cy. That the term ballot implies secrecy, and that this mode of voting was adopted mainly to enable each voter to keep secret his vote, is clear. (Cushing on Leg. Asssmblies, Sec. 103. May's Constitutional History of England, Vol. 1, p 353. People vs. Pease, 27 N. Y., 45. Cooley's Const. Lim., 604. Temple vs. Mead, 4 Vt., 535.)

§ 414. A statute of Indiana provided, that in an election to determine the question whether a county subscription should be made to aid in constructing a railroad, the form of an affirmative ballot should be "for the railroad appropriation." At an election held under this statute, ballots were cast which had printed or written upon them only the words "for the railroad." This was held to be an irregularity which would not affect the election. (R. R. Co. vs. Bearss, et al, 39 Ind., 39.)

§ 415. Where a statute authorizes an election to be held by a county, city, or township, for the purpose of determining a given question—as for example, whether such municipality shall subscribe to the stock of a railroad company—and where such statute points out no mode for conducting such election, it has been held that it should be conducted in the manner prescribed by law for other elections by the same body. For example, if an election in a township is held for such a purpose under a statute silent as to the manner of proceeding, it should be held in the manner township elections are required to be held, in the election of their town officers, and not under the general election laws of the State. (People vs. Dutcher, 56 Ill., 144.) The doctrine of this case is that where the legislature authorizes a town

ship or other corporate body to hold an election, and has prescribed no mode, it is to be presumed that it was designed to authorize it to be conducted in the manner usually adopted and authorized by the laws governing the action of the body.

CHAPTER VIII.

VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION.

§ 416. If it clearly appear that the fairness, purity or freedom of an election has been materially interfered with by acts of violence, intimidation, or armed interference, such election should be set aside. Slight disturbances frequently occur, and are often sufficient to alarm a few of the more timid, without materially affecting the result or the freedom of the election. The true rule is this. The violence or intimidation should be shown to have been sufficient either to change the result, or that by reason of it the true result cannot be ascertained with certainty from the returns. To vacate an election on this ground, if the election were not in fact arrested, it must clearly appear that there was such a display of force as ought to have intimidated men of ordinary firmness. (Harrison vs. Davis, 1 Bartlett, 341. Bruce vs. Loan, Ibid, 482.)

§ 417. In Harrison vs. Davis, the committee say in their report: "It (the specification,) nowhere makes the formal allegation that the law requires,

either that the election was arrested and broken up in every ward, or that so many individuals were excluded by violence and intimidation as would, if allowed to vote, have given the contestant the majority. Either of these grounds, if stated and proved, would have been in law decisive of the case, but neither is stated in the specification, and neither is proved by the evidence."

The case of Bruce vs. Loan arose in Missouri in the early part of the war of the rebellion, (1862,) and the allegation was that the election in many places was controlled, and large numbers of voters overawed by the "enrolled militia,” a State military organization which had been raised and armed for military service. There was much dispute about the facts, but both the majority and minority of the committee appear to have conceded the correctness of the general rule of law laid down in Harrison vs. Davis.

§ 418. There can, however, be no doubt but that the law looks with great disfavor upon anything like an interference by the military with the freedom of an election. An armed force in the neighborhood of the polls is almost of necessity a menace to the voters, and an interference with their freedom and independence, and if such armed force be in the hands of, or under the control of the partisan friends of any particular candidate, or set of candidates, the probability of improper influence becomes still stronger. And although the fact that an armed force was stationed at or near the polls will not, of itself, vitiate an election in the absence of proof that it did in fact deter from voting a portion of the elec

tors sufficiently large to change or render doubtful the result, yet, in such a case, it would not be necessary to show that the electors who declined to vote would have been in actual danger if they had attempted to do so. If it be made to appear that there was an armed force at the polls, and that a number of voters sufficiently numerous to affect the result, or render it doubtful, considered the presence of such force so menacing to them as to render it unsafe for them to vote, and that they had reasonable cause so to think, and if for this reason they declined to go to the polls, the election ought to be set aside.

§ 419. In Giddings vs. Clark, a contested election case tried by the U. S. House of Representatives of the forty-second Congress, the following facts were shown in relation to the election in the county of Limestone.

"The colored voters generally failed to vote, so that only twenty-eight votes were cast for Clark, to one thousand, one hundred and fifty-three for Giddings. That a state of excitement and fear existed in this county about the time of the election, is clear. A collision occurred between some colored policemen and certain white men, which resulted in the death of one of the latter, and the wounding of one of the former. This produced great excitement, and was followed by a general uprising and arming of both whites and blacks. On the day of election, the town where the election was held was occupied by an armed force under command of one Captain Richardson. Pickets were stationed on all the roads leading into town, and persons coming in to vote

were obliged to obtain a pass from the military authorities. Although the witnesses say that all voters were permitted to come and go in peace, and that the freedmen were urged to vote, yet it is clear that they abstained from doing so for reasons which most men would consider good and sufficient."

The committee were of the opinion that this was not a free and fair election, and so reported to the House. The correctness of this decision cannot be doubted. Where the polls are surrounded by a military force, and voters required to pass pickets, and procure permission of military authorities, in order to approach them, there can be no free election. It is no answer to this, to say that the military are stationed around the polls to preserve the peace, and

secure freedom to all voters.

§ 420. A case may perhaps arise where it will not be improper to station troops in the vicinity of the election, at a place where they can be called upon in case of emergency to suppress riot or prevent bloodshed, but in all such cases the troops should be removed from the actual presence of the voters, and should not be permitted in any manner to interfere with persons going to or returning from the polls. We have inherited from our British ancestors a strong aversion to interference by the military power with the conduct of elections, and this feeling has been heightened by the long enjoyment in this country of the larger liberty of American citizenship. As early as 1741 an attempt was made to interfere with an election held for the city of Westminster, by stationing a body of armed soldiers near the poll. On this being shown to the House of