The Court held, that the retired partners were not released from their liability. It is necessary that both the creditor and the new member introduced into the firm should have consented to the transfer of the debt. (6) IN PARTICUlar. 1. Arbitration, Submission to. See also, ante, tit. Arbitration. STEAD V. SALT, E. T. 1825. C. P. 3 Bing. 101. A SUBMISSION to arbitration was signed only by three out of five partners The Court held, that it did not bind the partnership, although the subject-matter arose out of partnership particulars, it being no part of the implied authority or business of a trading firm. See 2 Mod. Rep. 228; Com. Dig. Arb. D. 2. ADAMS v. BANKART, H. T. 1835. Ex. 1 C., M. & R. 681.—S. P. One partner cannot bind his co-partners by arbitration, submission to PARTNERSHIP accounts were submitted to arbitration by parol, without his and the arbitrator made an award. The Court held, that the sum so awarded was not evidence on the account stated, the submission not being proved to be by all the partners, or with their consent. 2. By Bills and Notes. THICKNESSE V. BROMILOW, E. T. 1832. Ex. 2 C. & J. 425. In an action on a bill of exchange, it appeared that one of the partners, having authority to bind the other by drawing or indorsing bills of exchange, raised money by bills in fictitious names, indorsed by him in the partnership firm, and the money was afterwards applied to the partnership purposes. The Court held, that the other partner was liable to the persons from whom the money was so obtained. WINTLE v. CROWTHER, H. T. 1831. Ex. 1 C. & J. 316; S. C. 1 Tyru. 216. In an action on a bill of exchange consent. One partner who raises money for the firm partner liable*. renders his co So, a partner, The Court held, that where a partner, by an acceptance, pledges by bill, can * But, where one partner borrows money on his own private credit, though he afterwards apply it to partnership purposes, semble the lender cannot charge the partnership with the liability of the single partner. (Lloyd v. Freshfield, T. T. 1826, N. P., 9 D. & R. 19; S. C. 2 C. & P. 325). Where two persons were joint agents of the Royal Veteran Battalion, but were not otherwise connected in business, and were in the habit of accepting bills by means of a clerk, in this form:-" For agents of the R. V. B.-J. G." It was held to be no answer to a joint action against them by the indorsee of such a bill, to shew that it was accepted for the private advantage of one without the knowledge of the other, although it appeared that the indorsee might, if he had inquired of the clerk who accepted it, have ascertained that such was the fact. (Sanderson v. Brooksbank, H. T. 1830, N. P., 4 C. & P. 286). pledge the name of the firm whether the partnership name, of whomsoever it may consist, and whether the partner be named or not, and whether known or secret partners, the partnership will be bound, unless the title of the party seeking to dormant part- charge them can be impeached; but, where the partnership acceptance was only in part pledged to satisfy the private debt of such partner, with the knowledge of the taker as to such part only being his separate debt ner or not*. An indorsement of a bill by one partner may bind the firm. Whether one partner in a who makes a note in the Held, that the secret partner was liable as to so much as was not, to the knowledge of the taker, applied in fraud of the partnership. SOUTH CAROLINA BANK v. CASE, T. T. 1828. K. B. 8 B. & C. 427. ONE partner of a firm in England proceeded to a foreign country for the purpose of establishing a branch concern, to be carried on in his individual name, with strict instructions that the name of the firm should appear as little as possible on paper, and that no greater sum than £— should be risked in partnership speculations; he, however, against those instructions, entered into risks greatly exceeding that sum, and indorsed bills in the course of such dealings in his own name, the firm in England subsequently sanctioning them; and the transaction being for the benefit of the partnership The Court held, that such indorsements were to be deemed the indorsements of the firm, in the name used by them for the purposes of the foreign business. FAITH V. RICHMOND, H. T. 1840. Q. B. 3 P. & D. 187. IN assumpsit upon a note payable "at the London and Westminster Bank, 9 Waterloo Place," and signed "for the Newcastle coal company, Coal Company, William Richmond, manager," to which the plea was, that the defendants did not make the note; it appeared that name of a firm, the usual style of the defendants' firm was "The Newcastle and Sunderland Wall's End Coal Company," and that they kept no account at the London and Westminster Bank, in Waterloo Place; Richmond was a partner in the firm, and had authority to sign notes in the name of the firm. binds his co partners, is a question for the jury. If one member of a firm pays away partner ship bills for a private debt, the firm cannot maintain trover for the bills. The Court held it was properly left to the jury to say, whether this signature substantially designated the firm, and whether Richmond had authority to make it. JONES v. YATES, E. T. 1829. K. B. 9 B. & C. 532. S., IN partnership with B. and also with Y. and Y., indorsed over to the latter firm bills belonging to the former, without the knowledge of B., in discharge of his private debt, and afterwards indorsed them over to a creditor of that firm upon the dissolution of the firm of S. and B. The Court held, that S. and B. could neither maintain trover against Y. and Y. for such bills, nor assumpsit for the monies paid *And a retired partner may give authority by parol to a continuing partner to indorse bills in the partnership name after a dissolution of partnership. (Smith v. Winter, T. T. 1834, K. B., 4 M. & W. 454). by S. out of the partnership monies to Y. and Y. in discharge of his private debt; neither could the assignees of S. and B. (become bankrupts) maintain such actions. VERE v. ASHBY, M. T. 1829. K. B. 10 B. & C. 288. THE defendant, by an agreement for a partnership with A. and B. on the 24th of June, agreed that he was to be considered a partner from the 18th of May previously, but that his name should not appear, and he continued a partner until the 21st of September following. The plaintiffs, who before and after the agreement had been the bankers of the firm, discounted one bill for them on the 21st May, and two others on the 13th July, and placed the amount to the partnership account, but were ignorant of the defendant being a partner until the winding up of the account. The Court held, that the defendant was not liable on the first, when he was not in fact a partner nor his credit pledged, but that he was for the latter. 3. Payments to. PORTER v. TAYLOR, E. T. 1817. K. B. 6 M. & Selw. 156. IT had been agreed between two partners that a third person should collect and pay the debts, of which the defendant had notice, and promised to pay at a future time, but before that paid it to one of the partners:-Held that such agreement amounting only to an authority to such agent to receive, and to make his receipt of the debt paid to him a good discharge, it did not restrain the rights of the partners, and the payment to one therefore was good. 4. With respect to Frauds ↑. * A clerk in a house lent money to the partnership composing it; two of them signed an acknowledgment for it, agreeing to pay 57. per cent. interest. Various changes took place in the house, in the course of which one of the parties who signed the acknowledgment retired from it. The interest was paid from time to time by the different firms till the last became bankrupt. The clerk continued to serve all the different firms, and was cognisant of the different changes:Held, that he might notwithstanding recover the money he had advanced from the two persons who signed the acknowledgment. (Blew v. Wyatt, T. T. 1832, N. P., 5 C. & P. 397). Where a receipt was given by one of several partners, without the knowledge of the others, in an action to recover the partnership debt-Held, that evidence was admissible to shew that the receipt was fraudulently given by a co-plaintiff; in all cases a receipt is only primâ facie evidence, which admits of explanation. (Farrar v. Hutchinson, T. T. 1833, K. B., 9 Ad. & E. 641; S. C. i P. & D. 437; abr., post, tit. Receipt). + A partnership cannot acquire property in goods obtained by the fraud of one partner, although the others are not privy to it. (Kilby v. Wilson, M. T. 1825, N. P., 1 Ry. & M. 178). One F., a partner in the plaintiff's house, transferred certain stock out of the defendant's name in the books of the Bank of England, under a forged power of attorney, and without any authority from her, and caused the produce to be VOL. V. H 5. With respect to Torts*. A partner who sells part of his share cannot afterwards object, that he could not do so without the consent of the rest. IV. RELATIVE TO THE SALE OF A PARTNER'S SHARE. M'NIELL v. REID, M. T. 1832. C. P. 9 Bing. 68. THE defendant, being in partnership with others, agreed to take the plaintiff into the concern, and give him part of the defendant's share, in