over in favour of the children of the testator's son. Darley v. Martin, 683. 2. Estate-Tail.]-A testatrix, seised in fee of certain copyhold heredita- ments, by her will, dated the 22nd of May, 1826, devised as follows:-"I give and bequeath unto my granddaughter Mary Anne, the house and land, with all the rights and appurtenances be- longing thereto, situate at R. ;" and, after a bequest to her of a sum of 2001. due on a bond, she proceeded as fol- lows," But, in the event of the said Mary Anne dying without having any lawful issue, it is my will that the said house and lands, and the said 2007., do revert to the survivor or survivors of my other granddaughters, to be divided. between them share and share alike:" -Held, that Mary Anne took an es- tate-tail in the realty, and an absolute interest in the 2001. Cole v. Goble, 445.
3. Interest due on Mortgage.]-Tes- tator gave to A. "all my interest and claim on household property in W., on which I have a mortgage of 1500l. :"- Held, that this entitled A. to the ar- rears of interest due upon the mort- gage at time of the testator's death. Gibbon, App., Gibbon, Resp., 205.
And see COPYHOLD.
Notice of,-See BILL OF EXCHANGE, I.
DRAWINGS.
See LUNATIC ASYLUM.
DUPLICITY.
See PLEADINGS, VI.
See MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.
Breach of Duty imposed by Statute,- See CASE, I, 4.
I. Action for Mesne Profits. Judgment in Ejectment.]-A judg- ment for the lessor of the plaintiff in ejectment, is not conclusive evidence of the plaintiff's title, in trespass for the mesne profits, with a plea of not possessed, where such judgment is not replied by way of estoppel. Matthew v. Osborne, 919.
II. Amendment of Demise in, under
3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 23.
In ejectment on a joint demise by H. W. and M. his wife, the proof was, that the property had been devised to H. W. in trust for the sole and sepa- rate use of M. The judge having de- clined to allow the declaration to be amended, by striking out the name of the wife, on the ground that the pro- posed amendment was not warranted by the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 23,-Held, that the amendment was properly re- fused. Doe d. Wilton v. Beck, 329.
By deceased Persons,-See EVI-
ESTATE-TAIL. See DEVISE, 2.
ESTIMATES.
See LUNATIC ASYLUM.
ESTOPPEL.
See EJECTMENT, I.
I. Confidential Communications. An attorney is not bound to produce, or to answer any questions concerning the nature or contents of, a deed or other document intrusted to him pro- fessionally by his client: and the judge has no right to look at the instrument, to see if the objection to produce it or disclose its contents be well founded or not. Volant v. Soyer, 231.
II. Secondary Evidence.
A paper which an attorney, on ex- amination as a witness, admits to have been delivered out of his office as a copy of a deed, but which he states he is unable of his own knowledge to vouch to be a copy,-is not admis- sible as secondary evidence, upon the attorney's refusal to produce the ori- ginal. Ib.
III. Entries by deceased Persons.
In an action by the executor of the payee against the maker, upon a pro- missory note more than six years over- due, the plaintiff, in order to take the case out of the statute of limitations, produced a book in which he had, in the years 1844 and 1847 respectively, at the request of the testatrix, entered two payments as for interest due upon the note, which she told him she had received from the defendant:-Held, admissible evidence, as entries against the interest of the party making them. Bradley v. James, 822.
IV. Presumption of Fraud. In an action by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, in order to raise a presumption that the plaintiff had received the bill fraudu lently and without value, evidence was offered to shew that the defendant had been defrauded of it, that one H., the
person from whom the plaintiff re- ceived it, had, in the year 1847, stood in the dock at the Old Bailey, that he retired thence, and was seen no more at large for eighteen months, and that the plaintiff had admitted that he "had known H. for a considerable time:"
Held, no evidence to go to the jury, that the plaintiff was aware of H.'s conviction or disreputable character. Berry v. Alderman, 674.
[Upon a second trial, the defend- ant obtained a verdict upon both issues, and retained it. Ed.]
