dant's counsel moved the court to quash the indictment on the ground that the county court had not at the time when the oath was charged to have been taken, legal and competent authority to administer the same. (Note; the executions on which the defendant had been taken, were all issued from the office of the county court of Frederick.)

The question in this case arose from the 2d and 13th sections of the act of 1794, amendatory of the execution law, (see 1 Rev. Co. ch. 176, p. 324 and 326), and their operation on the 38th section of the execution law of 1793. (See p. 303.) The law of 1793 provides for bringing the person charged in execution before the court itself (if sitting) in which the suit was commenced or prosecuted, or (if not sitting) before two judges, or justices of the said court, (as the case may be); which court, judges or justices many administer the insolvent debtor's oath. The 2d section of the act of 1794 provides for bringing the person charged in execution, before any two justices of the county or corporation, to whose jail he may be committed, and the said justices shall have power to administer the oath. The 13th section of the last mentioned law repeals so much of the 38th section of the act of 1793 as "is contrary" thereto. So that in this case the question was whether the power vested in the courts themselves to administer the oath by the act of 1793 was

taken away from them by the act of the next year, and confided exclusively to the two justices. The general court, June 13, 1812, decided "that the county court of "Frederick had not on the 5th day of September, 1809, "legal and competent authority to administer the oath "prescribed in the case of insolvent debtors."

Barnet Hendrick, who as well for the Common. wealth as for himself, sues against Jacob Andrick, and Robert Renick.

THIS was a qui tam information exhibited in the Su

perior Court of Law for Greenbrier county against the defendants. They were charged with having, on the 2d January, 1810, felled thirty trees, on the commonwealth's highway and public road leading from the upper navigation of James' river, to the upper navigation of Kenhawa river, within the county of Greenbrier, and with having permitted them to lie and remain from the said second to the eighth day of January upon the common highway aforesaid, to the grievous and common nuisance of all the citizens of Virginia passing, riding, and travelling upon and through the highway aforesaid,

against the form of the act of assembly in such case made, &c.

The defendants pleaded not guilty, and the jury found them guilty of one of the offences in the information charged against them. The defendants moved in arrest of judgment, and assigned the following reason: be“ cause by law a qui tam information does not lie to re"cover the penalty imposed by the act of assembly for "obstructing a public highway."

The act of assembly inflicts a penalty of ten pounds on the act of felling a tree on the public highway, and permitting it to remain forty-eight hours, and declares that one moiety of the penalties inflicted by the act for the several offences enumerated in it, shall be to the informer, and the other to the use of the county, recoverable with costs, on warrant, petition, or action, as the case may be. The only question in this case was, whether a qui tam information was included in the remedies provided for by this act. [See 1 Rev. Code, p. 28, sections 9th and 11th.] The question was adjourned by the circuit court, and the general court decided, June 13, 1812, "that an informa“tion qui tam does not lie to recover the penalty impo"sed by the act of assembly for obstructing a public high"way."

Matthias Hite against Jesse Fitz-Randolph.

ΤΗ

THE plaintiff had obtained a judgment in the Circuit Court of Law for Harrison county against the defendant. The defendant thereupon applied to the county court of Harrison, on the chancery side thereof, for an injunction to stay proceedings thereon, which was granted him. The plaintiff, not regarding the injunction, proceeded to carry his judgment into effect, on which the defendant obtained from the county court an attachment for his contempt in disobeying the order in chancery of the county court, by virtue of which the plaintiff was taken into the custody of the sheriff of that county. The plaintiff then applied to the judge of the superior court, during its session, for a habeas corpus, to bring his body before the court to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever should then be considered in this behalf, which was granted. The question before that court was whether the plaintiff was legally detained in custody, which depended on the point whether a county court can injoin the judgment of the superior court. It was adjourned to the general court. That court, June 15th, 1812, decided, "That "Matthias Hite the plaintiff ought to be discharged, the 66 county court having no right to make an order restrain"ing him from proceeding on his judgment at law ob"tained in the superior court of law."

The Commonwealth against Benjamin B. Jones.

HIS case was adjourned from the Circuit Court of

THIS

James' City County. The judge of that court during its session in April, 1811, brought into court the following certificate, which was ordered to be entered.

66

"Virginia to wit. On the 25th day of January, 1811, "I, William Nelson, one of the judges of the general court, and judge of the circuit court of James' City 66 county, having taken the affidavit of a witness con"cerning a duel, then about to take place between Wil"liam Irvine, and James W. Murdaugh, called upon "Benjamin B. Jones, and demanded his affidavit as ad"ditional testimony, on which to ground a warrant "against those concerned. The said Benjamin B. Jones "wished to consult counsel, and after consulting them, "refused to give me any information on the subject. I "informed him that according to the opinion of some, I "had a right to commit him, but as I had doubts on the

subject I should not do that, but should either proceed "against him at the then next session of the circuit "court of James' City county, or refer the case to the 66 general court." The circuit court then ordered the certificate and the following questions to be adjourned to