consideration of his giving up a valuable appointment, which he did. The Court held, first, that it was not an objection lying in the defendant's mouth, that the plaintiff could not be received into the partnership without the consent of the rest; and secondly, that the consent to become a partner was a sufficient consideration for such an agreement. One partner cannot transfer a contract to bind a third party to a copartner. V. RELATIVE TO THE RIGHT OF ONE PARTNER TO ROBSON V. DRUMMOND, E. T. 1831. K. B. 2 B. §. Ad. 303. A PERSON made a contract with one partner alone, not knowing of the other; it was to be a continuing contract for the hire of a carriage. The partnership was afterwards dissolved, and the partner with whom the contract was made left the business, which was continued by the other. The Court held, that the person making the contract was not bound to continue it with the other partner. VI. RELATIVE TO BOTTOMRY AND RESPONDENTIA mixed with the money of the firm; F. having been convicted of another forgery committed under similar circumstances, and executed :-Held, that the defendant might recover the amount in an action against the surviving partners for money had and received to their use. (Marsh v. Keating, H. T. 1835, C. P., 1 Scott, 5; abr., ante, tit. Money had and received). * Semble, the rule that there is no contribution amongst tort-feasors does not apply where they are so by mere inference of law, but is confined to cases where they must be presumed to be cognisant of the wrongful act. (Pearson v. Shelton, T. T. 1836, Ex., 1 M. & W. 504; S. C. 1 T. & G. 848). †The statute 69 Geo. 1, c. 18, s. 12, did not extend to prevent partners from lending money on respondentia. (Gore v. Wynne, T. T. 1829, N. P., 1 M. & M. 393). VII. RELATIVE TO DORMANT AND ACTING PART- BECKHAM V. KNIGHT, H. T. 1838. C. P. 4 Bing. N. S. 243; S. C. The Court held, that a plea by a dormant partner, sued jointly with W. M. K., that at the time of the agreement he was a secret partner; that the plaintiff did not know he was a partner in the firm, and contracted with K. and S. alone on their credit, and not with the defendant, or on his credit; and that there never had been any consent or agreement with the plaintiff for his services, other than the agreement set out; traversing the promise in manner and form, &c., was good, on demurrer. DAVID v. ELLICE, H. T. 1826. K. B. 5 B. & C. 196. On the retirement of the defendant from the firm, notice was given to the plaintiff, a creditor of the firm, of the remaining partners continuing the business, and charging themselves with the debts, and the plaintiff's balance was transferred with his assent to the new account, and he drew bills upon them, which were paid, to a considerable amount. The Court held, that as the plaintiff acquired no new security, and in the absence of any proof that the retiring partner left funds in the hands of his former partners which he could otherwise have withdrawn, he was not discharged. CARTER v. WHALLEY, T. T. 1830. K. B. 1 B. & Ad. 11. A servant cannot sue a dormant partner. But a mere notice and transfer of the ing partner does not absolve him from liability*. debt of a retir A BILL was drawn upon partners by the name of the P. & M. Unless a party Company, and accepted by procuration for the Company; it appearing publicly repre * If a debtor who is a partner in a firm leaves that firm, and any person trading with the firm has notice of it, and goes on trading with the firm, and making fresh contracts, the retiring partner is not liable, though no new partner joins the firm. (Hart v. Alexander, H. T. 1837, N. P., 7 C. & P. 746; S. C. 2 M. & W. 484). But where a retired partner permitted his name to remain on the cart and over the house of business :-Held, that he was responsible for the negligence of the driver. (Stables v. Eley, H. T. 1825, N. P., 1 C. & P. 614). An indorsee of a bill of exchange cannot recover against acceptors of a bill accepted by one who was formerly a partner, if such person had ceased to be a partner at the time of the accepting of the bill, even though the bill was accepted for a partnership debt, unless the person still held himself out to the world as a partner, as, if he allowed his name to remain on the door of the house of business, or the like. If one of the partners gave notice to a witness that they had ceased to be partners, that might be evidence for the defendants; but a conversation between the witness and one of the defendants, in which he so stated, is clearly not 80. (Dolman v. Orchard, M. T. 1825, N. P., 2 C. & P. 104). |