Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

THE CASE OF THE STEAMSHIP METEOR.

HEARING UPON THE MOTION FOR DELIVERY OF THE VESSEL TO CLAIMANTS UPON THEIR BOND.

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,

WEDNESDAY, March 14, 1866.

HON. SAMUEL R. BETTS, PRESIDING JUDGE.

SAMUEL G. COURTNEY, ESQ., Ass't. U. S. Dist. Attorney,

appeared for the United States.

WILLIAM M. EVARTS, Esq.,

JOSEPH H. CHOATE, Esq.,

appeared for the claimants.

Ar the opening of the Court Mr. Choate addressed the Court upon the matter of delivering the vessel to the claimants as follows:

[ocr errors]

MR. CHOATE. May it please your Honor,- We move in the case of the United States against the steamship Meteor, which was seized in January last for an alleged violation of the act of 1818, known as the Neutrality Law, for the appointment of an appraiser to report the value of the vessel to the Court, with a view of having it delivered to its owners on bond. The motion is made on the part of the claimants, representing the entire ownership of the vessel, the Messrs. John M. Forbes and R. B. Forbes, of Boston, through their agent, W. F. Cary. We did not anticipate any opposition to this motion, which we thought would be taken as a matter of course; but your Honor will remember that the learned District Attorney appeared here yesterday to oppose it, as he suggested, under instructions from one of the departments of the government, and he was proceeding to state his objection to our motion when he was interrupted by other proceedings which caused the adjournment of the Court. The learned gentleman is now present, and will perhaps proceed with a statement of his objections.

ARGUMENT OF MR. COURTNEY.

MR. COURTNEY. May it please your Honor,-I can find, on examination, no authority for the motion of my learned friend to bond this vessel, unless it be the general rule of the Court. I suppose, if your Honor please, that the rule of the Court as to the bonding of vessels is based upon the Revenue Act, and that bonding is permitted only in cases where vessels are seized under and by virtue of that act.

Independent of this objection, we have others which I think are fatal to this motion. This vessel, the Meteor, was seized by

the United States Government

JUDGE BETTS. Have there been any pleadings in the case?

MR. COURTNEY. Yes, sir. I will refer to them presently. This vessel was seized under what is known as the Neutrality Act, that is to say, the Act of 20th April, 1818, and under the third section of that act, which says,

"SEC. 3. If any person shall, within the limits of the United States, fit out and arm, or attempt to fit out and arm, or procure to be fitted out and armed, or shall knowingly be concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel, with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace; or shall issue or deliver a commission, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, for any ship or vessel, to the intent that she may be employed as aforesaid; every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years. And every such ship or vessel, with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, together with all materials, arms, ammunition, and stores, which may have been procured for the building and equipment thereof, shall be forfeited; one half to the use of the informer, and the other half to the use of the United States."

The libel of information was filed under that section, and it contains, if your Honor please, six different counts, concluding in the usual form, according to the words of the statute. After that libel had been framed and due service made, the Messrs. Forbes,

1 The New York Evening Post of March 14th reports Mr. Courtney on this head as

follows:

"In the course of the objections of Mr. Courtney, he said there was one which would be fatal to this motion. It was found in a letter from the State Department to the District Attorney. The Spanish Minister had made an application to Mr. Seward that the bonding should not be permitted,' &c.

The letter of the Spanish Minister, which, by the way, was not given in any newspaper report of the hearing, at the time, will be found, post, p. 5.

We use a transcript from the original on file in the office of the U. S. District Attorney.— EDITOR.

claiming to be the owners, appeared, through their proctors, in this court, and by their agent, W. F. Cary, and put in an answer.

Mr. Courtney then read the answer of the claimants. [See Appendix.]

Your Honor sees that the claim is put in by Cary, and not by the owners, the Messrs. Forbes. To this answer, exceptions were taken by the United States.

Mr. Courtney then read the exceptions. [See Appendix.]

[ocr errors]

These exceptions were duly served and have been noticed for trial before this Court. Now, I submit, that while that question is at issue and undetermined, the question as to the ownership of the vessel, this motion is premature, and on that ground should be denied, even if no other objection existed. I make on that head the following points:

First. The motion of the claimants cannot be now entertained, because the exceptions to the answer of Mr. Cary, the agent, are undisposed of.. Until they are passed upon, the alleged owners have no more standing in Court than a person who has filed no claim whatever. [Rules 74 and 94, District Court; rule 30, Supreme Court.]

