over in favour of the children of the
testator's son. Darley v. Martin, 683.
2. Estate-Tail.]-A testatrix, seised
in fee of certain copyhold heredita-
ments, by her will, dated the 22nd of
May, 1826, devised as follows:-"I give
and bequeath unto my granddaughter
Mary Anne, the house and land, with
all the rights and appurtenances be-
longing thereto, situate at R. ;" and,
after a bequest to her of a sum of 2001.
due on a bond, she proceeded as fol-
lows," But, in the event of the said
Mary Anne dying without having any
lawful issue, it is my will that the said
house and lands, and the said 2007., do
revert to the survivor or survivors of
my other granddaughters, to be divided.
between them share and share alike:"
-Held, that Mary Anne took an es-
tate-tail in the realty, and an absolute
interest in the 2001. Cole v. Goble, 445.
3. Interest due on Mortgage.]-Tes-
tator gave to A. "all my interest and
claim on household property in W., on
which I have a mortgage of 1500l. :"-
Held, that this entitled A. to the ar-
rears of interest due upon the mort-
gage at time of the testator's death.
Gibbon, App., Gibbon, Resp., 205.
And see COPYHOLD.
Notice of,-See BILL OF EXCHANGE, I.
DRAWINGS.
See LUNATIC ASYLUM.
DUPLICITY.
See PLEADINGS, VI.
See MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.
Breach of Duty imposed by Statute,-
See CASE, I, 4.
I. Action for Mesne Profits.
Judgment in Ejectment.]-A judg-
ment for the lessor of the plaintiff in
ejectment, is not conclusive evidence
of the plaintiff's title, in trespass for
the mesne profits, with a plea of not
possessed, where such judgment is not
replied by way of estoppel. Matthew
v. Osborne, 919.
II. Amendment of Demise in, under
3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 23.
In ejectment on a joint demise by H.
W. and M. his wife, the proof was,
that the property had been devised to
H. W. in trust for the sole and sepa-
rate use of M. The judge having de-
clined to allow the declaration to be
amended, by striking out the name of
the wife, on the ground that the pro-
posed amendment was not warranted
by the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 23,-Held,
that the amendment was properly re-
fused. Doe d. Wilton v. Beck, 329.
By deceased Persons,-See EVI-
ESTATE-TAIL.
See DEVISE, 2.
ESTIMATES.
See LUNATIC ASYLUM.
ESTOPPEL.
See EJECTMENT, I.
I. Confidential Communications.
An attorney is not bound to produce,
or to answer any questions concerning
the nature or contents of, a deed or
other document intrusted to him pro-
fessionally by his client: and the judge
has no right to look at the instrument,
to see if the objection to produce it or
disclose its contents be well founded or
not.
Volant v. Soyer, 231.
II. Secondary Evidence.
A paper which an attorney, on ex-
amination as a witness, admits to have
been delivered out of his office as a
copy of a deed, but which he states
he is unable of his own knowledge to
vouch to be a copy,-is not admis-
sible as secondary evidence, upon the
attorney's refusal to produce the ori-
ginal. Ib.
III. Entries by deceased Persons.
In an action by the executor of the
payee against the maker, upon a pro-
missory note more than six years over-
due, the plaintiff, in order to take the
case out of the statute of limitations,
produced a book in which he had, in
the years 1844 and 1847 respectively,
at the request of the testatrix, entered
two payments as for interest due upon
the note, which she told him she had
received from the defendant:-Held,
admissible evidence, as entries against
the interest of the party making them.
Bradley v. James, 822.
IV. Presumption of Fraud.
In an action by the indorsee against
the acceptor of a bill of exchange, in
order to raise a presumption that the
plaintiff had received the bill fraudu
lently and without value, evidence was
offered to shew that the defendant had
been defrauded of it, that one H., the
person from whom the plaintiff re-
ceived it, had, in the year 1847, stood
in the dock at the Old Bailey, that he
retired thence, and was seen no more
at large for eighteen months, and that
the plaintiff had admitted that he "had
known H. for a considerable time:"
Held, no evidence to go to the jury,
that the plaintiff was aware of H.'s
conviction or disreputable character.
Berry v. Alderman, 674.
[Upon a second trial, the defend-
ant obtained a verdict upon both issues,
and retained it. Ed.]
