gality of the voyage or trade is wholly immaterial, but, in order to render the insurance illegal, it is necessary that the illegality should exist during the course of the voyage insured. Hence a policy on goods purchased with the proceeds of an illegal cargo is bindings; and, in like manner, the assured may recover on a policy, although the ship, in a prior voyage, had been guilty of some transgression for which she was liable to be seizedt. Trading with an enemy", without the king's license, being illegal, the law will not enforce. a contract of insurance made for the protection of such trade. But it is legal to trade with the subjects of an enemy's country by the king's license. If it be provided in such license, that the party acting under it shall give bond for the due exportation to the places proposed of the goods intended to be exported to such country, and they are exported without such bond having been given, such exportation is illegal, and the owners cannot recover on a policy to protect the goods. If a license to export and deliver goods to an enemy's country be granted for a limited time, it is not sufficient, that the goods were shipped before the expiration of the time, the ship not sailing until after that time. But if the adventure licensed be bonâ fide prosecuted within a part of the time limited, it will not become illegal, because, by some accident, the voyage was protracted beyond that periody. Whenever the crown, for purposes of state policy and public advantage, licenses a description of trading with an enemy's country, which would otherwise be unquestionably illegal, such commerce must be regarded by all the subjects of the realm, and by the courts of law, as legal, with all the consequences of its being legal; one of which consequences is a right to contract with other subjects of the country for the protection of such property in the course of its conveyance to its licensed place of destination, through an enemy's country, and for the purpose of being there delivered to an alien enemy as consignee or purchaserz. A., a Spaniard by birth, who had been domiciled as a merchant in England for several years, having purchased and shipped goods in a neutral vessel, on account of a correspondent, a native of, and resident in Spain, obtained a license from the British government for the vessel to proceed with her cargo on a voyage from an English port to a port in s Bird v. Appleton, 8 T. R. 562. t S. C. u Potts v. Bell, 8 T. R. 548. x Vandyck v. Whitmore, 1 East, 475. y Schroeder v. Vaux, 15 East, 52. Spain. A. effected a policy on the goods, which was in the usual form, and stated to be made by A. "as well in his own name as in the name of any person to whom the same might appertain." The vessel, in the prosecution of the voyage, was captured by a French privateer, and carried into a port in Spain, where the vessel and cargo were condemned. At the time of the capture and condemnation, France and Spain were co-belligerent allies at war with England. A. having brought an action on the policy, averring interest in the purchaser, it was holden, that A. was entitled to recover, and that the action was well brought in his name for the benefit of the purchaser; that the legal result of the license was, that not only the plaintiff, the person licensed, might sue in respect of such licensed commerce in an English court of law, but that the commerce itself was to be regarded as legalized for all purposes of its due and effectual prosecution. That for the purpose of the licensed act of trading (but to that extent only,) the person licensed was to be considered as virtually an adopted subject of this country, and his trading, as far as the disabilities arising out of a state of war were concerned, was British trading; that the plaintiff and the Spanish purchaser of the cargo were actually privy to the objects of the British government, and acting in furtherance thereof, and in direct opposition to the laws and policy of their own country, and that it could not be contended to be illegal to insure a trade carried on in contravention of the laws of a state at war with us, and in furtherance of the policy of our country and its trade, and which this trade in question, sanctioned as it was by his majesty's license, must be deemed to have been. Although the authority of the preceding decision appears to have been doubted in Mennett v. Bonham, 15 East, 495, and Flindt v. Crokatt, 15 East, 522; yet on a review of these two cases in a court of error, the judgment of B. R. has been reversed. See 5 Taunt. 674. Anthony v. Moline, 5 Taunt. 711; and Bazett v. Meyer, 5 Taunt. 824. A license granted under an order in council to H. S. (a British resident merchant), permitting a vessel bearing any flag, except the French, to proceed in ballast from any port north of the Scheldt to Archangel, there to load a cargo of such goods as are permitted by law to be imported, and proceed with the same to a port in the united kingdom, was considered as not confined personally to H. S., or any particular class of persons: and, therefore, where Russian subjects at Archangel, b Robinson v. Touray, 1 M. & S. 217. S. P. Same v. Cheesewright, ib. 220. recognized in Hullman v. Whitmore, 3 M. and S. 340. The same subject was discussed again in Rucker v. who were alien enemies, had shipped goods under such license for the purpose of being brought into this country: it was held, that they were protected by it; and an insurance made for their benefit was legal. A license to I. H., of London, merchant, on behalf of himself and other British or neutral merchants, to import a cargo from certain limits, within which an enemy's port is situate, in any vessel, bearing any flag except the French, will protect a ship trading from that port, in which ship I. H. and an alien enemy are jointly interested; and therefore such interest was held insurable. By virtue of a treaty of commerce entered into between Great Britain and the United States of America (38), the citizens of the United States may carry on trade between the British territories in the East Indies and the United States, in articles not entirely prohibited. It is not necessary that this trade should be a direct and immediate trade from the United States to the British