Second. Even if the Court should hold that the claim already filed and excepted to gives the party sufficient standing in Court to be heard on this preliminary motion, it is still not obligatory on the Court to grant the motion. It is altogether within the discretion of the Court, and the Court should deny the motion. The allegations in the libel are that the vessel in custody has been fitted out and is intended to be used for hostile purposes against a nation with whom the United States is at peace. These allegations are denied only by an answer unsworn to by either of the claimants whose right to intervene is contested.

Third. The purpose of the third section of the act of 1818 was to prevent the departure from the United States of such vessels as this. The allegations against the vessel are that she has been fitted out and was about to depart in violation of this act of Congress, and on the prayer of the United States the Court has interposed its process to prevent her departure. This mode of preven

1

tion in the case of this vessel is manifestly proper. So long as she is in the custody of the Court the power conferred on the President by the eighth section of the act, and which should only be availed of in extreme cases, need not be exercised.

Fourth. The Court should not lend an indulgent ear to this application unless peculiar ground has been laid therefor. - [The Brig Struggle, 1 Gal. 476, Story, J.]

Fifth. The act of 1799 only relates to vessels seized for violation of the revenue laws, and has no application whatever to seizures under the Neutrality Act. [The Brig Struggle, ub. sup.]

Sixth. There is a common desire among all nations, including England, that laws of neutrality be made as stringent as possible, in order to prevent all enterprises of a hostile tendency not inspired or controlled by the governments themselves.

Seventh. There is a disposition manifested everywhere, not only to give to the laws already enacted a construction in the interest of neutrality, but even to adopt more stringent provisions. If the Court holds that the bonding provisions of the revenue laws apply to and become part of the act of 1818, the vitality of our Neutrality Act, so far as hostile vessels are concerned, will be destroyed. A decision by the Court to the extent claimed by counsel will open a seam in the act of 1818 through which a whole navy of either belligerent can go to sea.

JUDGE BETTS. By whom do the owners appear?

MR. EVARTS. By their consignee, or agent; - the owners are non-residents.

MR. COURTNEY. That does not appear.

JUDGE BETTS. They are citizens, and the vessel is an American vessel ?

MR. EVARTS. Yes, sir. They are Boston merchants.

MR. COURTNEY. Resuming: If your Honor please, we submit, in the first place, there is no power, as we understand the decisions and practice of this Court, to bond a vessel which has been seized under the circumstances stated in the libel and in the manner in which this vessel appears, from the libel, to have been seized. We submit that the power to bond vessels is derived entirely from the eighty-ninth section of the act of 2d March, 1799, known as the Revenue Act, and that the rule of the Court is based upon and derived from the same act. We submit that this law has no application whatever in any shape, manner, or form, to the

case now before the Court. If your Honor please, let us look at this motion in another light. What is the aim and object of this Neutrality Act? It is to prevent armed vessels leaving the ports of a neutral to cruise in behalf of one belligerent power against another. Now, suppose, for the sake of argument, that this ship should be bonded. When she is bonded she is free to leave this port she does so, goes to another port, fits out for sea, and at once proceeds on the predatory cruise, to put a stop to which she was first seized. I would ask your Honor whether that is carrying out in good faith the neutrality laws of the United States?

I oppose this motion not only because I deem it my duty in my official capacity to do so, but also under instructions from the State Department, which I will read and make part of my argument in the case. It seems that information was sent to the Spanish Minister at Washington, that an application would be made to bond this vessel. How that information got to the minister I do not know; all I have to say is, that he did not receive the information from the office of the District Attorney. Probably it was ascertained by reading the account of the proceedings had in Court given in the newspapers. It is, however, sufficient to know that the information reached him, and that he addressed a note to the Secretary of State upon the subject, which is as follows:

(TRANSLATION.)

LEGATION OF SPAIN AT WASHINGTON,

No. 18.

WASHINGTON, 10 March, 1866.

The undersigned, Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Catholic Majesty, has advices that the owners of the Meteor applied yesterday to the District Court at New York, praying that she be released under surety, and that the application was to be decided on Monday, the 12th instant.

The undersigned must believe that under existing charges and proofs, the Court will not accede to the application. He hopes, however, that the Government of the United States, in the sphere of its attributes, will give instructions to the District Attorney of New York to oppose it, trusting that even in the case of the Court acceding to the motion, the vessel will not be delivered to the owners. The undersigned must urge this matter the more, as the Meteor not having, as is notorious, the qualities of a merchant vessel, there is no reason for letting her go on any ground, having reason to suppose that her owners, in accordance with the Chilian agents, are disposed not merely to lay down the security in question, but whatever other additional securities may be exacted from them, in order to use the vessel, once outside of the jurisdiction of the United States, to go and

« AnteriorContinuar »