EXCESSIVE DISTRESS.
See CASE, III.
On Judge's Order under 1 & 2 Vict.
c. 110, s. 18.
In trover by the plaintiffs as church-
wardens, to recover possession of a
book belonging to the parish, a verdict
was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to
a special case. Upon the argument of
the special case, the court directed a
nonsuit. The case was afterwards
turned into a special verdict, and, upon
the argument, it was agreed "that the
judgment of the court below should
stand, and the select vestry be at an
end; the costs of both sides to be paid
out of the parish funds." This agree-
ment was embodied in an order of
Erle, J., which was afterwards made a
rule of court.
Difficulties arising in carrying out
this order, the court of error awarded
a venire de novo; and, upon the cause
again coming on for trial, an order of
nisi prius was drawn up, by consent, re-
ferring it to Williams, J., to determine
the cause and all matters relating to it,
with power to direct in what manner
the order (and rule thereon) of Erle, J.,
was to be carried into effect.
In August, 1852, Williams, J., made
an order directing the defendants to
pay to the plaintiffs on the 1st of
March, 1853, the sum of 1735l. 5s. 5d.
(the amount at which the plaintiffs'
costs had been taxed), "unless in the
meantime the said sum be paid to the
plaintiff's out of the funds of the
parish."
This last-mentioned order having
been made a rule of court, and the
money not having been paid, the plain-
tiffs issued an execution thereon, under
the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18:-
Held, that the order of Williams, J.,
was not an award, but a judge's order,
and made with competent authority:
but, that, being conditional, it was not
FEME COVERT.
Rights and Liabilities of.
The plaintiff, a married woman,
bought, with moneys earned by her
partly before and partly during cover-
ture, railway stock, in her own name,
and was registered as the proprietor
thereof:-Held, that, inasmuch as she
might be joined with her husband in an
action against the company for dividends
due
upon the stock, she might (subject
to be met by a plea in abatement) main-
tain an action for the same in her own
name. Dalton v. The Midland Coun-
ties Railway Company, 474.
See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, II.
one upon which an execution could at Effect of, on Covenant,-See HUSBAND
once issue, in pursuance of the statute.
Gibbs v. Flight, 803.
Disbursements by.
Repairs.]-At the time of the testa-
tor's death, certain debts were due in
respect of repairs done in his life-time
to certain mortgaged premises. These
were paid by the executrix :-Held,
that she was not entitled to be reim-
bursed by the person to whom the
premises so mortgaged to him were
devised, the sums so paid. Gibbon,
App., Gibbon, Resp., 205.
EXECUTORY BEQUEST.
See DEVISE, 1.
EXECUTORY CONTRACT.
See SHIPPING, I.
FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE.
See BANKRUPT, II.
GENERAL WORDS.
In a Deed, limited by particular
Recitals.
General words in a release are to be
limited and restrained by the particular
words in the recitals. Boyes v. Bluck,
652.
HABEAS CORPUS.
The court granted a writ of habeas
corpus, at the instance of the father of
an infant between seven and eight
years of age, commanding the mother
(from whom the applicant was divorced)
and her father to bring the infant into
court, without any previous demand.
Ex parte Diedrich Witte, 680.
HABENDUM.
Office of-See SHIPPING, I, 2.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
I. Liability of Husband for Neces-
saries supplied to the Wife.
In an action for goods supplied to a
married woman, the proper question to
leave to the jury is, not simply whether
the goods were necessaries suitable to
the station in life of the party, but
whether, upon the facts proved, the
Midland Counties Railway Company,
474.
III, Separation Deed procured by
Fraud on the Part of the Trustee.
1. In covenant upon a separation-
deed, by which B., the husband, cove-
nanted to pay to A., as trustee for the
wife, certain quarterly payments,—B.
pleaded, that he was induced to make
the indenture, and to covenant as in the
declaration mentioned, through and by
means of certain false and fraudulent
wife had authority, express or implied, misrepresentations of A. by him made
to bind her husband by her contracts.
Reid v. Teakle, 627.
II. Wife's Right to Separate Estate.
1. A married woman deposited with
the defendant the savings of certain
rents of leasehold property which had,
on her marriage, been conveyed by her
with the consent of the intended hus-
band, to trustees, upon trust to pay or
permit her to receive the rents &c. to
her sole and separate use :-Held, that,
the trust being discharged on the rents
coming to the wife's hands, the trustees
ceased to have any interest in or control
over them; and that, upon the wife's
death, her husband was entitled to bring
an action, in his own right, to recover
the money so deposited. Bird v.
