A pardon under 6 Geo. 4, c. 25, restores the felon to his Pardon. See, also, ante, tit. Indictment. DoE d. EVANS v. EVANS, T. T. 1826. K. B. 5 B. & C. 584; S. C. 8 D. & R. 399. A COPYHOLDER was attainted of felony, and was pardoned, and the lord had not entered in pursuance of the forfeiture. The Court held, that the pardon restored the copyholder to his competency to tenement, for which he might maintain ejectment. A pardon under the sign-manual, according to 6 Geo. 4, c. 25, s. 1, has the effect of restoring civil rights so completely, as to prevent the consequence of an inchoate forfeiture not completed effected by entry. hold lands*. A promise of pardon is no bar to an indictment. The mere mo REX v. GARSIDE, M. T. 1834. K. B. 4 N. & M. 33. The Court held, the King's proclamation, offering a pardon to accomplices on certain conditions, confers on the party who performs the conditions no legal right to a pardon; so that he cannot plead it either in bar of the indictment or in bar of execution; but the Court will delay execution, in order to enable the party to make application to the Crown for a pardon. Parent and Child. See ante, tits. Habeas Corpus-Infant. MORTIMORE v. WRIGHT, E. T. 1840. Ex. 6 M. & W. 482. THE defendant, on being applied to for a bill for the board of, and ral obligation is for supplies to, his son, who was living separate from his father, and working on his own account, unequivocally referred the plaintiff to the son for payment, adding, that he would become entitled to a sum on attaining full age. The plaintiff had a verdict; but not sufficient to render a father liable for his son's debtst. The Court directed a nonsuit. A parent is not under any legal obligation to pay his son's debts. A moral obligation alone cannot create a legal one. * By 6 Geo. 4, c. 25, pardon on condition of transportation, imprisonment, or other punishment, declared to have the same effect as a pardon under the Great Seal. †A. had several of his children residing in a house distant from his own, in the charge of B., a servant :-Held, that if an accident happened to one of the children, A. was liable to pay for its cure, although he did not know the surgeon who was called in, and although the accident might have arisen from the carelessness of the servant. (Cooper v. Phillips, E. T. 1831, N. P., 4 C. & P. 581). To charge a father with the amount of clothes supplied to his son, it is essential that the clothes should have been supplied either with the assent of the father or by his authority; and the father is the person to judge what is proper for his son. (Rolfe v. Abbott, M. T. 1833, N. P., 6 C. & P. 286). In an action on the case by a father for an injury done to his son, a minor, in his service :- Held, that the loss of service and expense was the only measure of damages, and not injury to parental feelings. (Flemington v. Smithers, T. T. 1826, N. P., 2 C. & P. 292.-S. P. Hall v. Hallender, 4 B. & C. 660; S. C. 7 D. & R. 133). LAW v. WILKINS, T. T. 1836. K. B. 1 N. & P. 697. THE son was in need of clothes, and the father had seen him A father seeing wearing those furnished by the plaintiff. The Court held, first, that it was some evidence to leave to the jury, and compelled the father to shew that his son was supplied with necessaries; and, secondly, that if a Judge thinks fit to nonsuit, counsel are not bound to insist on the case going to the jury. URMSTON V. NEWCOMEN, E. T. 1836. K. B. 6 N. & M. 454; THE father of a child, illegitimate in point of law, placed it with its grandmother, the plaintiff, at her request, on the express undertaking given by her, that the father would never be asked a shilling either for her maintenance, clothes, education, or journey; and the child was subsequently delivered to its mother, who was living in adultery, where she was ill-treated, and became at last in a state of helplessness and destitution, and was again taken care of by her grandmother; the father having no notice of the ill-treatment of the child, or of the change of custody from time to time. The Court held, that the father might reasonably be taken to have supposed that the child remained in the custody of the plaintiff, at whose instance she was delivered over, and that the plaintiff was providing for it at her own expense, so as to rebut any implied promise on his part to pay the plaintiff for the board, maintenance, clothing, and education of his child, even supposing that such an undertaking can be implied at law, by reason of the relationship of father and child. REX v. TOKE, E. T. 1838. Q. B. 3 N. & P. 323. his son wear