This is the very paper which calls one house the house of Delegates, and the other the Senate.

This is the very paper which declares that the former shall consist of two representatives from each county, chosen by freeholders, &c.

This is the very paper which fixes the number of the senate to twenty-four-which defines the number that shall compose a house of senate,-under which the state is to be divided into twenty-four districts.

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Which declares that each county shall vote for a senator, who besides other qualifications shall be twenty-five years age; that a comparison of polls shall be made by the sheriffs, who are to return the person having the greatest number of votes.

That a certain number are to be displaced by rotation.

That writs may issue from each house for supplying vacancies.-And

That all laws shall originate in the house of delegates subject to amendment by the senate, except money bills.

I ask then, whether the legislature do not sit under the constitution?

The answer in the affirmative to me is inevitable.

But it may be objected that, although the legislature would be bound by a fundamental regulation, made by a convention or other body delegated expressly for such a purpose, the body who formed this, not having been thus specially appointed, this act possesses not sufficient sanctity; but is an act equal only to those of a common legislature, because some acts passed int he same session are confessedly so.

Here let it be remembered that the question is not whether the people can change it; but whether the legislature can do so.

As to the powers of the convention, this body seems to have been appointed, not only to see that the commonwealth sustained no injury, but also to consult in general for the public good, and in such a crisis as that at which our government was formed, those who are delegated have authority more extensive than a legislature appointed under a government, one object of which is to restrain that as well as the other departments,—whereas in the former case the people alone can decide whether these powers have been strained too far.

As to some acts of the same session being temporary and others revocable by the legislature.

I answer, that the subject-matter of them will evince which are intended to be of this nature, and if any were designed to be permanent, they must be so until changed by the people, unless indeed calling these ordinances and the other a Constitution,* sufficiently manifest a design that this should be of higher authority than those.

It is confessedly the assent of the people which gives validity to a Constitution.

May not the people then, by a subsequent acquiescence and assent, give a Constitution, under which they have acted for seventeen years, as much validity, at least so long as they acquiesce in it, as if it had been previously expressly authorized?

The people have received this as a Constitution. The magistrates and officers down to a constable (for even the mode of his appointment is directed) have been appointed under it.

The people have felt its operation and acquiesced.

Who then can change it?-I answer, the PEOPLE alone.

* See note, p. 24.

But it has been supposed that the legislature can do this.

To decide this question, I have already stated that the legislature derive their existence from the Constitution.

It may be answered that those members who passed the law under contemplation were elected under the act of 1785.

But who held the election? Who was to decide in case of an equality of votes? and, who certified the persons elected? The sheriff under the law. Who appointed the sheriff? The executive.-By what authority?-Under the fifteenth article of this Constitution, which the legislature from their acts acknowledge to be inviolable.

If then the legislature were elected at an election holden by, and were returned by a sheriff, who derives his commission from the Constitution, does not that body derive its existence from the same source?

And can the legislature impugn that charter under which they claim, and to which by their acts they themselves have acknowledged an obligation?-I apprehend not, nor can any argument against this position be drawn

from an acquiescence in some acts which may be unconstitutional.

1st, Because we may presume, that if there be any such, their unconstitutionality has not yet been discovered by the legislature, which, if it had been done, (from the instance before recited, and some other instances) we have reason to think, would have produced a similar declaration from that body.-And

2dly, Because no individual may have yet felt the operation of them, and consequently they have not been brought to investigation.

But the greatest objection still remains, that the judiciary, by declaring an act of the legislature to be no law, assumes legislative authority, or claims a superiority over the legislature.

In answer to this,—I do not consider the judiciary as the champions of the people, or of the Constitution, bound to sound the alarm, and to excite an opposition to the legislature. But, when the cases of individuals are brought before them judicially, they are bound to decide.

And, if one man claim under an act contrary to the Constitution, that is, under what is no law, (if my former