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proved as alleged. The statement is, that "one Stephen Stringer, who was before in the habit of dealing with the plaintiff in his said trade on credit, refused any longer to do so, and refused to deliver to the plaintiff certain goods which the plaintiff had purchased of the said Stephen Stringer, until the plaintiff had paid for them." Stringer said he was about to execute an order for the plaintiff, but that he declined to do so in consequence of the statement of the defendant. It was not suggested that there was any binding contract, which could have been enforced against Stringer. The amount of damages was for the consideration of the jury; and I think it is impossible to say that these words spoken of a man in trade did not justify them in awarding compensation to the extent of 150%. I think there should be no rule.

WILLIAMS, J. I also think there should be no rule; although, if the words proved had not been actionable without special damage, I should have thonght the rule ought to go, because the question of damages was left at large to the jury, without telling them to limit it to the probable loss resulting from the non-execution of Stringer's order. The question, therefore, resolves itself into this, whether or not the words proved were actionable in themselves, without special damage. I think they were. To say of a tradesman,-" if he does not come and make terms with me, I will make a bankrupt of him, and ruin him,"-must necessarily be highly prejudicial to him in his business. The words are clearly defamatory in their nature: and there is no pretence for disturbing the verdict.

TALFOURD, J. I am of the same opinion. The words proved were clearly actionable without special damage. When one says of a trader, "If he does not settle with

me, I will make him a bankrupt," that necessarily implies that he has the power to carry his threat into execution.

JERVIS, C. J. I think I was wrong in this case. I told the jury that the questions for their consideration were, whether the words were spoken, whether the damage alleged resulted from the speaking of them, and what damages the plaintiff was entitled to,-and that this would depend upon Stringer's evidence. I think I was wrong in so limiting it. The jury, however, have set that right and I agree with the rest of the court in thinking that there is no ground for disturbing their verdict.

:

1853.

BROWN

v.

SMITH.

Rule refused.

RAMSDEN v. SKIPP.

May 6.

DEBT for goods sold and delivered. The venue was The court in

laid in London. On the 24th of March, 1853, an order was made by Platt, B., at chambers, at the instance of the defendant, to change the venue from London to Gloucestershire, upon the common affidavit "that the plaintiff's cause of action, if any, arose in the county of Gloucester, and not in the city of London, or elsewhere

out of the said county of Gloucester."

On the 6th of April, the defendant pleaded never indebted; and, on the 16th, application was made by the plaintiff to Maule, J., at chambers, to change the venue from Gloucester to Middlesex, where it was alleged the delivery of the goods took place. The learned judge, however, declined to interfere, but referred the party to the court.

clined to think

that the affidavit in support of an application for a spechange the venue,

cial order to

since

the new rule of

Hilary Term,

1853, r. 18, must be found

ed

upon an affidavit dis

closing special

circumstances.
[But see the
next two cases,
from which it
seems that the
common affi-

davit, if un-
answered, will
suffice.]

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1853.

RAMSDEN

v.

SKIPP.

Ball, on a former day in this term, moved for a rule nisi to rescind the order of Platt, B., and to change the venue from Gloucestershire to London, upon an affidavit stating "that the cause of action did not arise in the said county of Gloucester either wholly or in part, but in the county of Middlesex, and not elsewhere out of the said last-mentioned county, except so far as the same may have partly arisen in the said city of London, the said goods having been purchased by the defendant of the plaintiff within the said city; that the witnesses in the plaintiff's behalf in this cause reside in London or the immediate neighbourhood thereof; and that considerable additional expense will be incurred, should the trial of this cause take place in the county of Gloucester, instead of the city of London or county of Middlesex." [Williams, J. Why did you not answer the matter before my Brother Platt?] The attorney was under an impression that the 18th rule of Hilary Term last, which provides that "no venue shall be changed without a special order of the court or a judge, unless by consent of the parties," required that special grounds for changing the venue should be laid before the judge, as was formerly the case where the application to change the venue was made after issue joined. [Jervis, C. J. If you have made a mistake, you must at all events pay for it.] A rule nisi having been granted,

Atherton now shewed cause. The order of Mr. Baron Platt was made without any substantial resistance on the part of the plaintiff. He now comes with a sort of double appeal against that order, and against the refusal of Maule, J., to interfere with it. The plaintiff, by applying to Mr. Justice Maule, not to rescind the former order, but to change the venue to Middlesex, must be taken to have acquiesced in the decision of Platt, B. And the affidavit now presented to the court shews no

ground for changing the venue from the county of Gloucester. It should at least be made to appear that the convenience preponderates greatly in favour of a trial in Middlesex. [Cresswell, J. Does not the new rule require something more than the common affidavit? I think I should not act upon it.]

Ball, in support of the rule. Issue not having been joined, the special order could not be made. [Atherton. That is an objection to the order of Platt, B.; and it is too late for the plaintiff to object to that, he having since taken a step.] [Jervis, C. J. Does the plaintiff's affidavit shew that the cause would be more conveniently tried in Middlesex?] It shews that all the witnesses reside in Middlesex, and that great additional expense would be incurred by a trial in Gloucestershire.

JERVIS, C. J. I am of opinion that the first alternative of this rule,—to rescind the order of my Brother Platt, should be made absolute. That order seems to be vulnerable upon two points. In the first place, when the old course of proceeding was abolished, it was intended that the special order should be made with reference to what was to be tried. As at present advised, I think the special order cannot be obtained until after issue joined; and that the same circumstances which under the old practice justified the special application to change the venue, apply to the special order under the new rule. Further, I think my Brother Platt took an erroneous view of the matter. rule never intended that the special order to change the venue should be granted upon the common affidavit, which would render necessary another application to bring back the venue. When the rule speaks of a special order, it must mean an order founded upon an affidavit of the special circumstances. The mere formal affidavit,

The new

1853.

RAMSDEN

V.

SKIPP.

1853.

RAMSDEN

V.

SKIPP.

according to my present impression, does not comply with the new practice. I think the application should be made upon an affidavit of the special circumstances, and after issue joined. I think there is no foundation for the suggestion that the plaintiff is estopped by his supposed acquiescence in my Brother Platt's order, from now applying to rescind it. My Brother Maule seems to have treated the application to him as an appeal from my Brother Platt's order. I think the rule should be made absolute to rescind that order.

The rest of the court concurring,

Rule absolute accordingly. (a)

(a) The rule suggested in the principal case having been qualified by the two following

cases, it has been thought convenient to insert them here.

Nov. 23.

Where a defendant is un

der terms to take short

notice of trial, he cannot move to change the venue, upon the common

CLULEE V. BRADLEY.

THE declaration (for goods sold and delivered, goods bargained and sold, and money found due upon an account stated,) in this case was delivered on the 29th of October, the venue being laid in Middlesex. On the 7th

of November, an order was made by Williams, J., giving the defendant four days' time to plead, "pleading affidavit. Nor upon an issuably, rejoining gratis, and taking short notice of affidavit merely stating, in ad- trial, if necessary, for the sitting after this term."

dition to the usual allega

tion that "the plaintiff's cause of action, if

On the 8th, the defendant took out a summons calling upon the plaintiff to shew cause why the venue should

not be changed from Middlesex to the Warwick division

any, arose in the county of W. (to which it was sought to change the venue), and not in M. (the original county), or elsewhere out of the said county of W.,"-that both parties, and the witnesses on both sides, reside in the county to which it is sought to change the venue.

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