Constitutionalism: Philosophical FoundationsA distinguished international team of legal theorists examine the issue of constitutionalism and pose such foundational questions as Why have a constitution? How do we know what the constitution of a country really is? How should a constitution be interpreted? Why should one generation feel bound by the constitution of an earlier one?The volume will be of particular importance to those in philosophy, law, political science and international relations interested in whether and what kinds of constitutions should be adopted in countries without them, and involved in debates about constitutional interpretation. |
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do accept and what we ( who ? ) should accept as supremely authoritative . On
the other hand , if authority stems not from acceptance but from content , how
does that change the answers to questions of constitutional identity and
interpretation ...
In the case of the United States Constitution , Kay argues that we now accept the
lawmaking authority of the framers then ( in 1789 ) . That is , we now accept a
meta- or preconstitutional norm that locates authority in the framers , which in turn
...
Moreover , the fact that we accept the legitimacy of these systems , even when
they thwart our democratic judgments , does not make such systems democratic
in Waldron's eyes . Now I do not read Waldron as arguing that democratic
decision ...
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In short, Kay argues in favor of the interpretive contraint provided by the "original intent" of the people's representatives and writers of the rules of the Constitution of "these United States," in this manner:
It must be held true that the original intent of the framing and wording of the rules of government, in the Constitution of 1788-9, is Necessary, but Insufficient, to the interpretation of those rules;
yet it must be held true too that the content of current judicial cases, with reference to the on-going authority of received beliefs and practices, is also Necessary, but Insufficient, to the Application of those same rules;
so that it must be held true finally that the proper business of a judge, operating under and with the authority of the Constitution, is to adjudicate the relevance of said constitutional rules to those current judicial cases.
Contenido
American Constitutionalism | 16 |
Constitutional Authorship | 64 |
What Is the Constitution? and Other Fundamental Questions | 99 |
On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions Some Preliminaries | 152 |
Legitimacy and Interpretation | 194 |
The Domain of Constitutional Justice | 235 |
Precommitment and Disagreement | 271 |
| 301 | |
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| Título | Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law |
| Autor | Lawrence A. Alexander |
| Editores | Larry Alexander, Lawrence A. Alexander |
| Edición | reimpresa |
| Editor | Cambridge University Press, 2001 |
| ISBN | 0521799996, 9780521799997 |
| Largo | 319 páginas |
| Exportar cita | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |