ralized aliens, otherwise qualified, have the right to vote under a provision of this character. The controversy is as to the meaning of the term "inhabitant," when used in this connection. Does it embrace the idea of citizenship? In Spragins vs. Houghton, [3 Ill. 377,] it was held that the question of citizenship does not enter into the qualification of a voter in such a case, and the question is there discussed at great length and with much ability. And this doctrine is sustained by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Stewart vs. Foster, [2 Binn. 110.]

§ 44. In Howard College vs. Gore, [5 Pick 370;] the Supreme Court of Massachusetts express a different view of the meaning of the word inhabitant. The question there was as to what constitutes an inhabitant of a county, within the meaning of the statute for taking the probate of Wills and granting administration on the estates of persons deceased "being inhabitants of or residents in, the same county at the time of their decease." And the Court in construing this statute say: "The term inhabitant, as used in our laws and this statute, means something more than a person having a domicil It imports citizenship and municipal relations, whereas a man may have a domicil in a county to which he is alien, and where he has no political relations." And see opinion of Fudge Cushing's Election Cases, 120 Malden's Case 1b, 377

§ 45. Notwithstanding the conflict of authority above referred to, it seems very manifest that where the term "inhabitant" is used especially in describing the qualifications of voters, it does not mean the same thing as citizen. It must be conceded that

while the two terms may to a certain extent mean the same thing, the term citizen has a more extensive signification than the term inhabitant, and it is therefore entirely fair to presume that when the framers of a law intend to express this larger meaning, they will use the larger term.

§ 46. The Constitution of Pennsylvania requires, among other qualifications of a voter, that he shall have resided one year in the State, "and in the election district where he offers to vote, ten days immediately preceding such election."

It was held in McDaniel's case [3 Pa, Law Journal 310, Brightley's Election Cases 238,] that an election district was any part of a city or county, having fixed boundaries within which the citizens residing therein must vote, as for example a ward in the city of Philadelphia. It was also held that a person who removed from one election district to another, within the ten days immediately preceding an election, lost his right to vote in the district removed from, and did not gain a right to vote at that election in the district removed to. The right to vote in the former does not continue until the same right is acquired in the latter, but is lost as soon as the removal is complete. There is therefore always a period following a change of residence, during which the citizen has no right to vote at any place. It is often laid down as a general proposition that in case of a removal by a person from one place to another, his first residence is not lost until the second is acquired. And this is true for some purposes, but not for the purpose of determining the right of such

person to vote.

That right ends in the place re

moved from, as soon as the voter completes his removal. It is acquired in the place removed to, only after such a residence therein as the law requires, and as no man can have two residences at the same time, it follows that he cannot acquire the right to vote in the new, by residing there, until he has ceased to have a residence in the old.

§ 47. A statute providing that "when two persons shall have an equal number of votes, the returning officer shall have the casting vote, but shall not vote in any other case whatsoever" is a constitutional and valid statute. (State vs. Adams, 2 Stewart, [Ala.] 231, Brightley's Election Cases, 286.) It is well settled that a citizen by accepting an office may waive a constitutional privilege. The constitution of each Slate grants the right of suffrage to all electors, and no elector can be deprived of this right otherwise than as prescribed by law. But the citizen can refuse to exercise this privilege, and he may also relinquish it for a time, in order to secure to himself a greater advantage, and therefore he may waive his right to vote, in common with other citizens, to secure the honors and emoluments of an office, and the power to give the casting vote in case of a tie.

§ 48. At common law voting by proxy is unknown, and every vote, whether given by a stockholder of a corporation, or by a freeman for his representative, must be personally given. A corporation may, however, by a provision in its charter, provide for voting by proxy, though it is to say the least, very doubtful whether a provision in the by-laws of a corporation, providing for voting by proxy, could be upheld. Upon this general subject see the following authori

ties: State vs. Tudor, 5 Day, 219. Taylor vs. Griswold, 2 Green, [N. 7.] 223. Angell & Ames on Corp. Chap. 4, 57. Brown vs. Commonwealth, Brightley's Election Cases 282. Phillips vs. Wickham, 1 Paige 598.

§ 49. In most of the States electors are privileged from arrest, except for treason, felony or breach of the peace, during their attendance upon the election, and in going to and returning from the same. This privilege does not cease when the elector deposits his ballot, but it seems that he has a right to remain at the polls or near them until they are closed, and to plead his constitutional privilege if arrested while thus engaged. In Swift vs. Chamberlain, [3 Connecticut, 537,] it was held that an elector who, after depositing his vote, retired to a public house in the neighborhood, while the election officers were counting the votes, was "attending on the business of the election," and therefore privileged from arrest on civil process. As to what amounts to a breach of the peace, within the meaning of the Constitutional provisions referred to, see Mr. Brightley's note to the case of Swift vs. Chamberlain, supra, Brightley's Election Cases, page 280.

§ 50. The vote of an idiot, or person non compos mentis, ought not to be received, and if such a person has voted, his vote may be rejected upon a contest, without a finding in lunacy. Thompson vs. Ewing, (1 Brewster, 68-9.) But the vote of a man otherwise qualified, who is neither a lunatic nor an idiot, but whose faculties are merely greatly enfeebled by old age, is not to be rejected. (Sinks vs. Reese, 19 Ohio, State R 307.) When a vote is attacked on the ground that the voter who cast it was non compos

mentis, it is necessary to establish satisfactorily, by competent evidence, the alleged want of intelligence, and the test would probably be about the same as in cases where the validity of a will is attacked on the ground that the testator was not of sound mind, when it was executed. If the voter knew enough to understand the nature of his act, if he understood what he was doing, that is probably sufficient.

§ 51. By the terms of the treaty of peace of 1848, between the United States and Mexico, it was provided that the inhabitants of the territories annexed to the United States, and detached from Mexico, might elect to remain citizens of Mexico, by making known such election within one year from the date of the treaty, but the manner of making such election was not prescribed either by the treaty or by any act of Congress. Held, that a declaration in writing, signed by persons so electing to remain Mexican citizens, and filed in one of the Courts of the territory of New Mexico, in pursuance of a proclamation from the Governor of the territory, was sufficient, and that the persons signing such declaration remained citizens of Mexico, and could, after making such declaration, become citizens of the United States, only by the ordinary process of naturalization, and that the votes of such persons for delegate in Congress were illegal, and should be rejected. Oltero vs. Gallegos, [1 Bartlett, 177.]

§ 52. Persons residing within the bounds of an Indian Reservation, in the Territory of Dakota, have no right to vote at an election for delegate in ConBut it is otherwise with persons residing gress. within the limits of a Military Reservation. It was