clothes is some evidence to go to the jury of a contract to pay. But a father who gives up his illegitimate the custody of child is not liable for necessaries*. AN order of justices for payment of a weekly sum for the main- A son is bound tenance of a father by the son, describing the application to have to maintain his been made to the justices of K., by the overseers of the parish of M. father. in the city of K., to have an order made on T. G., of the parish of M., in the same county, &c., and proceeding to order the said T. G. to pay &c. The Court held, that the order sufficiently shewed that T. G. was dwelling within the jurisdiction of the justices; and that, by making their order on the said T. G., the justices had adopted those words, and adjudicated that he dwelt there. SKINNER, Ex parte, M. T. 1824. C. P. 9 Moore, 279. ON motion for a habeas corpus The Court said, we think the courts of law have not in their constitution that species of delegated authority from the king as "parens patriæ," which resides in the Court of Chancery. The Court of *The Court will remove a child from the custody of the mother to that of the father, although there is no suggestion that the child is subjected to any imp roper confinement or restraint, nothing being shewn to prove that the custody of the father is improper. (M'Clellan, Ex parte, T. T. 1831, B. C., 1 D. P. C. 81). A mother cannot legally appoint a testamentary guardian of her natural child, and therefore such a guardian, if appointed, cannot have a habeas corpus to remove such child from the custody to which it was committed by the mother during her lifetime. (Glover, Ex parte, M. T. 1835, B. C., 4 D. P. C. 291). It seems courts of common law have not the same jurisdic tion as courts of equity over infants*. The union of parishes does not alter the Common Pleas, therefore, doubting its jurisdiction, refused upon habeas corpus to interfere to remove a legitimate child of six years old from the custody of the father, who was in gaol, on the ground of his immoral conduct, being separated from his wife and living in adultery, and having obtained the custody of it by fraud and stratagem after it had been placed, by order of the Court, with consent of parents, with a third person, there being no suggestion of ill-treatment by him. See ante, tit. "Infant." Parisht. Parish Certificate. See tit. Settlement and Removal of the Poor. Parish Clerk. See tit. Mandamus. HARTLEY V. COCKE, H. T. 1833. C. P. 9 Bing. 728; S. C. 5 C. & P. 441. PREVIOUSLY to the union of two parishes in the city of A. under 22 Car. 2, c. 11, s. 23, the appointment of parish clerk was exercised appointment of jointly by the rector and the parishioners. the clerk. The Court held, that by the union such custom was not destroyed, so as to give to the rector alone the common-law right of appoint ment. Parish Landt. See tits. Churchwarden-Ecclesiastical Parish Officers. See tits. Churchwarden-ConstableOverseer. Parish Register. See tit. Marriage. *See 2 & 3 Vict. c. 54, ante, vol. 4, p. 269. On the question whether a place is parcel of a certain parish, old entries made by a churchwarden in a book, by which he does not charge himself, but in which he merely makes statements relative to repairs &c. done to a chapel in the parish church, alleged to belong to the place in question, are not evidence. (Cooke v. Bankes, M. T. 1826, N. P., 2 C. & P. 478). ‡ Where a party has been in possession of a tenement claimed by a parish during a period of twenty years, for the last three of which he has paid rent, and then being expelled under the authority of a magistrate's warrant he is again let into possession by the parish, he is not liable to be expelled by a warrant of two magistrates pursuant to the 33 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 24. (Reg. v. Justices of Middlesex, T. T. 1839, B. C., 7 D. P. C. 767). Parliament. See tits. Bribery-Commons, House of-Courts -Election-Habeas Corpus-Inquiry, Writ of-Judge-Libel-Process-Requests, Court of. Parol Evidence. See tit. Evidence. Particulars of Demand. See tit. Set-off, and particular titles according to the subject-matter. I. RELATIVE TO, WHEN IT WILL OR WILL NOT BE II. RELATIVE TO THE AFFIDAVIT AND RULE FOR, III. RELATIVE TO THE FORM OF, AND RULES OF IV. RELATIVE TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF, p. 86. V. RELATIVE TO WHERE TWO PARTICULARS ARE VI. RELATIVE TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF MISTAKES VII. RELATIVE TO THE EFFECT OF, p. 87. VIII. RELATIVE TO THE NON-DELIVERY OF, p. 88. IX. RELATIVE TO THE AMENDMENT OF, AND