the plaintiffs as follows, "The hops which I bought on the 25th of last month are not yet arrived, nor have I ever heard of them. I received the invoice: the last were much longer on the road than they ought to have been; however, if they do not arrive in a few days, I must get some elsewhere, and consequently cannot accept them." It was holden, that this was not a sufficient note in writing.

Signed by the Parties.] The place of the signature is immaterial. If a person draw up an agreement in his own handwriting, beginning, I, A. B., agree, &c." and leave a place for a signature at the bottom, but does not sign it, the agreement will be considered as sufficiently signed". So it seems, if a person be in the habit of printing instead of writing his name he may be said to sign by his printed name, as well as his written name. In an action on the case for the non-delivery of a quantity of gin, bought of the defendants, it appeared, that at the time the order of the gin was given by the plaintiff to the defendants, a bill of parcels was delivered to the former, the printed part of which was, "London. Bought of Jackson and Hankin, distillers;" and then followed in writing "1000 gallons of gin, 1 in 5. gin 7s. 3501." The name of the purchaser was inserted in the bill of parcels. About a month after, the defendants also wrote the following letter to the plaintiff; "Sir, we wish to know what time we shall send you part of your order, and shall be obliged for a little time in delivery of the remainder; must request you to return our pipes. Your's &c. Jackson and Hankin." It was holden, that by connecting the bill of parcels with the subsequent letter of the defendants, the requisites of the statute were sufficiently complied with. So where the name of the seller was printed on the bill of parcels, but he had written thereon the name of the purchaser, that was holden to be a recognition of the contract and adoption of the printed name, so as to satisfy the words of the statute".

Or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.] The question, whether this (17th) section of the statute, comprehends contracts for the sale of goods by auction, as well as other sales, has not as yet been solemnly determined. Assuming, however, that sales by auctioneers or brokers are within the 17th section, it has been uniformly holden, ever since the

n Knight v. Crockford, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 190. per Eyre, C. J.

o Per Eldon, C. J. in 2 Bos. and Pul. 239.

p Saunderson v. Jackson and another, 2 Bos. and Pul. 238.

q See Champion v. Plummer, 1 Bos. and Pul. N. R. 254.

r Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. and S. 286.

case of Simon v. Metiviers, that the auctioneer or broker is the agent of both parties, and a memorandum, made by him of the bargain, is a sufficient compliance with the terms of the statute, to make the contract of sale binding on each (14). But the memorandum by the auctioneer must be a sufficient memorandum; for where at a sale by auction of sugars, the

s Per Ellenborough, C. J. delivering the opinion of the court in Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East. 569.

(14) In like manner, the memorandum in a broker's book, and the bought and sold notes transcribed therefrom, and delivered to the buyers and sellers respectively, are sufficient to bind the bargain, the broker being considered as the agent of both parties. Rucker v. Cammeyer, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 105, ruled by Kenyon, C. J. on the authority of Simon v. Metivier; and per Ellenborough, C. J. in Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 569. S. P. A material alteration in a salenote by the broker, after the bargain made, at the instance of the seller without the consent of the purchaser, annuls the instrument, so as to preclude the seller from recovering upon the contract, evidenced by the instrument so altered by him. Powell v. Divett, 15 East, 29. "If the broker deliver a different note of the contract to each party contracting, there is no valid contract. There is, I believe, a case which states the entry in the broker's book to be the original contract, but it has been since contradicted. Each is bound by the note which the broker delivers, and if different notes are given to the parties, neither can understand the other." Per Gibbs, C. J. Cumming v. Roebuck, Holt's N. P. C. 172. recognized by Taunton, J. Smith v. Reynolds, Somerset Lent Ass. 1831. MS. The traveller of the defendant had sold a quantity of tallow to the plaintiff, to be delivered at a certain time. The plaintiff had signed the bought note, and the traveller had signed the sold note for the defendant and left it with the plaintiff. The tallow not having been delivered at the time specified, plaintiff brought an action and produced in evidence the sold note. The defendant produced in evidence the bought note; between which and the sold note there was a material variance. The plaintiff was nonsuited. This doctrine renders it essentially necessary that a plaintiff should procure an inspection of the other note, before he can commence his action with safety, unless he has retained a copy. Where a broker made an entry of a contract in his book, which he did not sign, but sent to the vendor and purchaser bought and sold notes copied from the book, and signed by him; it was holden, that these were a sufficient memorandum of the bargain, and that the parties were bound by the contract so made. Goom v. Aflalo, 6 B. and C. 117. The bought and sold notes delivered to the parties, and not the entry in the broker's book, are the proper evidence of the contract. Abbott, C. J. Thornton v. Meux, M. and Malk. 43.

auctioneer (having before him the printed catalogue of sale, containing the lots, marks, and number of hogsheads, and the gross weights of the sugars; and also another written paper, containing the conditions of sale, which latter he read to the bidders, as the conditions on which the sugars were to be sold; but the two papers were neither externally annexed nor contained any internal reference to each other,) wrote down on the catalogue the name of the highest bidder, and the sum bid for the particular lots; it was holdent, that the minute made on the catalogue of sale (which catalogue was not by any reference incorporated with the conditions of sale,) was not a sufficient memorandum of a bargain under those conditions of sale. Where, however, goods were sold by auction to an agent", and the auctioneer wrote the initials of the agent's name, together with the prices opposite the lots purchased by him, in the printed catalogue, and the principal afterwards, in a letter to the agent, recognised the purchase, it was holden, that the entry in the catalogue, and the letter, coupled together, were a sufficient memorandum of the contract. But the agent contemplated, by the 17th sect., who is to bind a defendant by his signature, must be a third person, and not the other contracting party; and therefore, where an auctioneer wrote down the defendant's name by his authority opposite to the lot purchased: it was holden, that in an action brought in the name of the auctioneer, the entry in such book by the plaintiff, the auctioneer, was not sufficient to take the case out of the statute. But if the entry be made by the auctioneer's clerk, it will suffice; for the clerk is not identified with the plaintiff who sues; and in the business which he performs, of entering the name, he is impliedly authorized by the purchaser. The defendant purchased leasehold premises at an auction, and signed a memorandum of the purchase on the back of the particular of sale, containing the name of the owner and the conditions; it was holden2, that the defendant was bound, although there was not any signature by the vendor. In Boydell v. Drummond, 11 East, 142, it was holden, that the signature of the defendant, in a book intituled "Shakspeare Subscribers, their signatures," not referring to a printed prospectus which contained the terms of the contract, and which was delivered at the time to the sub

t Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East, 558. Kenworthy v. Schofield, 2 B. and C. 945. S. P.

u Phillimore v. Barry, 1 Campb. 513. x Farebrother v. Simmons, 5 B. & A.

y Bird v. Boulter, 4 B. and Ad. 443. 1 Nev. and M. 313.

z Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 Bingh. N. C. 735.

scribers to the Boydell Shakspeare, could not be connected with the prospectus, so as to take the case out of the statute, inasmuch as such connection could not be established without the intervention of parol evidence, and that would open a door for perjury, which it was the object of the statute to prevent. But where the purchaser of lands by auction, signed a memorandum of the contract indorsed on the particulars and conditions of sale, and referring to them, and afterwards he wrote to the vendor, complaining of defect in the title, referring to the contract expressly, and renouncing it; the vendor wrote and signed several letters, mentioning the property sold, the names of the parties, and some of the conditions of sale, insisting on one of them as curing the defect, and demanding the execution of the contract; it was holdena, that these letters might be connected with the particulars and conditions of sale, so as to constitute a memorandum in writing, binding the vendor, although neither the original conditions and particulars, nor the memorandum signed by the purchaser mentioned, or were signed by, the vendor. If, on the sale by auction of goods, the same person is declared the highest bidder for several lots, a distinct contract arises for each lot; and although all the lots together purchased by the same person exceed 10%. in value, yet if the lots are separately of less value than 10%. a memorandum in writing is not necessary b. It is to be observed, that neither the 4th nor 17th sections of this statute require, that the agent should be authorized by writing. A parol authority, therefore, is sufficiente (15). But the character of agent, cannot be supported by one of the contracting parties. Where A. and B. being jointly interested in a quantity of oil, A. entered into a contract for the sale of it without the authority or knowledge of B., who, upon receiving information of the circumstance refused to be bound, but afterwards assented by parol, and samples were delivered to the vendees, it was holdene, in an action against the vendees, that B.'s subsequent ratification of the contract rendered it binding. So in Kinnitz v. Surry, Paley, Pr. and Ag. 143. n. 2nd ed. where the broker, who signed the broker's note upon a sale of corn was

a Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 Ad. and Ell.
355.

b Emmerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunt. 38.
c Per Kenyon, C. J. in Rucker v. Cam-

meyer, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 106. See also
Emmerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunt. 46.

d Wright v. Dannah, 2 Campb. 203.
e Soames v. Spencer, 1 Dow. and Ry.

32.

(15) The third section, relating to assignments and surrenders of leases, &c. requires that the agent should be authorized in writing.

the seller's agent, Lord Ellenborough held, that if the buyer acted upon the note, that was such an adoption of his agency, as made the note sufficient within the statute. So where A. without authority, made a contract in writing for the purchase of goods by B., and B. subsequently ratified the contract, it was holdenf, that such ratification rendered A. an agent lawfully authorized within the statute.

III. The Fifth and Sixth Sections, relating to the Execution and Revocation of Wills. Repealed 1 Vict. c. 26. s. 2. but see s. 34.

5th Section." All devises and bequests of any lands or tenements, devisable either by force of the statute of wills, or by this statute, or by the custom of Kent, or of any borough, or any other particular custom, shall be in writing, and signed by the party so devising the same, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express directions, and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the devisor, by three or four credible witnesses, or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect."

"All facts relating to the subject matter and object of the devise, such as that it was or was not in the possession of the testator, the mode of acquiring it, the local situation, and the distribution of the property, are admissible to aid in ascertaining what is meant by the words used in the will." Parke, J. Doe d. Templeman v. Martin, 4 B. & Ad. 785.

Per

All devises of any lands or tenements.] Although these words are very general, and extend to customary freeholds, not passing by surrender, yet it has been holden, that copyhold landh and customary1 estates, passing by surrender, are not comprehended within them. In these cases, the estate is considered as passing by the surrender of which the will

f Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bingh. 722. See
Gosbell v. Archer, 2 Ad. & Ell. 500.
4 Nev. and Mann. 485.

g Hussey v. Grills, Ambl. 299.
h Roe d. Gilman v. Heyhoe, 2 Bl. R.
1114. See also the Atty.-gen. v.
Barnes, 2 Vern. 598. Atty.-gen. v.
Andrews, 1 Ves. 225. Tuffnell v.
Page, 2 Atk. 37.

i Doe d. Cook v. Danvers, 7 East, 299. Carey v. Askew, coram Sir L. Kenyon, M. R. May 9, 1786. 2 Bro. C. C. 58. and in a note to Wagstaff v. Wagstaff, 2 P. Wms. 259. Cox's ed. recognized by Ellenborough, C. J. in 7 East, 324.