners in lunacy and secre-
tary of state; and consequently that
the plea was proved, it appearing, that,
although certain drawings had been
submitted to the committee, none had
been approved by them. Moffatt v.
Dickson, 543.