or more than he had earned in the past, notwithstanding the total loss of an arm, leg, eye, or other member of his body. In our opinion, such conclusion would entirely change the intent and purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, §§ 21916-22112). The compensation provided for under the provisions of the act is for injury sustained. While loss of earning power may be evidence tending to show the extent of injuries, the mere fact that earning power has not decreased will not prevent recovery for injuries actually sustained. If an injury results in amputation of an arm or leg, compensation for such loss cannot be avoided by showing the victim's ability to earn as much in another occupation not requiring the use of the missing member. The undisputed evidence in the case warrants the finding of the Compensation Board and the court below. The judgment is affirmed. MAGUIRE v. JAMES LEES & SONS CO. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT ERALLY CONSTRUED. COMPENSATION ACT LIB Courts will liberally construe the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.) to carry out its intentions, but will not depart from the clear meaning of language used. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 348.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY BY COEMPLOYEES AFTER WORKING HOURS HELD NOT COMPENSABLE AS OCCURRING WHILE "ACTUALLY" ENGAGED IN EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS. Where a foreman was killed while on way home from work, 500 feet from place of work, by employees with whom he had quarreled during working hours concerning a matter connected with employer's business, his widow was not entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.); the killing not having occurred while the foreman was "actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer" within section 301, requiring employee to have been "actually" engaged in employer's affairs where injury occurs elsewhere than upon employer's premises. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 373.) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County; Aaron S. Swartz, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Elizabeth C. Maguire for death of her husband, James Maguire, opposed by the James Lees & Sons Company, employer. Award for claimant affirmed by the court of common pleas, and employer appeals. Judgment of court and award of Compensation Beard reversed, and judgment entered for employer. Argued before Moschzisker, C. J., and Frazer, Walling, Simpson, Sadler, and Schaffer, JJ. Aaron S. Swartz, Jr., John M. Dettra, Samuel H. High and Montgomery Evans, all of Norristown, for appellant. George C. Klauder, of Norristown, for appellee. MOSCHZISKER, C. J. In this workmen's compensation case, the claim was refused by the referee, allowed by the Board, and affirmed by the court below. Defendant has appealed. James Maguire, plaintiff husband, was a foreman in defendant's mill. On December 23, 1919, he had a quarrel with two subordinates in the course of his employment and concerning a matter connected with his employer's business. About two hours subsequent to this quarrel, after Maguire's daily working hours had ceased and when on his way home he was met in the public street, at a point about 500 feet from defendar.t's works, in front of a property belonging to a third party, by the two men with whom he had quarreled. These men, who had armed themselves at defendant's mill with iron pipes, at once attacked and killed Maguire. Compensation was allowed his widow for the injury thus incurred. Appellant contends that Maguire's death was not due to an injury by accident in the course of his employment, and therefore plaintiff was not entitled to an award under the Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.). Section 301 of the act in question (P. L. 1915, pp. 736, 738; Pa. St. 1920, § 21984) provides, inter alia, that, in instances where the statute has been accepted. "compensation for personal injury to, or for the death of," an employee, "by an accident in the course of his employment," shall be made in all cases; that the term "injury by an accident in the course of his employment," as used in the act, shall not include "an injury caused by an act of a third person" intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee or because of his “employment," but shall include "all other injuries sustained while the employee is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer's premises of elsewhere." Then the act provides that the term under discussion shal! include injuries occurring on "the premises" of the employer. Since, admittedly, the injury in the present case did not occur on the premises of the employer, and since the findings of the Compensation Board and the court below are to the effect that the intent to harm was "directed against" Maguire "because of his employment," the only question left for determination is: Did the injury occur in the course of Maguire's employment or while he was, in the words of the act, "actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of his employer"? The Compensation Board and the court below thought that, because a causal connection could be found between the original quarrel, which occurred when Maguire