LIST OF LEADING ARTICLES IN VOLUME 73 No. 1. The Liability of the Initial Carrier Un- der the Interstate Commerce Act. By No. 2. Review of the Opinions of the Su- preme Court of the United States in the Property Rights in Human Bodies. By No. 4. The Trust Decisions. By William L. No. 5. The Reform of the Law and of the Lawyer. By Andrew A. Bruce, 76. No. 6. Tariff Laws from the Constitutional No. 7. The Supreme Court and the Standard Oil Case. By Andrew A. Bruce, 111. No. 8. The Illinois Plan for the Prevention and Suppression of Monopolies. By R. M. No. 9. Is a "Wireless Message" within the Provisions of the Criminal Statutes Relat- ing to Telegraphs and Telephones? By No. 15. Equitable Jurisdiction of Commerce Court over Dismissal Orders of Interstate Commerce Commission. By Paca Oberlin, No. 16. The New Federal Judicial Code. By No. 17. The Value of a Study of Comparative Is the United States Judiciary Power- No. 18. Uniform Judicial Procedure - Let No. 19. Humanity of the Law. By Andrew No. 20. The Revision of the Federal Equity Rules--Report of Committee Appointed for Commission on Uniform State Laws- TABLE OF CASES This list includes only those cases commented upon editorially or in our Notes of Important Decisions, or in full annotated. The abbreviation Ed., indicates editorially-R. D., cases commented upon in our Notes of Important Decisions, and ann, case., annotated case. Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 7, 1911. HAS THE RULE OF REASON DOCTRINE TAKEN THE LOCK-STEP OUT OF THE SHERMAN ACT? In 71 Cent. L. J. 376, we expressed the view that the late construction, or, as we might say, the belated construction, of the anti-trust act has created brand new prob lems as to its enforcement on the criminal side of the court. We have observed that the attorneys for the defendant in the meat trust, pending in Chicago, were quick to seize upon the new idea, and that the federal judge in whose court they have been ruled to trial, contented himself with a formal overruling of their contention. What significance this bears we do not undertake to say. The contention may have been regarded by the judge as frivolous, or he may have considered it his duty to refer such a deadly assault upon the anti-trust act to the tribunal, that has enunciated the new rulelet the principle proclaimed be regarded as obiter or a necessary part of the Standard Oil decision. That the point is not to be considered frivolous, the dissenting opinion of Justice. Harlan and what he instances for support on this subject would seem to bear witness, as the distinguished jurist quotes with approval from Senator Nelson, a very distinguished lawyer, in an adverse report to the Senate as to the amending of the antitrust act. Senator Nelson said: "The anti-trust act makes it a criminal offense to violate the law, and provides a punishment both by fine and imprisonment. To inject into the act the question of whether an agreement or combination is reasonable or unreasonable would render the act as a criminal or penal statute indefinite and uncertain, and, hence, to that extent utterly nugatory and void, and would practically amount to a repeal of that part of the act. *** And while the same technical objection does not apply to civil prosecutions, the injection of the rule of reasonableness or unreasonableness would lead to the greatest variableness and uncertainty in the enforcement of the law. The defense of reasonable restraint would be made in every case, and there would be as many different rules of reasonableness as cases, courts and juries. What one court or jury might deem unreasonable another court or jury might deem reasonable. A court or jury in Ohio. might find a given agreement or combination reasonable, while a court and jury in Wisconsin might find the same agreement and combination unreasonable." Senator Nelson further said, in quotation made by Justice Harlan, of such a change, that "to destroy or undermine it (the anti-trust act) at the present juncture, when combinations are on the increase, and appear to be as oblivious as ever of the rights of the public, would be a calamity.” It is further to be noted that the chief justice alluded in no way whatever to the operation of the new principle in criminal prosecutions, and, probably, it is clear he should not have done so. It is easy, however, to see, that if the eight justices, with whom Justice Harlan differed, thought that the rule-of-reason doctrine would have the effect of disemboweling the act as a penal statute, this would have been a very potent argument against their holding as they did. Therefore, it is to be presumed, that they believe that the Sherman law contains all of the elements of certainty required in a criminal statute. It cannot be supposed, that they overlooked the view expressed by Senator Nelson and approved by Justice Harlan, as the latter must have urged it in the conference room of the justices. Assuming, then, that indictments may be framed and prosecutions get to juries for alleged violations of the Sherman Act, the inquiry remains whether it is capable of practical enforcement. Certainly it seems incapable of anything like uniformity in enforcement—at least |