EXCESSIVE DISTRESS. See CASE, III.
On Judge's Order under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18.
In trover by the plaintiffs as church- wardens, to recover possession of a book belonging to the parish, a verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to a special case. Upon the argument of the special case, the court directed a nonsuit. The case was afterwards turned into a special verdict, and, upon the argument, it was agreed "that the judgment of the court below should stand, and the select vestry be at an end; the costs of both sides to be paid out of the parish funds." This agree- ment was embodied in an order of Erle, J., which was afterwards made a rule of court.
Difficulties arising in carrying out this order, the court of error awarded a venire de novo; and, upon the cause again coming on for trial, an order of nisi prius was drawn up, by consent, re- ferring it to Williams, J., to determine the cause and all matters relating to it, with power to direct in what manner
the order (and rule thereon) of Erle, J., was to be carried into effect.
In August, 1852, Williams, J., made an order directing the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs on the 1st of March, 1853, the sum of 1735l. 5s. 5d. (the amount at which the plaintiffs' costs had been taxed), "unless in the meantime the said sum be paid to the plaintiff's out of the funds of the parish."
This last-mentioned order having been made a rule of court, and the money not having been paid, the plain- tiffs issued an execution thereon, under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18:-
Held, that the order of Williams, J., was not an award, but a judge's order, and made with competent authority: but, that, being conditional, it was not
FEME COVERT.
Rights and Liabilities of.
The plaintiff, a married woman, bought, with moneys earned by her partly before and partly during cover- ture, railway stock, in her own name, and was registered as the proprietor thereof:-Held, that, inasmuch as she might be joined with her husband in an action against the company for dividends due upon the stock, she might (subject to be met by a plea in abatement) main- tain an action for the same in her own name. Dalton v. The Midland Coun- ties Railway Company, 474.
See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, II.
one upon which an execution could at Effect of, on Covenant,-See HUSBAND
once issue, in pursuance of the statute. Gibbs v. Flight, 803.
Disbursements by. Repairs.]-At the time of the testa- tor's death, certain debts were due in respect of repairs done in his life-time to certain mortgaged premises. These were paid by the executrix :-Held, that she was not entitled to be reim- bursed by the person to whom the premises so mortgaged to him were devised, the sums so paid. Gibbon, App., Gibbon, Resp., 205.
EXECUTORY BEQUEST. See DEVISE, 1.
EXECUTORY CONTRACT. See SHIPPING, I.
FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE. See BANKRUPT, II.
GENERAL WORDS.
In a Deed, limited by particular Recitals.
General words in a release are to be limited and restrained by the particular words in the recitals. Boyes v. Bluck, 652.
HABEAS CORPUS.
The court granted a writ of habeas corpus, at the instance of the father of an infant between seven and eight years of age, commanding the mother (from whom the applicant was divorced) and her father to bring the infant into court, without any previous demand. Ex parte Diedrich Witte, 680.
HABENDUM.
Office of-See SHIPPING, I, 2.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. I. Liability of Husband for Neces-
saries supplied to the Wife.
In an action for goods supplied to a married woman, the proper question to leave to the jury is, not simply whether the goods were necessaries suitable to the station in life of the party, but whether, upon the facts proved, the
Midland Counties Railway Company, 474.
III, Separation Deed procured by Fraud on the Part of the Trustee. 1. In covenant upon a separation- deed, by which B., the husband, cove- nanted to pay to A., as trustee for the wife, certain quarterly payments,—B. pleaded, that he was induced to make the indenture, and to covenant as in the declaration mentioned, through and by means of certain false and fraudulent
wife had authority, express or implied, misrepresentations of A. by him made
to bind her husband by her contracts. Reid v. Teakle, 627.