Peagrum, 639.
2. The plaintiff, a married woman,
bought, with moneys earned by her
partly before and partly during cover-
ture, railway stock, in her own name,
and was registered as the proprietor
thereof:-Held, that, inasmuch as she
might be joined with her husband in
an action against the company for divi-
dends due upon the stock, she might
(subject to be met by a plea in abate-
ment) maintain an action for the same
in her own name. Dalton v. The
to B.,-that is to say, by A., before and
at the time of the making of the inden-
ture by B., falsely and fraudulently
representing that E., the wife of B.,
was a virtuous and moral person, and
that he, A., was a virtuous and moral
person, and fit to be trustee for her for
the purposes of the indenture, whereas
in truth E. was not, nor was A., a
virtuous and moral person, &c.; that
A. had then treacherously, &c., seduced
the said E., so then being the wife of A.,
and subsequently to the marriage,-
which last-mentioned facts A. before
and at the time of the making of the
indenture suppressed and concealed
from B.; that A. so fraudulently pro-
cured B. to make the indenture, in
order that he, A., might seduce away
the said E, from B., and might harbour
and have access to her for the purpose
of continuing the adulterous inter-
course; and that B. was induced to
make the indenture in the declaration
mentioned, and to covenant as therein
alleged, through and by means of the
said false and fraudulent misrepresen-
tations of the plaintiff, and by reason
of the suppression and concealment as
aforesaid of the premises so suppressed
and concealed as in the plea mentioned,
and in ignorance thereof, and not
otherwise.
The jury having found this plea
proved,-Held, on motion for judgment
non obstante veredicto, that the plea
sufficiently shewed the deed to be so
tainted with fraud as to be incapable of
being enforced in a court of law; and
that the plea might be sustained as a
general plea of fraud, notwithstanding
the absence of a direct averment that
A. knew, at the time he seduced E.,
that she was the wife of B. Evans v.
Edmonds, 777.
2. And, held, that it was no answer
to this defence, that the plaintiff was
suing as a trustee, whose cestui qui
trust was not shewn to have been party
to the fraud alleged on the record. Ib.
3. And, semble (per Maule, J.), that
it made no difference whether A. falsely
asserted to be true that which he knew
to be false, or merely asserted that to
be true of the truth or falsehood of
which he had no knowledge. Ib.
Publication.]-Addressing a letter
to a wife, containing matter reflecting
on her husband, is a publication.
Wenman v. Ash, 836.
HORSE-RACE.
Liability of Steward.
One who gratuitously accepts the
office of steward of a horse-race, is not
responsible for a loss resulting to one
who enters a horse for the race, from
his mere nonfeasance in omitting to
appoint a judge,-at all events, unless
it appears that he has actually entered
upon the duties of the office. Balfe v.
West, 466.
HYPOTHECATION.
See SHIPPING, II.
ILLEGAL DISTRESS.
See CASE, III.
IMMORALITY.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, III.
Annuity payable out of a Fund in
India.
The Bengal Civil Service Annuity
Fund, is a fund formed in India, under
the sanction of the East India Com-
pany, by the subscriptions of their civil
servants upon the Bengal establish-
ment, augmented by contributions
from the company; and a civil servant
who has regularly subscribed to the
fund, and retires after the regular
period of service, becomes entitled to
receive thereout an annuity of 10,000
rupees. The fund is invested in India,
and managed there by a committee of
nine, four of whom are officially con-
nected with the government.
By an arrangement with the com-
pany, the annuitants have the option
of receiving their annuity in India,
from the managers of the fund, or of
being paid at the East India House in
London, at the rate of 2s. per sicca
rupee, the company being in that case
provided out of the fund with moneys
for the purpose of making the pay-
The plaintiff, a retired civil servant,
entitled to a pension of 1000l. a year,
whose permanent residence was in
France, elected to receive his annuity
in London :--
Held, that the annuity was not sub-
ject to income-tax, under the 5 & 6
Vict. c. 35, not being payable out of
any fund in England; and that he
might maintain an action for money
had and received against the company
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