was "actually engaged" in the affairs of his employer, and the attack subsequently made upon him, they were warranted in connecting the two as cne transaction; and thus they reached the conclusion that the death of plaintiff's husband was due to an injury by accident incurred during the course of his employment. The difficulty with the application of this line of reasoning to the present case arises because of the words of the act. They require the injuries for which compensation is claimed to be "sustained" while the employee is "actually" engaged in his employer's affairs. The act does not give a right to compensation for all injuries arising out of the employment, as do the laws of some other states, nor does it allow compensation for injuries the proximate cause of which may be traced to the employment. On the contrary, it requires in express words, the injuries not occurring on the premises of the employer to be sustained while the employee is "actually" engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of his employer; and by no line of justifiable reasoning can it be held that the injuries in this case were sustained by plaintiff's husband when he was so actually engaged. [1] Language is a medium for conveying ideas. Courts can give words a liberal interpretation, when construing an act such as the one now before us, in order to carry out its advanced humane intentions, as we have repeatedly done, and shall continue to do, in the administration of this law; but we have no power to depart from the clear meaning of a plainly expressed phrase. "Actually" means "As an actual or existing fact'; and the word "actual" is used as "opposed to constructive." Century Dictionary. The phrase employed in the present statute "actually engaged in the business or affairs of his employer's cannot be interpreted to mean "constructively" engaged, but must be read as it is written "actually" engaged. The law was expressed as it is by those having the sole power to write it, and thus the courts must read and administer it. * * * A glance at our prior decisions will show that, in every instance where compensation was allowed for accidental injuries occurring off the premises of the employer, the facts warranted the conclusion that the employee sustained his injuries while actually on the errand of, or during a time set apart for the performance of, some as yet uncompleted business of his employer; in other words, while actually engaged in the transaction of the latter's business. In Lupfer v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 Atl. 458, relied on by appellee, the claimant received injuries on the premises of his employer. As a result of these injuries, be became insane and subsequently committed suicide at his home. That case fairly fell within the provisions of the statute, because the accident which caused the injuries took place while the deceased was, as a matter of fact, engaged in the affairs of his employment, and the insane act of suicide followed as a consequence of the injuries thus incurred; whereas in the present case the accident happened after working hours, off the premises of the employer, and at a time when the employee was not engaged in the former's affairs. In Callihan v. Montgomery, 272 Pa. 56, 115 Atl. 889, we recently held that, whether one was killed in the "course of his employment," within the meaning of that term as used in the act, is a question of law, and as such open to review. The opinion there filed contains a full discussion of our prior rulings on this point. [2] For the reasons already stated, we cannot agree with the view of the court below and the Compensation Board that Maguire's death was due to an accidental injury incurred during the "course of his employment," as that term is defined in the act. It may be, were we constructing the statute, instead of construing it, we would write the law so that plaintiff, under the circumstances of this case, could be allowed compensation; but, unfortunately for her, the courts are confined to the words of the law as enacted by the Legislature, and here these are too explicit to permit of the interpretation given by the court below in adopting the view of the Compensation Board. The judgment of the court below and the award of the Compensation Board are reversed. Judgment is here entered for defendant. MORGAN v. PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. March 6, 1922.) 116 Atlantic Reporter, 891. MASTER AND SERVANT EVIDENCE IN COMPENSATION CASE HELD INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW INJURY CAUSED FATAL DISEASE. In a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, evidence held insufficient to show that death from bronchial pneumonia was traceable to a slight injury received nearly four weeks before the beginning of his illness. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 405[4].) Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County; Henry O. Bechtel, Judge. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pa. St. 1920, § 21916 et seq.), by Hannah M. Morgan, for compensation for the death of her husband, opposed by the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, employer. An award of compensation was affirmed by the court of common pleas, and the employer appeals. Reversed, and judgment entered for the employer. Argued before Moschzisker, C. J., and Walling, Simpson, Kephart, Sadler, and Schaffer, JJ. John F. Whalen and George Ellis, both of Pottsville, for appellant. SCHAFFER, J. On October 1, 1920, the husband of plaintiff, for whose death she claims compensation, sustained some slight injuries, consisting of bruises to his chest, when the team he was driving fell over the edge of a bridge, precipitating him into the water and wetting him. He worked the remainder of the day and until about ten o'clock at night. The following day he remained at home and called in a doctor who treated him for a cold. On October 6th, acting on his own judgment and the physician's advice, he resumed work; the testimony of the physician was that he had returned to his normal condition. Deceased continued at his employment until and including October 27th, a period of 22 days, when he again called in the doctor, who found pain in his chest, a cough with bronchitis, and perhaps a slight pleurisy. The illness grew increasingly worse, and death resulted on November 11th, from bronchial pneumonia. The claim for compensation was filed on the ground that death by pneumonia was attributable to the accident on October 1st. The referee allowed the claim, his award was confirmed by the Compensation Board and by the common pleas on appeal, one of its judges dissenting; from the judgment there entered we have this appeal by defendant. If the claim is to be upheld, warrant for so doing must be found in the testimony of deceased's physician, Dr. Quinn; there is nothing else in the record to rest it on. When asked whether, in his opinion, the accident on October 1st caused the bronchial pneumonia, of which deceased died November 11th, six weeks later, he answered that the injuries then received were "indirectly responsible" for the pneumonia. This could be said of any injury, however slight, which was coincident with certain illnesses or with conditions leading up to them, in the sense that vitality would be lowered, although the injury might have no direct relation to the illness at all. The doctor further testified, the development of pneumonia is of short duration; that the form of the disease his patient had was bronchial pneumonia, which is not due to traumatism; that traumatic pneumonia would develop within a very short time after any injury which caused it; that the pneumonia was not caused by the bruise to the chest but "was secondary to his bronchitis and pleurisy"; and that he thought "the pleurisy was brought on indirectly from the blow in his chest." The doctor had not seen the deceased for three weeks after he had gone back to work, and admitteed the pneumonia might possibly have resulted from some cause other than the injuries; that he could not say it had not, but expressed the opinion: "I think it was indirectly due to his bruise of the chest, considering the condition of the man previous to his injury." As was pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Judge Koch in the court below: "The doctor is by no means positive of any opinion connecting the accident with the man's death. He does not say it is a case of traumatic pneumonia or traumatic pleurisy from which the pneumonia resulted. He only thinks that 'indirectly' the accident had something to do with the man's final taking-off." The testimony did not support the conclusion that the pneumonia was traceable back to the accident as a natural result therefrom. Dumbluskey v. P. & R. C. & I. Co., 270 Pa. 22, 112 Atl. 745, is a case where death was due to pneumonia, and in which compensation was awarded, but there the family doctor testified the injury received by the deceased caused traumatic pleurisy, which latter developed into pneumonia, and thus the direct relation between the compensable cause and death was established; in the instant case no direct relation whatever was shown. In Fink v. Sheldon Axle & Spring Co., 270 Pa. 476, 113 Atl. 666. we said, speaking through the present Chief Justice: "It is not enough for the doctors to say simply that the ailment in question might have resulted from the assigned cause, or that the one could have brought about the other; they must go further and testify at least that, taking into consideration all the attending data, it is their pro fessional opinion the result in question most probably came from the cause alleged." The testimony in that case was that paralysis "could be due to a blow on the head," and we determined this was not enough to justify or support a finding, that the blow or jar testified to caused the paralysis. In the instant case, the testimony relied on to establish a relation between the injury and death is not even as strong as it was in the case just cited. Here all that appears is that the injuries were "indirectly responsible for the pneumonia. This amounts to no more than saying it "might have resulted," which we held in the Fink Case is not sufficient. In cases such as this, there must be a probable, direct relation shown between the injury and the disease resulting in death, otherwise liability would be fixed by surmise. No such direct relation appears by the record before us. The judgment of the court below is reversed and is here entered for defendant. |