II. Wife's Right to Separate Estate. 1. A married woman deposited with the defendant the savings of certain rents of leasehold property which had, on her marriage, been conveyed by her with the consent of the intended hus- band, to trustees, upon trust to pay or permit her to receive the rents &c. to her sole and separate use :-Held, that, the trust being discharged on the rents coming to the wife's hands, the trustees ceased to have any interest in or control over them; and that, upon the wife's death, her husband was entitled to bring an action, in his own right, to recover the money so deposited. Bird v. Peagrum, 639.
2. The plaintiff, a married woman, bought, with moneys earned by her partly before and partly during cover- ture, railway stock, in her own name, and was registered as the proprietor thereof:-Held, that, inasmuch as she might be joined with her husband in an action against the company for divi- dends due upon the stock, she might (subject to be met by a plea in abate- ment) maintain an action for the same in her own name. Dalton v. The
to B.,-that is to say, by A., before and at the time of the making of the inden- ture by B., falsely and fraudulently representing that E., the wife of B., was a virtuous and moral person, and that he, A., was a virtuous and moral person, and fit to be trustee for her for the purposes of the indenture, whereas in truth E. was not, nor was A., a virtuous and moral person, &c.; that A. had then treacherously, &c., seduced the said E., so then being the wife of A., and subsequently to the marriage,- which last-mentioned facts A. before and at the time of the making of the indenture suppressed and concealed from B.; that A. so fraudulently pro- cured B. to make the indenture, in order that he, A., might seduce away the said E, from B., and might harbour and have access to her for the purpose of continuing the adulterous inter- course; and that B. was induced to make the indenture in the declaration mentioned, and to covenant as therein alleged, through and by means of the said false and fraudulent misrepresen- tations of the plaintiff, and by reason of the suppression and concealment as aforesaid of the premises so suppressed and concealed as in the plea mentioned,
and in ignorance thereof, and not otherwise.
The jury having found this plea proved,-Held, on motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, that the plea sufficiently shewed the deed to be so tainted with fraud as to be incapable of being enforced in a court of law; and that the plea might be sustained as a general plea of fraud, notwithstanding the absence of a direct averment that A. knew, at the time he seduced E., that she was the wife of B. Evans v. Edmonds, 777.
2. And, held, that it was no answer to this defence, that the plaintiff was suing as a trustee, whose cestui qui trust was not shewn to have been party to the fraud alleged on the record. Ib. 3. And, semble (per Maule, J.), that it made no difference whether A. falsely asserted to be true that which he knew to be false, or merely asserted that to be true of the truth or falsehood of which he had no knowledge. Ib.
Publication.]-Addressing a letter to a wife, containing matter reflecting on her husband, is a publication.
Wenman v. Ash, 836.
HORSE-RACE. Liability of Steward.
One who gratuitously accepts the office of steward of a horse-race, is not responsible for a loss resulting to one who enters a horse for the race, from his mere nonfeasance in omitting to appoint a judge,-at all events, unless it appears that he has actually entered upon the duties of the office. Balfe v. West, 466.
HYPOTHECATION. See SHIPPING, II.
ILLEGAL DISTRESS.
See CASE, III.
IMMORALITY.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, III.
Annuity payable out of a Fund in India.
The Bengal Civil Service Annuity Fund, is a fund formed in India, under the sanction of the East India Com- pany, by the subscriptions of their civil servants upon the Bengal establish- ment, augmented by contributions from the company; and a civil servant who has regularly subscribed to the fund, and retires after the regular period of service, becomes entitled to receive thereout an annuity of 10,000 rupees. The fund is invested in India, and managed there by a committee of nine, four of whom are officially con- nected with the government.
By an arrangement with the com- pany, the annuitants have the option of receiving their annuity in India, from the managers of the fund, or of being paid at the East India House in London, at the rate of 2s. per sicca rupee, the company being in that case provided out of the fund with moneys for the purpose of making the pay-
The plaintiff, a retired civil servant, entitled to a pension of 1000l. a year, whose permanent residence was in France, elected to receive his annuity in London :--
Held, that the annuity was not sub- ject to income-tax, under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, not being payable out of any fund in England; and that he might maintain an action for money had and received against the company
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