acquitted or convicted not only in due form, but by a court having competent jurisdiction. 1st. As to due form. Here is nothing in this record that amounts to an acquittal or conviction of either murder or manslaughter. The party was not arraigned; he was not even indicted;-there can be no acquittal or conviction, but in consequence of BOTH these modes of proceeding. 2 H. H. P. C. 216. 4 Bl. 322.

2d. The court had not competent jurisdiction; the court has no jurisdiction in criminal cases beyond the letter of the act. That act authorizes the court only to do one of three things; viz. to consider, whether as the case may appear to them the prisoner may be discharged from further prosecution; may be TRIED in the county or corporation court, or must be TRIED by the district court. Now the act establishing county courts is express, that these courts shall not have jurisdiction in any case, where the JUDGMENT in case of CONVICTION shall be for life or member.

3d. The record produced does not support either of these pleas. An acquittal must be final: so must a conviction: the court have neither acquitted, nor convicted; for they have sent him hither to be TRIED for the offence of manslaughter. Here then the opinion of the court is neither an acquittal nor a conviction, but merely an opi

nion that he must be TRIED before a court having competent jurisdiction of the case, who may thereafter ACQUIT or CONVICT as the case shall appear before them.

Prentis Judge, dissented from the junior judge as to the record's not supporting the pleas. He thought it did support them. Therefore the court being divided the judgment of the court was necessarily in favour of the prisoner, (See the district court law, ch. 66, sect. 16.) viz. that there is such a record. But as he concurred in the opinion that the county court had no right to discriminate betwen murder and manslaughter, the prisoner was put upon his trial upon the indictment for murder, and found guilty of manslaughter.

The Commonwealth against Luke Ray and Sarah his wife.

THE defendants were jointly indicted in the Superior

Court of law for Bedford county, for an assault and battery committed on T. Minor. They pleaded jointly "not guilty," and the jury found the following verdict. "We of the jury find the defendants guilty and

66 assess their fine to one hundred dollars." They moved to arrest the judgment for these reasons, "that the hus"band and wife ought not to be joined in an indictment "for the same offence. 2d. That joint damages ought not << to be assessed against two defendants, but that the jury "ought to have assessed the amercement against each, "according to the degree of their offence."

The case was adjourned on this motion, and the general court, June 13th, 1812, present judges Nelson, White, Stuart, Holmes, Brockenbrough, Semple, Johnston, Smith and Randolph, decided “that the first reason alleged in "arrest of judgment, is insufficient to arrest it, it being "lawful to join a husband and wife in such indictment; "but that the second cause assigned is sufficient, because "the fine ought to be assessed against each defendant "separately."

See 1st Call, p. 555. Jones vs. The Commonwealth.

Peter Case against the Commonwealth.

HIS was a writ of error obtained from the Hamp

THIS

shire Circuit Court, for the purpose of revising and correcting a judgment of the county court obtained by the commonwealth against the plaintiff.

He had been indicted for retailing spiritous liquors, to wit, a half pint of whiskey, to be drank at the place where sold, without having obtained the license of the law. The defendant's counsel on the trial filed two bills of exceptions to the opinion of the court. In the first, it was stated that the defendant's counsel asked the witness a question tending to his own discredit, which question the court declared improper, and refused to let him answer it. The defendant therefore excepted. In the second, it was stated that the only evidence produced against the defendant, was that he had sold brandy, whereas the indictment charged that he had sold whiskey, and that the jury found for the commonwealth on such evidence; whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial which the court refused, to which refusal the defendant excepted.

In the circuit court, the counsel for the plaintiff in error admitted that this being a criminal case, the court below was not obliged to sign the bills of exceptions, but contended that as the court had actually signed them, they became a part of the record, and that the superior court was bound to take notice of any error which they disclosed, and to reverse the said judgment if the error so disclosed was sufficient. That question was adjourned to the general court for its advice.

The general court, June 13, 1812, decided that as the county court was not obliged to sign a bill of exceptions in any criminal case, although the county court has in this instance signed the bills, they do not thereby become a part of the record, and the superior court for Hampshire county was not bound to take notice of any error stated in the said bills of exceptions.

The Commonwealth against Jesse Calvert.

THE defendant was indicted in the Frederick Circuit

Court for wilful and corrupt perjury in taking the oath of an insolvent debtor before the county court of Frederick on the 5th day of September, 1809. The defen