territories; it may be carried on circuitously through any country in Europe, including Great Britain. A natural-born subject of Great Britain, admitted a citizen of the United States of America, either before or after the declaration of American independence, has been considered as a citizen of the United States, within the meaning of the above-mentioned treaty, and as such entitled to the commercial privileges thereby granted. Hence a policy of insurance, effected by or in favour of such adopted citizen of the United States, for the protection of such circuitous trade, is valid. A natural-born subject of this country, domiciled in a foreign country, in amity with this, may lawfully exercise the privileges of a subject of the country where he is domiciled, to trade with another country in hostility with this; therefore where plaintiff, a British-born subject domiciled in America, effected a policy of assurance on ship, freight, and goods, at and from Virginia to any ports in the Baltic, and the ship was captured in her way to Elsineur, in c Hagedorn v. Reid, 1 M. and S. 567. d Wilson v. Marryat, 8 T. R. 31. Af firmed on error in the Excheq. Ch. 1 Bos. and Pul. 430. e Bell v. Reid, 1 M. and S. 726. (38) This treaty was entered into on the 19th of November, 1794, ratified by the United States on the 14th of August, 1795, and by his majesty on the 28th of October in that year, and retrospectively confirmed by parliament. See stat. 37 Geo. 3. c. 97. The articles of this treaty, relating to the subject now under consideration, will be found in a note to the report of Wilson v. Marryat, 8 T. R. 35. Denmark; Denmark being in amity with America, but at war with this country: it was holden, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Although insurances upon goods, the exportation or importation of which is prohibited by the law of England, or by the law of nations, be illegal, yet where the prohibition is founded merely on the law of a foreign state, the insurance will be valid; because one nation never takes notice of the revenue laws of anotherf. The mere circumstance of an alien residing in an enemy's country will not invalidate an insurance effected by him on goods to be delivered at a neutral or friendly port. Though a state may be in the military possession of one of two belligerents, that will not constitute her subjects enemies to the other belligerent, if the sovereign power of the latter chooses to permit a continuance of commerce with themh: therefore, where an insurance was effected on property, shipped in this country, on account of persons who were domiciled at Hamburgh, at a time when that country was in the possession of French troops, the senate continuing to exercise the powers of civil government in the same manner as before; it was holden, that the assured were entitled to recover for a loss which happened in the course of a voyage permitted by his majesty's orders in council. Where a particular trade is prohibited by express statute, insurances made for the protection of such trade are illegali. The owners of a vessel, who by performing the legal stipulations of a charterparty, provoke confiscation by the illegal and piratical act of a foreign state, do not thereby avoid their assurancek. Trading in contravention of a proclamation, whereby an embargo is laid on, in time of war, is illegal: and consequently an insurance upon such trade, even when carried on by a neutral', is void. If a vessel brings hither from an hostile country, under a license, a cargo of enumerated goods, and also certain other goods not licensed, the insurance on the licensed goods is not thereby vitiated. If there be an infirmity in any part of an integral voyage, it will make the whole illegal, so that the insured cannot recover upon a policy on any part of it". So if a party insure goods altogether in one policy, and some of them are of a nature to make the voyage illegal, the whole contract is illegal and void. A policy was f Planche v. Fletcher, Doug. 250. g Bromley v. Heseltine, 1 Campb. 75. 4 Taunt. 856. 1 Delmada v. Motteux, Park. 234. m Pieschell v. Allnutt, 4 Taunt. 792. See 1 M. and S. 450. n Admitted by Lord Kenyon, C. J. in Wilson v. Marryat, 8 T. R. 46. and expressly laid down by the same learned judge in his charge to the jury, in Bird v. Pigou, London Sittings after H. T. 40. G. 3. B. R. MSS. effected on goods to be thereafter specified to a certain amount; by the specification it appeared that the goods consisted principally of hardware, but partly of naval stores, the exportation of which was prohibited, under pain of forfeiting the stores, treble their value, and the ship. It was holden, that the exportation of the stores being illegal, all contracts for protecting the stores so exported were impliedly avoided; that the policy was one entire contract on goods to be thereafter specified, to which the underwriters subscribed; and the subsequent specification by the assured could not alter the nature of the contract with respect to the underwriters, so as to sever that which was originally one entire contract. 3. Misrepresentation, Concealment, and Suppression. The allegation of a falsehoodp or misrepresentation, (though by mistake) or the concealment and suppression of the truth, as to a fact or circumstance material to the risk, either by the assured or his agents, is considered as a fraud on the underwriter, and consequently will vacate the policy or annul the contract from the beginning. Hence, the underwriter may avail himself of this ground of defence, even where the loss arises from a cause wholly unconnected with the fact or circumstance misrepresentedt. The question of materiality is not a matter of law, but a question of fact" to be decided by a jury, and the proper evidence to guide their judgment is the evidence of persons conversant with the subject matter of the inquiry. But a misrepresentation as to the cargo with which a ship is to sail on a future day will not suffice as a defence, unless the misrepresentation be fraudulently made. Goods were insured as the goods of a Hamburgher, who was an ally, and the goods were, in fact, the goods of a Frenchman, who was an enemy; this was holden, by Holt, C. J. to be a fraud. So where a letter had been receiveda, stating |