the most authoritative source of information on her subject, since it contains an official list of the presidential appointments which were submitted to the Senate for confirmation.

In one of Jefferson's first messages to the Senate, he set at naught twenty-four of Adams' appointments which had been made in the preceding February, January, and even in December. All of these appointments had been confirmed by the Senate and the commissions had been issued. They were confined to the judiciary, the customs service, and the diplomatic service.

Adams' so-called "midnight appointments" refer principally to forty-two appointments of justices of the peace whom he nominated for service in the counties of the District of Columbia. These nominations had all been confirmed, and, as a rule, the commissions had been made out, signed, and delivered before midnight of the third of March. Jefferson refused to recognize any of these justices as legally appointed. He issued new commissions to twenty-five of them, thus virtually removing seventeen. In justice to Jefferson, however, it must be said, of course, that these removals were solely in the interest of retrenchment.

These removals were not all that Jefferson made. Others followed in quick succession until, at the end of his first administration, ninety-nine had been made. An analysis of these removals shows the following distribution among the different classes of officers: District attorneys, 10; marshals, 13; judge of orphan's court, I; register of wills, I; collectors of customs, 26; naval officers, 3; surveyors, 5; commissioners of loans, I; supervisors of revenue, 4; surveyorgeneral, I; minister, I; consuls, 6; commercial agents, 10; justices of peace, 17; total, 99. To this number should be added, also, those whose tenure of office was limited to a term of years-the marshals and territorial officers—and who were not reappointed, six in all. There were thus one hundred and five cases of forced retirement before the close of 1804, confined, for the most part, to the years of 1801 and 1802. Within this same period Jefferson was enabled to appoint five district judges and two judges in the territories,

four district attorneys, two marshals, fifteen collectors, one naval officer, thirteen surveyors, and thirty-one other officers, to fill vacancies caused by deaths, resignations, and from unexplained causes, some few of which may have been removals. There were, therefore, the following changes in the civil service during Jefferson's first administration:

When allowance is made for political conversions, both genuine and politic, it is evident that but very few Federalists were in office at the end of 1804. Added to the evidence furnished by these figures is that contained in a letter from Jefferson to Duane, which is published curiously enough in the Gallatin Papers (Adams' Gallatin, i., p. 130), written in the latter part of 1803, and stating that every possible removal had been made, and that of 316 officers, only 130 remained in Federalist hands.

In these figures are omitted the inspectors of surveys appointed under the excise act, since, inasmuch as that act was repealed, their tenure of office was limited to such period as was necessary for the completion of their duties.

Some of these removals were, doubtless, made for good cause. There must have been irregularities in the customs service, and there probably was more or less of abuse in the judiciary. No one can believe, however, that these irregularities and abuses required the removal of ten of the twentytwo attorneys and thirteen of the twenty-two marshals, or one fourth of all the customs officers. Jefferson himself admits that sixteen of his removals were made purely for political reasons, where no cause existed, and the sole motive for the removal was to obtain places for political followers..

("So that sixteen only have been removed in the whole for political principles-that is to say, to make some room for some participation for the Republicans.”—Jefferson to Mr. Nicholson, Letters, iv., 486.)

These are the facts in regard to Jefferson's removals. Now, what do they show? They show, first, that a more general policy of proscription was indulged in than has commonly been supposed; that, whereas current authorities have sought to apologize for the few removals Jefferson is supposed to have made, those who would excuse him must recognize the fact that the list of his removals includes one hundred and five, instead of thirty-nine. These facts show, moreover, that removals were made where there was no just cause; that the claims of friends were recognized and rewarded even at the expense of capable and unoffending opponents.

If Jefferson did not recognize the full meaning of the spoils cry, he at least recognized the claim of the victors to a just participation of the spoils-i. e., he recognized a political standard of appointment, which afterward naturally developed into the policy of Jackson and Van Buren. His sincere conviction that he was doing the country a service, by freeing it from the control of monarchists and monocrats, may excuse him from the charge of being influenced to any pronounced degree by the desire to reward political followers by gifts of official positions; but, nevertheless, there can be no doubt that a large faction of his party stood out boldly for spoils, and that they obtained what they wished more generally than correct ideas of civil appointments would sanction.

Abstract of Dr. Taussig's Paper.

After a paper by A. B. Houghton, of Harvard University, upon the question: "Can the United States Guarantee the Neutrality of a Canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific?" Dr. F. W. Taussig, of the same institution, discussed "The Early Protective Movement and the Tariff of 1828." That act, said Dr. Taussig, was the most striking illustration in

our history of the manner in which politics have affected tariff legislation. The high-tariff feeling was strong in the nation in 1828. Both political parties—the Jackson party and the Adams party-tried to conciliate it for the coming presidential election. But the Jackson men were divided among themselves. They included in their ranks not only high-tariff men from the North, but also low-tariff men from the South. An advance of duties was opposed by the Southern men, but was desired by their associates in the North. The politicians who were managing the Jackson party devised an ingenious solution of this difficulty. They proposed a very high and extravagant tariff bill-a bill containing a number of provisions particularly obnoxious to New England. The Southern and Northern wings of the Jackson party agreed to prevent all amendments to the bill. The Southern men, especially those opposed to high duties in general, agreed to vote against all amendments which would make the bill less objectionable. The hope was that the New England members, who were almost all Adams men, would refuse to swallow it, and would finally vote against it. The discredit of causing the defeat of a tariff bill would thus fall on the Adams party. This programme was carried out by the Jackson men. But, at the last moment, the New Englanders, instead of voting against the bill, did swallow it. They voted for it, contrary to the expectations of their opponents. It was passed, and became law, although no one really desired its passage. It was an indefensible measure, as was admitted at the time by the high-tariff men themselves. The peculiarly objectionable provisions, called the "abominations," were abolished by general consent in 1830 and 1832, and the protective system was then put in a more rational form. The history of the act of 1828 shows the manner in which legislation was manipulated for political effect by Van Buren, Wright, and the other Democratic politicians who came into prominence in the time of Jackson. It has often been described as a typical high-protectionist measure; in reality it was only a piece of political trickery.

MORNING SESSION.

THURSDAY, April 29, 1886.

This session was called to order at the appointed hour by Mr. Bancroft, who said that he was a minute-man. The promptness and despatch with which Mr. Bancroft conducted the proceedings of the Association were among the noticeable features of the Washington convention. The papers presented at this morning's session were all of a military character, and they attracted several army men of distinction, besides the usual audience of members and of their Washington friends. The first paper was by a regular army officer, Major-General George W. Cullum, formerly Superintendent and Commandant of the West Point Military Academy. The subject was "The Attack on Washington City in 1814."

General Cullum's Paper.

It is proper to state that this paper is chiefly copied from one of a series of campaign sketches of the war of 1812-15 against Great Britain, which I wrote and printed some years ago; but as few persons have ever read them, I venture to offer to the American Historical Association this short narrative of the operations connected with the capture of Washington in 1814.

Admiral Cockburn having withdrawn the English fleet from Chesapeake Bay in 1813, no further danger of an attack upon Washington was apprehended. Even the abdication of the Emperor Napoleon at Fontainebleau, April 11, 1814, and his banishment to the island of Elba, leaving Great Britain free to transport her vast veteran forces to America, did not disturb the equanimity of our statesmen at the capital or rouse them to a realizing sense of the danger to which we were exposed. One Cassandra, under the title of "Americanus," in the National Intelligencer, did utter a note of warning, but the prophecy was not believed till the enemy was almost within our walls. No preparation was made to oppose the foe. One company of artillery at Fort Warburton, and another of marines at Washington,