PAR- X. RELATIVE TO THE COSTS. See div. I., p. 84, n. I. RELATIVE TO, WHEN IT WILL OR WILL NOT BE JAMES V. CHILD, H. T. 1832. Ex. 2 C. & J. 252; S. C. 2 Tyrw. 302. On a rule to shew cause why full particulars should not be delivered, it was contended that in all cases, according to the spirit * By Rule T. T. 1 Will. 4, it is ordered, "That with every declaration, if delivered, or with the notice of declaration, if filed, containing counts in inde Since new rules defendant is en entitled on terms to full particulars, though an account has been delivered. of the new Rule, full particulars should be delivered, if required by the defendant, whether he had previously had an account rendered or not. Bayley, B.-It may be that the defendant has had the particulars of the account, and mislaid them. At chambers I have granted such applications as the present, upon the terms of the defendant paying the costs of the particulars, and, if necessary, taking short notice of trial. But a particu lar need not be given where the declaration BROOKS v. FARLAR, M. T. 1836. C. P. 5 D. P. C. 361; S. C. 1 Bing. N. S. 291; S. C. 3 Scott, 654. A DECLARATION amended upon demurrer was reduced to a single count on a bill of exchange The Court held, that the defendant was not entitled to a bill of is only on a bill particulars, though the bill delivered with the declaration before or note*. amendment, and which still remained unaltered, alleged, that the sums ought to be recovered, (and which was specified), was only part of the consideration given for the bill of exchange. bitatus assumpsit, or debt on simple contract, the plaintiff shall deliver full particulars of his demand under those counts, where such particulars can be comprised within three folios; and where the same cannot be comprised within three folios, he shall deliver such a statement of the nature of his claim, and the amount of the sum or balance which he claims to be due, as may be comprised within that number of folios." And to secure the delivery of particulars in all such cases, it is further ordered, "That, if any declaration or notice shall be delivered without such particulars or such statement as aforesaid, and a Judge shall afterwards order a delivery of particulars, the plaintiff shall not be allowed any costs in respect of any summons for the purpose of obtaining such order, or of the particulars he may afterwards deliver: and that a copy of the particulars of the demand, and also particulars (if any) of the defendant's setoff, shall be annexed by the plaintiff's attorney to every record, at the time it is entered with the Judge's marshal." In assumpsit to recover damages sustained by the non-performance of an agreement to assign premises, the Court refused to compel the plaintiff to furnish a particular of the special damage. (Retallick v. Hawkes, H. T. 1836, Ex., 1 M. & W. 573; S. C. 1 T. & G. 1134). So, in order to obtain particulars in trepass, trover, or on the case, there must be an affidavit stating that defendant does not know what the plaintiff is going for. (Snelling v. Chennells, E. T. 1836, Ex., 5 D. P. C. 80). And the same rule holds in an action for an escape. (Davis v. Chapman, M. T. 1837, K. B., 6 Ad. & E. 767). *If the declaration is on a bill of exchange, and for goods sold, and a particular of demand is obtained under a Judge's order, the plaintiff may recover on the bill, though it is not mentioned in his particular of demand. (Cooper v. Amos, E. T. 1826, N. P., 2 C. & P. 267). In an action by indorsee against acceptor of two bills of exchange for 5001. each, the declaration contained two counts on the bills only. The particulars of demand stated the action to be brought to recover 5007., the amount of the bills set forth in the declaration. The plaintiff had arrested the defendant for 2407. only, and the bills were given by the defendant to the drawer as a security for money paid by him for the defendant, and indorsed by the drawer to the plaintiff :-Held, that the defendant was entitled to further and better particulars of the plaintiff's demand, Alderson, B., dissentiente. (Dawes v. Anstruther, T. T. 1837, Ex., 5 D. P. C. 738). The declaration contained two counts, each on a bill of exchange. The parti culars stated the action to be brought to recover the amount of the bill mentioned in the first count, with interest, and that the plaintiff would rely on the whole of any part of the declaration for the recovery thereof:-Held sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to proceed on the second count. (Hay v. Fisher, M. T. 1837, Ex., 2 M. & W. 722). |